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FOREWORD 
From its inception, social anthropology has struggled theoretically and politically 
with questions concerning the encounter between contrasting and often opposing life-
worlds. This concern arose in part from the fact that anthropology was born out of 
the moral dilemmas and inherent social contradictions of colonial expansion and the 
westernization of non-European societies. It also reflected the tension between the 
idea of 'science' as an organised system of thought in search of universal laws or 
principles of organisation, and the equally meaningful 'practical' ways in which 
people of diverse cultures gave meaning to their own life experiences. 
This fascination with cultural and social difference and how to deal with it 
analytically has remained a central theme in anthropological work. Yet only recently 
have anthropologists turned their ethnographic spotlight on the critical interfaces 
where life-worlds in fact intersect and accommodate to each other. The neglect of 
this obvious, though complex, issue is due, it seems, to two factors: the prevalence 
of structuralist and culturalist explanations of social phenomena which tend to 
underscore the separation and coherence, rather than the interpénétration and 
heterogeneity, of cultural and social worlds; and the methodological difficulties of 
studying such multiplex and dynamic situations. 
In the present book, Dr. Alberto Arce makes an audacious attempt to break 
through this theoretical and methodological impasse. He does so by turning away 
from the well-trod paths of anthropological enquiry - the peasant community, ethnic 
group and urban neighbourhood - by focusing upon an area of social life that has 
been the preoccupation of other social scientists such as political scientists, public 
administrators and rural development specialists. His focus of attention is state 
intervention in the peasant sector and what he calls 'the social life of development 
projects'. 
This enables him to explore the intricacies of the workings of the Mexican 
agricultural bureaucracy and the encounters of frontline government personnel with 
local peasant actors. But, unlike most studies of state-sponsored agricultural 
intervention, he avoids the rather crass judgements of 'who benefits' and whether 
the project has 'failed' or 'succeeded', and replaces them instead with an analysis 
of the ongoing socially-contested and socially-negotiated nature of the intervention 
process. This involves a detailed ethnographic account of the perceptions, 
expectations and strategies of the main participants in the drama and an actor-
oriented interpretation of the social construction of the project as it unfolds over 
time. 
This facilitates an empirically-based critique of existing models of planned 
intervention and theories of the state. It also places in centre stage the agency, 
discourses and social practices of the various participants, and documents how the 
institutional, personal and political life-experiences of the intervenors shape frontline 
strategies and outcomes. Throughout the account Dr. Arce takes great care to build 
his analysis on the everyday life conditions and subjectivities of the particular social 
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actors rather than on an aggregated picture of their assumed structural locations and 
dispositions. This enables him to demonstrate the diversity of social responses, 
manoeuvres and skills that exist among bureaucrats and peasants alike, and to reveal 
the ways in which they accommodate to, challenge, and subvert each others' 
interests and understandings. In this manner he constructs a picture of the struggles 
and interfaces embedded in and generated by the Mexican Food System (SAM) and 
the transformations it undergoes during its so-called policy formulation and 
implementation phases. 
The result is a rich and sensitive analysis of the encounter between different 
cultural traditions, both within the Ministry of Agriculture, where agronomic and 
technocratic schools of thought vied against each other, and within the local political 
and social arena. In examining these conflicts and alliances, Dr. Arce draws upon 
the testimonies and interpretations of key protagonists, and describes how he himself 
gains access to their representations, images and assessments. In this way, he carries 
the reader along with him so that he or she might also taste something of the 
excitement of this anthropological journey of discovery. 
Although essentially an ethnographic work, the construction of the text is bold 
and provocative in theoretical terms. In fact, even if Dr. Arce dislikes his brainchild 
being baptised as such, his study is undoubtedly a product of the postmodern era. 
It rejects totalising theory, builds its 'structures' and 'anti-structures' from below -
amidst the discordance and flux of 'contingencies' and 'multiple realities'- and 
strives to find a way out of the dichotomies of external/internal, actor/structure, and 
beliefs/actions. It also, fruitfully, hangs much of its theoretical argument on issues 
of knowledge, power and discretion. In short, it whets the appetite for a new 
anthropology of policy intervention founded upon the study of the everyday life of 
administrative practice and development projects, which accords serious attention to 
the analysis of political, institutional and cultural interfaces. Only in this direction 
can anthropology truly demonstrate its intellectual strengths and live up to its claim 
to cast important light on issues of cultural diversity and the interpénétration of 
people's life-worlds. 
It is a great pleasure for me to launch this book and to know that Dr. Arce's 
work is, in no small measure, a product of the Wageningen group of social scientists 
working on rural development. The book is especially rewarding since it does not 
distance itself from issues of development practice. Instead, the author jumps in 
where other anthropologists have feared to tread, while at the same time securing 
his safety belt to sound theoretical foundations. 
Norman Long, 
Wageningen, 8111 July 1993. 
x 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This book took a long time to materialise. While it is based on the findings of my 
doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Manchester (1986), in many ways it 
is a different intellectual venture. The fieldwork material of my first Mexican 
experience has been analyzed and worked over, in and out of my lectures, seminars 
and with my colleagues here at Wageningen University during this last year. The 
first touches of this book were laid down at the University of Hull, England, where 
a lively and provocative debate took place among my students about the relevance 
of the actor-oriented approach. I want to single out for special mention Andrew 
Hanson, who read and commented on earlier draft chapters of this book. 
Any progress I have made in integrating an anthropological perspective to 
relevant issues in rural sociology have been due to the patience of several friends 
and people who have listened to my ideas and made suggestions. Their criticisms 
and suggestions are a major intellectual contribution to this book. Among these are 
Professor Norman Long, whom I know and have had the privilege to work with for 
some years, and Professor Bryan Roberts who gave me the possibility of working 
on rural development and state intervention issues for my Ph.D at Manchester. I am 
particularly grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council of the United 
Kingdom that financed my fieldwork period in Mexico. 
In Mexico where I was fortunate to work, my style of doing research produced 
more than one ironic or highly charged political comment. I owe debts to the staff 
and tecnicos of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) and 
with the rural producers of Jalisco. Having lived among them, I remain surprised 
by the knowledge and kindness with which they received social anthropologists, such 
as myself, into their homes and everyday life. They shared with me their 
experiences and life-worlds. I hope I have protected myself enough against my 
admiration of Mexico and its people in the writing and interpretation of my data. My 
critical view at times during this book should not obscure my support for the staff 
and fieldworkers working in SARH. 
I am especially grateful for the close reading, criticisms, and assistance in the 
rewriting of the material by Thea Hilhorst. With her constant encouragement and 
enthusiasm for this material, she insisted that I should publish this book for my 
students. I hope that the time and energy she has given so generously to bring this 
book to finition has been worthwhile and that we will continue the collaborative, 
intellectually challenging experience. I extend my admiration to her for her tenacity 
and commitment in the production of this book and I thank her for her friendship. 
This book would have not been completed without the meticulous work of Ann 
Long. She deserves a very special mention for both her feeling for what constitutes 
'sound English' and for her critical perception of what should constitute an 
anthropological analysis. Ann's respect for authors' ideas, as well as her editorial 
revisions and suggestions, have made her an indispensable actor for the coherence 
of the arguments and case presentations in this book. 
Finally I want to express my gratitude to Jos Michel who processed the text and 
xi 
the camera ready-copy of the manuscript. She was always there to accept editorial 
and page changes even minutes before she was ready to leave for her holidays. I 
thank my colleague Berry Lekanne and the other members of the editorial committee 
of the Wageningen Studies in Sociology. They made it possible that this book was 
published under pressure in record time. 
In short, the writing of this book has been a rewarding collective experience. 
The support from friends and colleagues have improved the presentation of my ideas 
and made the text more readable. The errors or questionable interpretations which 
still remain in the book are my responsibility. 
Last, but not least, I would also like to express my gratitude to my family for 
their support. Cecilia has provided in so many ways the stimulus, encouragement 
and environment to finish this book, to which I am more than grateful. 
Alberto Arce 
Wageningen, 8"1 July, 1993. 
xii 
xiii 
UNITS IN DISTRICT NO. 1 
ui 
o O 
Os 0 01 Q 
< _) 
< 
</>N O 
UJ 
l 3 ° < 2 o <  
s D < J fi < J • 
S cj m aj P N w t 
- B B Ï > > ? 3 Î < X  > > 
< 
§ 
-J O 
CD S 
Eo 
© • 4 
j < 
& 
G 
d 2 
a2 
< t/5 » £• 
ü 3 S ? 
g M g g S  
tü ^ S U b> vj U b 
< 
9 
H 
Z § 
f c :  
z  
_J 
< 
ce °  J  
9 < S -j 
UJ H Z < 
LU S 
O û. < 
M 
i/)\ 
M v^;. 
•N 
SA 
s 
e H 
x/v 
1. PROBLEMATIZING RURAL STATE INTERVENTION 
This book sets out to be an anthropology of rural state intervention. For the 
anthropologist, the process of rural development intervention provides an 
ethnographic field for study. It has its own discourse, symbolic marks, interfaces 
of systems of knowledge, and political choices among bureaucrats and rural 
producers. The anthropological focus of the study is mainly concerned with 
describing and examining the everyday practices and interactions of these actors. 
For development practitioners (project designers, managers, policy makers, 
technical experts) anthropology has recently assumed a 'new value' (Cemea, 
1991). It has begun to be recognised that knowledge emerging from social 
anthropological studies that analyze the cultural variables of policies and projects 
is important in rural development. The implication of this is that applied social 
anthropology is increasingly seen as a 'tool' to be used by practitioners in the 
implementation of projects and policies. 
The reasons for re-valuing social anthropological knowledge and the 
sociology of people's responses to planned rural development are not difficult to 
ascertain. Most rural practitioners now accept that 'putting people first' is an 
imperative to induce development and project effectiveness (Cernea, 1991: 7). 
We have finally realised that the rural development practitioner, often a technical 
or economic expert, encounters in 'real life' rural producers with perceptions of 
development, agricultural knowledge, state intervention and policy 
implementation that differ radically from his/her own. 
As contributions from anthropology began to identify these issues, it became 
clear that there was, as Long argues, "a need to develop a more adequate 
analytical approach to understanding the relationships between policy, 
implementation and outcomes. The tendency in much existing work [conventional 
approaches] is to conceptualize the relationship between policy objectives, the 
means of implementation and the outcomes as essentially linear in nature, 
implying a kind of step-by-step deterministic process whereby a policy is 
formulated, implemented and then certain results follow" (1989: 3). 
Indeed, by the 1980's and 1990's the re-valuation of the social knowledge 
that originated in the analysis of social processes in rural development was at the 
core of a challenge to the western scientific paradigm of progress and 
modernisation in contemporary society (e.g. Ortiz, 1973; Chambers, 1983; 
Richards, 1985; Box, 1987). 
Although this theoretical challenge has forced a rethinking of the whole 
process of intervention, we have to agree with Cernea (1991) that projects have 
remained the main instruments of development intervention. Despite the recurrent 
debates in rural development, project implementors are still the actors at the 
interface between western rural development values and the values of local rural 
producers. This book therefore primarily intends to focus on the social life of 
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project implementors, in order to contribute to a better understanding of their 
own institutional culture and interface with rural producers. 
This approach, however, is not without pitfalls. We have now a large trans-
cultural position in rural development that recognises the limitations of western 
expert knowledge and has re-valued local knowledge as containing important 
'indigenous skills'. Contributions from this position have added to knowledge 
about local rural producers among practitioners, and contributed to their 
understanding of rural social life. In doing so, what is now referred to as 
'interface' methodology has been developed. This approach has become the main 
body of research that focuses on the socio-cultural context and its implications for 
rural development. 
And here lies the problem. It is by now a truism that social anthropology 
must engage in the identification and articulation of different knowledge networks 
in rural development. According to Box (1989: 67), the science of agronomy 
needs to recognise the practical value of cultivators' knowledge and their 
innovations in order to produce effective solutions to problems. However, 
knowledge, as an expression of culture, appears from this position to be an 
infinitely manipulable concept. The question we need to address is whether such 
identification and articulation of knowledge networks helps the implementor to 
provide a better service, or whether it provides him/her with the power to label 
and socially control the rural producer. 
In order to address this question, we have to critically evaluate projects and 
policies according to the 'fate' of the rural producers rather than follow some 
abstract notion of development (Barnett, 1981). This book argues that it is also 
necessary to include rural field implementors in the ethnography, i.e. their 
discourses and practices as well as the language and responses of rural producers 
during the process of policy implementation. The end product is a social 
construction of the world views of actors in rural intervention based on the close 
observation of these actors. Rather than offering an anthropology as a tool for 
development practitioners, this study hopes to enlarge our understanding of 
people, including these practitioners, in processes of rural intervention. 
Two Realms: Science and Power 
It becomes more and more clear that rural policies have used two distinct realms 
to organise rural intervention. The first is the scientific and technocratic realm: a 
realm which is organised by experts constantly searching for 'truth' within the 
'objective reality' of rural development. Agents and agencies organise 
intervention as a process to change the 'natural' properties of rural 
underdevelopment. That is to say, they search for quantified indices of 
phenomena, rather than looking for the socio-cultural context and practices of the 
actors' actions that surround and shape underdevelopment. 
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However, social factors are not waiting 'out there' in 'objective reality' to be 
captured as natural objects. Human intentions cannot be reduced to natural 
properties of objects, but are a constitutive part of rural development. Therefore, 
we cannot but criticize this abstract view of intervention. This is especially 
important when we consider that scientific knowledge has been one of the most 
important factors in making projects respectable and legitimate in the eyes of the 
public at large. 
The second realm is power: We have to recognise that every rural 
development project always includes a political dimension. Hence, we have to 
look at political actions occurring around and within rural development projects. 
This means that we have to analyze the practices of rural policy implementation, 
since this allows us to understand how everyday institutional practices reorganise 
the presence of the state at local level. Furthermore, it can show how local actors 
are capable of operating within the grid of the institutional environment: 
resisting, manipulating and creating new social spaces for themselves. We need 
to see how, in the dynamics of everyday practices, actors re-organise the 
objectives of policy formulation and planning while at the same time re-creating 
culture. The active participation of actors in policy (redefinition challenges any 
ideology or definition of 'truth', 'rationality' and 'meaning' as used by experts. 
Everyday practices show us, on the one hand, the strength or weakness of 
experts' power in organising rural transformations, and on the other, how the so-
called project beneficiaries can exercise their capacity to pursue specific aims and 
interests within the framework of the institutional environment. 
If we want to approach rural development, then, the first step is to abandon 
the traditional dichotomy that maintains that the scientific approach is about 
'truth' and the political approach is about power (Callon, Law and Rip, 1986). In 
this context, a critical view of the science of agronomy and the importance of 
power in development would provide a more sophisticated connection between 
truth and power. This may eventually transform our entire perception of rural 
development. 
Social Science and Knowledge 
By focusing on actors' practices and interactions we can develop a social 
knowledge of rural development based on people's responses to institutional 
environments, their social construction of development alternatives and the 
meanings they attribute to their social struggles. 
In this sense, I believe with Cernea (1991) that rural sociology can contribute 
to the creation of an alternative and revelatory form of social information that 
could provide a different interpretation of the constitution of rural development 
projects and the value of local knowledges in practice. By connecting concepts 
such as 'truth' and 'power', we can reassess important theoretical issues on rural 
development practices. 
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By now, we recognize that people's mutual knowledge (Giddens, 1984) and 
everyday practices (de Certeau, 1988) should be analyzed in situations of policy 
implementation. Indeed, it is realized today that local knowledge constitutes 
'indigenous skills' that must be used in development action (see Chambers, 1983; 
Richards, 1985; Arce and Long, 1987; Chambers, 1989). Nevertheless, 
substantial differences still exist in how to conceptualise and analyze local 
knowledge in different agrarian cultural contexts. 
Chambers and Richards have provided the foundations for a 'rethinking' of 
rural development intervention. They have nurtured a movement which is known 
as Farmers First. This movement is dedicated to a twofold objective: firstly, to 
translate science for the people, and secondly, to increase peasant political 
participation. In their methodology, we can find a synthesis of the analytical 
methods of the influential phenomenological sociology of Berger (1977) and the 
empiricist epistemology of Lipton (1977) in development studies. Chambers' 
book, Rural Development: putting the last first (1983), is an expression of this 
synthesis. In this book Chambers first employs scientifically valid criteria (such 
as lack of access to education, health and technology) in order to show that 
poverty is an objective reality in the world. The solution he then proposes to 
alleviate such poverty is a radical transformation in the values of technocrats and 
other development practitioners. He provides a check-list for practitioners willing 
to understand the 'other half of reality'. For example, he argues they should not 
only visit communities in summer, but also in the rainy season, when roads are 
cut off and poverty-related problems, become truly manifest. 
Chambers' phenomenological position leads him to identify a change in 
experts' values as the basic requirement for rural development reconstruction. 
However, the question is how Chambers can induce rural experts and 
professionals to adopt his goodwill morality. Apparently, he believes that 
practitioners can change, if only they get access to better scientific insights. This 
means that in his view science is portrayed as somehow neutral and devoid of 
issues of power. In his perspective, the adoption of a new morality is left to the 
judgement of the scientific experts. Rural sociology is consigned to become the 
critical consciousness of the scientific community in a functional partnership with 
the technical sciences. 
This surrogate solution is derived from a pluralist framework of 
complementary knowledges where rural producers, social anthropologists, 
extensionists, administrators and technical experts all come together to make 
sense of rural development. Supposedly, they should be able to achieve this by 
combining their different individual experiences and specialisations, which 
suggests the feasibility of functional solutions. The solution proposed by 
Chambers is surrogate because it builds on a world constituted of goodwill and is 
totally devoid of concepts like truth and power. It overlooks the fact that not 
every problem can be solved by experts and that some of the experts' solutions, 
in spite of their good intentions, may be carriers of a negative morality brought 
about by the intended or unintended consequences of their interventions. 
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Paul Richards' study on Sierra Leone builds on the same approach (1985). It 
argues that by using the techniques of ecological particularism it is possible to 
reconstruct the relationship between science and development in situ. He leads us 
to distinguish sharply between scientific universal principles (that are true for all 
times and places) and the particularities of the ecological relationships at the level 
of the locality. According to him, it is only in the local practices of producers 
that effective responses to highly specific local problems can be found. In order 
to mobilize peoples' local knowledge in micro-situations, Richards argues for the 
application of participatory research and development. This would allow local 
skills and resources to adapt themselves to the universal principles of scientific 
agriculture. This approach suggests that Richards perceives knowledge, culture 
and power as unproblematic analytical dimensions in social change. 
Richards' emphasis on rural action research as a new instrument of 
intervention aims at re-valuing local culture and knowledge in order to ameliorate 
farmers' existing lower material standards, which will eventually achieve a more 
balanced rural development. However, this perspective does not take into account 
the impacts that participatory interventions have on people's quality of life and 
culture. It presupposes that intervention, because it is participatory, can only 
produce good results. So again, this perspective overlooks the problematic issues 
of power and the emergent properties at the interface of different systems of 
knowledge. As a result, it ends up supporting a naive fusion of agronomic 
science and local knowledge as a solution to rural development problems. 
The views I shall develop in this book are different from those above. My 
ideas have their point of origin in what I call a multiple perspective approach to 
the social life of policy implementation. According to this approach, the social 
life of policy implementation is constituted by actions motivated by different 
interpretations, values and meanings of those actors involved in the process. 
These differential responses generate the particularities of the economic, political 
and social outcomes of policy implementation. Multiple perspective analysis first 
identifies the differential perceptions of the different actors. Then it follows how 
actors, on the basis of these different perceptions, interact, conflict, cooperate 
and negotiate the conditions of rural development. This approach allows us to 
assess the nature of the discontinuities involved in rural development intervention. 
I shall argue that, before jumping to solutions, it is necessary to analyze what 
rural intervention actually is, as well as diagnosing its consequences for truth and 
power in rural development contexts. 
My approach demands a critical view of some of the existing positions in 
rural development, especially those advocating that science is a value-free system 
that can be enriched by the complementary insights of social scientists. Because 
of the limited views on science, culture and power in their epistemological 
orientation to 'truth', these positions on development cannot enhance the 
understanding of the realities of rural development interventions. 
It is by now evident that success or failure of a project cannot be defined as a 
matter of truth. The objective evaluation of the outcomes of projects vis-à-vis the 
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lives of the people is never assured. Therefore, a sociological study of the 
implementation process becomes central in order to follow how intervention 
affects peoples' ability to organise everyday life through their current political, 
economic and cultural local interactions. Such a study will show the significance 
of their interpretations of the allocation of resources and their capabilities to 
struggle for the control of their future. This last point leads me to suggest that we 
cannot understand the effect of rural policies or projects without looking into the 
social interface of state representatives and local producers in rural development. 
Local Knowledge and Rural Intervention 
Local knowledge as an important social and cultural factor in state rural 
intervention emerged out of critiques of principles advocated by rural technocratic 
interventionists. Early indications of this disquiet are evident in Long's theoretical 
dissatisfaction with the notion of external determination (Long, 1984: 2). In his 
paper, Creating Space for Change (1984), Long is concerned with the problem of 
how to analyze interventions in the existing life-worlds of individuals and groups, 
and suggests that "external factors are both mediated and transformed by internal 
structures" (p.2). However innocent this proposition may appear, it marks a 
considerable departure from the doctrine of social change based on the 
determination of external factors. According to Long, for the understanding of 
the interaction between external and internal factors, one must not only know 
what external forces encapsulate, but also what situations are excluded. One can 
only understand what is precluded in a situation if one understands the actors' 
room for manoeuvre through their capability (agency) to re-construct their 
relationships. All actors are entangled in the process of change, although the 
properties that emerge from particular actors' agencies and interactions accord 
them different degrees of influence, power or authority." In this thinking, it is 
not external factors (culture, markets or state intervention) which are put against 
local reality to understand social change, but the whole social field of interactions 
and strategies. These interactions and strategies are the outcome of people's 
reproduction processes in their everyday life. 
In conclusion, we can say that the acceptance of change does not depend 
upon a force emanating from centres of power (state, powerful economic and 
political groups, international institutions), but upon its resonance within 
established local practices and the interpretation of external influences by 
different actors within the local community. No external force is able to 
dismantle totally a set of local social relationships and to reconstruct an 
environment out of pure external factors. In this book, I argue that the 
implementation of a Mexican food policy (Sistema Alimentario Mexicano, SAM) 
depended upon both the institutional and cultural realities of the Ministry's 
fieldworkers and Jalisco's rural producers. 
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One consequence of Long's critique is that the status of outside forces, either 
as the ultimate conveyor of significance for explaining local social change or as 
the absolute foundation of power and knowledge, is radically undermined. It is 
clear that in no circumstance can outside forces be considered in complete 
isolation from actors' interpretations and the whole local social field of 
interactions and strategies. It is in this field that external forces acquire meaning 
through a process wherein local knowledge interprets, internalizes and re-shapes 
their interventions. This is not to deny that external social processes are 
important in people's lives. However, the way in which these processes 
intertwine with each other, and the way in which people respond to them and 
shape their character in the process, is so contingent that their actual impact is 
never fixed in space or time, and thus generates differential outcomes. This 
contingency of both the context and actors' responses implies that an 
understanding of state intervention can only be acquired through a situational 
analysis in combination with the study of the life experiences of the actors 
involved. 
Local Knowledge and External Forces 
The critique of external forces as the ultimate conveyor of significance to explain 
social change was closely connected with a more general reconsideration of the 
nature of interaction in development analysis. 
It was through the analysis of knowledge and social interfaces that the social 
meaning of knowledge in development studies was recognized (Arce and Long, 
1987, 1992). Arce and Long challenge the notion of equating knowledge with 
some professional, specialized or esoteric set of data or ideas, and question the 
'objectivist' view of the world as composed of facts which knowledge provides a 
literal account of (see also Knorr-Cetina, 1981). Thus, Arce and Long suggest 
that a body of knowledge emerges out of the interface involving a number of 
actors vis-à-vis social, situational, cultural and institutional factors. Second, if we 
accept that a body of knowledge emerges out of social processes, we also have to 
acknowledge power and authority as components in shaping bodies of knowledge. 
A body of knowledge is not an accumulation of facts, but a way in which 
people construct their world. Alongside the study of expert knowledge, we need 
to take into account the existence of other knowledges and the connection 
between the social character of knowledge and the actors' life-worlds. If their 
actions are not based on the recognition of these 'other' knowledges, 
administrators will not be successful implementors, no matter how efficient they 
are or how many resources they have to popularise science, technology or 
policies. In practice, the linkage between knowledge and life-worlds as manifest 
in the personal experiences of actors, defines the boundaries of the interface 
between the administration and rural producers2*. This interface thus becomes 
the window on studying actors' agency. Hence a study of administrative 
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techniques in rural development would probably reveal links among interests, 
resources, knowledge and levels of power. 
Chapter 2 illustrates this part of the analysis. Focusing on the personal 
knowledge and dynamic character of bureaucratic conflicts in a senior regional 
office in the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, this chapter highlights the 
contradictions surrounding the dynamic of governability and presents a picture of 
the highly heterogeneous social character of the administrative culture within the 
Mexican State. 
The case presented in this book underlines the scepticism concerning the 
merits of policy implementation and the translation of agricultural science for 
people. Rural sociology can contribute to understanding social change by 
clarifying how agricultural knowledge is actually used by bureaucrats and 
ejidatarios3> in their social, cultural and everyday practices (Arce and Mitra, 
1991). This was the experience of the case of the SAM within the Mexican 
institutional environment. 
Is the Concept of Local Knowledge Enough? 
As we stressed earlier, local knowledge is an important theme in the discussion 
of rural development. For authors, such as Ortiz (1973), Scott (1976) and 
Richards (1985), there is the assumption that all forms of local knowledge are 
intrinsically the same, since they represent isolated pictures of specific local 
realities. However, it is clear that this assumption of a single characteristic 
common to all significant local knowledge is another a priori assumption made 
by the researchers looking at their ethnographic material from without. 
Local knowledge is not something that can be simply subsumed under what 
anthropologists might call a 'traditional system of knowledge'. Perhaps what we 
have to realise is that local knowledge does not constitute a common, 
homogeneous body of knowledge at all. People are able to use their local 
knowledge in different ways. If, by criticising science, rural sociology has 
advanced in abandoning the notion of scientific validation embedded in expert 
knowledge, it is necessary to argue by the same token that at local level we have 
many forms of knowledge. Hence, a new agenda of research should look at how 
different forms of local knowledge relate to one another. A detailed ethnographic 
analysis of local interactions would present the complex networks of these 
different persisting and ephemeral 'local knowledges' (see Arce and Long, 1987: 
16-19). 
Local knowledge as an analytical concept does not have a rigid boundary, 
nevertheless it remains a usable concept. The lack of commonality in the concept 
local knowledge means that there are many different 'local rationales' in 
constructing a reality. This reality may mean many things at the same time to 
different people, but somehow these things are related to one another in different 
ways. It is these interactions that we call local knowledge. In this book I look at 
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local knowledge interfaces in a political-institutional environment. Leaving behind 
a theory of universals, and analyzing specific interfaces of knowledge, we are 
able to understand how state intervention re-organises, and is re-organized by, 
our everyday life. 
The Meaning of the Concept of State 
The concern with policy implementation points us to the concept traditionally 
associated with the maximum expression of institutional power: the state. The 
concept of state underpins the analytical contributions of both modernisation and 
neo-marxist traditions. Initially, modernisation perspectives argued that Third 
World societies could transform - if only their cultures were able to change -
from societies based on mechanical solidarity to societies based on organic 
solidarity. What was really required was the emergence of a pragmatic rationality 
that could conjure up the spirit of capitalism. The failure of Third World 
countries to build up successful administrative state machines or to achieve 
progress was attributed to the unfortunate persistence of non-Western traditional 
values or to the economic backwardness of these societies. Obstacles to 
modernisation were identified as cultural, economic and political, while the 
unstable situation of Third World states was used as an illustration of these 
explanations. 
Contrary to this perspective, the neo-Marxist dependency tradition has taken 
the view from the 'other' and has argued that the causes of Third World 
conditions have their historical roots within the international economic order. A 
few European and American nations were able to impose unequal trade patterns 
on the majority of countries in the Third World. In this interpretation, the South 
is seen as economically subject to the imperialistic North. The state in this 
tradition is seen as the motor of capitalist development that solves crises and 
ensures the reproduction of the dominant social relations within society. 
In these interpretations, the meaning of the concept of state is associated with 
different views on the empirical constitution of nation states in Western Europe, 
and is influenced by the post World War II experience that envisaged the 
reconstruction of Europe through application of planning technologies and the 
diffusion of these techniques into the developing nations. The practices of 
centralised planning agencies (Hardiman and Midgley, 1982) created combined 
social and economic effects which confirmed and reinforced different existing 
theoretical models about the state. They created a debate over the 'true role' of 
the state and each of them sought for a universal theory of the state. Instead of 
looking at how the state was constituted and how it operated within different 
contexts, a universal concept of the state was used to move the stock of ideas 
about the state from one continent to the next. What did not move, however, was 
the meaning of the state in local contexts. 
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This point was brilliantly demonstrated by B. Moore (1966) in his classic 
book about the historical origins of political styles of governability. His 
separation of the concept of state from the meaning of state indicates that 
universal concepts are not very useful in interpreting the world outside us. Thus, 
universal notions associated with state policy formulation may not have a real 
bearing on practical situations such as state policy implementation. 
With these ideas in mind, it is important to note that an abstract concept of 
the state cannot characterise the social world of state intervention. Choosing to 
analyze rural development as if it were a system of centralised planning 
techniques aimed at increasing agricultural production may be important. But it is 
a different matter to argue that the social world of intervention is just a system of 
planning techniques. 
The universal concept of the state is not empirically founded, but the meaning 
of state intervention in local rural development is. In other words, we have to 
study the practices of implementing a rural policy, rather than attempting to use a 
pre-packed model of state authority and power. From the critique of 
modernisation and neo-marxist traditions emerges an alternative approach to the 
state, which is not insensitive to the impact of societal forces on state 
intervention. This point will be elaborated in Chapter 2. 
The Nature of the Approach 
To articulate an approach to local knowledge and state intervention, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of the core ideas upon which such an approach is 
built. In this section, five theoretical bases for the approach will be presented. 
The presentation is brief, just sufficient to make sense of the field data that 
follow in the next chapters. 
Policy Implementation and Administrative Practices 
The approach to policy implementation which underlines everyday administrative 
practices establishes a close connection between the meaning of a rural policy and 
its use. In the book Room for Manoeuvre Schaffer (1984) argues that policies can 
make a difference in developing countries and that the process and practice of 
government activities is a fundamental area for social research. This research is 
aimed at acquiring information on the intentions and outcomes of state 
intervention. It focuses on the degree of political will, levels of trained woman-
and man-power, and the analysis of professional groups in policy making, and 
considers policy as something different from a rational exercise in resource 
allocation. Schaffer formulates this connection by stressing that institutional 
procedures and the social practices of bureaucracy in implementing policies are 
more significant than the 'established theoretical models of policy practice' which 
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are considered more rational. Some of these issues are illustrated in Chapter 3 of 
this book. 
Two practical issues are central to this perspective. The first is the analysis 
of the style of policy and the discourse of the actors. It is here that the selection 
and linking of aspects of development policy are made. The second issue is 
whether 'technical policy' can handle the highly political and institutionally 
contaminated nature of 'social life' surrounding policy practice. 
Schaffer's position signals the need for studies about the actual everyday 
practice of policy making and implementation. This perspective suggests that, 
while some rural policies may indeed have a meaning in accordance with state 
policy documents, we cannot presume that all everyday policy practices have a 
meaning in reference to such documents. A policy practice depends on the way in 
which different actors participating in the implementation of a policy use the 
policy document to shape, influence and affect the general direction of that 
policy. Hence we can argue that the meaning of a rural policy is to be found in 
actors' everyday use of the rural policy document and in the recognition that a 
rural policy document can be used in various ways in particular situations. One 
of the aims behind this perspective is to identify openings and possibilities within 
public policies, i.e. the intermediate field that connects the choices generated by 
the state and the existing opportunities shared by everyday practices among the 
actors participating in the development process. The field material of this book 
tends to agree with Schaffer's position. 
Praxeology and Everyday Practices 
Praxeology is the perspective that highlights the need to study the local stock of 
people's knowledge. This perspective can be traced back on the one hand to the 
work of Malinowski (1935), and on the other, to the substantive issues 
recognised by Wittgenstein (1969) in the tradition of ordinary language 
philosophy. 
Reality is expressed in people's disconnected pieces of everyday knowledge 
and practices, i.e. diversionary tactics, modalities of action, local discourses, 
proverbs, games, tales and speech-acts. These are signposts of local constitutive 
conventions that organize a network of knowledge, which provides meaning to 
acts of local actors. The signposts provide a sense of direction to people. They 
are used to discern the complexities involved in everyday practices and to 
construct the specialised local style of practices. 
Praxeology is thus the study of people's arts of thought and action, an 
appreciation of how to live in interaction with the other. The first to use this 
approach in rural development was van Lier (1979). He highlighted that rural 
change was a situation constituted first by social discontinuity, and second, by the 
pragmatic action of people's knowledge. 
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Embedded in the concept of local knowledge are various kinds of people's 
practice, and because of this, these have no single knowledge characteristic in 
common: there is no single essence to the organisation of local knowledge. The 
success or failure of an agricultural policy will depend upon how people define 
and play out their interactions with the representatives of the state in a particular 
situation. 
From this it follows that a rural policy is implemented within a network of 
meanings that is activated and constructed within everyday human activity. 
Praxeology, then, highlights the point that policy implementation is part and 
parcel of the discontinuity of social life. The emphasis on everyday practices in 
rural development means that we can no longer sustain a division between 
institutional and cultural environments. These two environments are fields of 
activity that reinforce each other. In general, these social fields point to a local 
social history, in which rural policies no longer just appear as normative 
frameworks to achieve modernisation. They also feature as rules or conventions 
that can be internalised and used by actors who are in the process of changing 
their values and life-styles. Chapter 3 shows how cultural factors affect the 
meaning of the interaction between bureaucrats and ejidatarios in Jalisco. This 
study of policy implementation links personal experiences to the multiplicity of 
daily activities that rural policy generates at the point of implementation. The 
approach gives central importance to the bureaucrats' experiences and actions, 
since it eradicates the separation between the 'public' and 'private' spheres in 
policy analysis. 
Social Rules and Conventions 
In contrast to the structural view that sees the significance of administrative 
action as dependent upon its technical and logical form alone, the focus on 
everyday practices regards the enactment of a meaningful action as a convention 
or rule that directs activity to achieve cultural preferences and choices in rural 
development (see Holy and Stuchlik, 1983). 
The process of agrarian development is not a dynamic which moves around 
different abstract models or rationalities, but a social construction of actors who, 
by linking different interactional settings and social zones, make practical use of 
government rules and conventions. In so doing they generate a specific common 
ground, i.e. a network whereby actors try to define their demands, negotiations 
and solutions vis-à-vis government officials within the everyday practices of rural 
development. One of the objectives of this process is to try to influence the 
allocation of resources (money, knowledge, power) so as to create new 
opportunities for the actors. 
Because of this, policy implementation cannot be predetermined in advance. 
The rural producers know that government officials, in order to implement a 
rural policy, have to organise a social situation which allows them to perform 
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their task-oriented activities among the diverse membership of the ejido. On the 
other hand, the government officials know that the possibility of implementing 
rural policy depends on organising an institutional environment at the local level, 
where officials can demonstrate the relevance of their institutional and personal 
repertoires to the producers (cf. Barth, 1981). These cultural interactions 
constitute the rules or social conventions of the rural development process, 
depicting the organisational bases for policy implementation. Social rules and 
conventions provide the network wherein rural development processes take place. 
To understand the significance of everyday practices one needs to see how state 
bureaucrats and rural producers in their contacts and interactions negotiate the 
properties, rules and conventions of state-rural society. 
Interface and Evidence 
The concept of interface is commonly used to establish the relations between the 
diverse and different meanings of a rural policy on the one hand, and the actors' 
situational rules on the other. To explain the meaning of a rural policy is to 
elucidate the rules of its implementation and use. This means that we have to 
clarify the central features that constitute the interface theoretically in order to 
justify the application of this concept. The interface concept involves a strong 
commitment to an actor-orientated analysis of agrarian change, based on the 
notion that social change generates different local variations, adaptations and 
responses within agrarian populations. The differentiated nature of social change, 
of organisational forms and cultural patterns, has to be explored situationally, 
identifying the different practices by which actors deal with problematic situations 
and accommodate themselves to other's interests and designs for living (Long, 
1989). 
Interface analysis recognises that 'the subject' in rural change is 
knowledgeable and active. The subjects in rural policy (i.e. government officials 
and rural producers) problematize situations, process information and strategize 
in their dealings with others (Long, 1989: 222). This conceptualisation of the 
subject of rural policy leads to an analytical approach that sees patterns and paths 
of agrarian change as social outcomes that result from 'the interactions, 
negotiations, and social and cognitive struggles that take place between specific 
social actors' (Long, 1989: 222). In the present study, the meaning of the 
Mexican Food Policy (SAM) is given by the interaction between producers and 
government officials. The characteristics of the interface are presented in practice 
through the implementation of the SAM policy and justified by appealing to the 
empirical evidence from the case studies. However, we need to remain aware 
that interface encounters are non-fixed situations that can be quite different 
through time and are affected by contingencies such as the conditions of political 
and economic stability, patterns of events, circumstances, resources and actors' 
expressions and feelings. For example, policy implementation in Mexico during 
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the SAM period changed from a political to a technocratic style of administration. 
This provides a criterion which helps to explain the interface between officials 
and rural producers in that period. However, this should not suggest that, in the 
past or in the future, the relation between politics and technology will always 
assume the same role in interactions between officials and rural producers. The 
present interface is simply a translation of fragments of actors' past experiences 
and future aspirations. 
The concept of interface links modalities of practices with the characteristics 
of actors' everyday life, connecting the way in which they individually internalise 
rural policy with the way they use their institutional environment. Therefore, 
interface analysis is an approach that goes beyond the dichotomies of the 
individual versus collectivity, and social action versus structure. In fact, the 
notion of human agency implicitly attributes to the individual actor the capacity of 
superimposing his/her own images and interests of rural development on those of 
the government. Through this, actors can create for themselves a social space in 
which they can find ways of using the institutional order of the state. 
Within any institutional environment local actors are able to establish a 
degree of choice and creativity. Human agency, by creating these sorts of social 
spaces, draws unexpected outcomes from processes of state intervention. The 
implementation of rural policy cannot therefore be perceived as an integrative 
system regulated by the state's supreme rules and integrative authority, which is 
based on some overarching rationality or planning. 
In this way, actors' practices within the social life of policy implementation 
should not be seen as idiosyncratic peculiarities of individuals, but as forming 
part of a social construction that includes local knowledge, processes of 
^interpretation and choices about actors' life-worlds. This capacity of the actors 
means that the content of social interaction is partly influenced by the mode in 
which these individual actors' consume their history (time and space) and 
associate themselves with different present and past levels of realities and courses 
of action in their localities. 
Interfaces do not merely obey existing 'traditional laws' of the community, 
since rules and social conventions cannot be defined or identified by any abstract 
notion of collectivity. On the other hand, an interface is not just the product of an 
'official' and technocratic rural policy that seeks to create national networks 
according to abstract models of development. The sociological uniqueness of 
interface centres around one feature in particular, i.e. the relationship between 
the social actors and the contours of a specific institutional and local social 
environment. 
Actors are able to produce, tabulate and impose strategies, to manoeuvre, to 
different degrees, rural policy implementation. This is not to say that individual 
actions take place in an institutional vacuum, or that they can directly manipulate 
or divert state interventions. On the contrary, it is the local network of actors 
within a specific institutional environment which creates local social space. We 
have to differentiate interface from other types of interactions between rural 
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producers and intervenors. An interface becomes regulated in the processes of 
speaking, communicating, organising, and using official policy. Thus we can 
view the interface as a situational encounter, a critical point where actors through 
their interactions simultaneously deconstruct and reconstruct a 'project of 
society'. At the point of the interface, a local translation takes place in the state 
intervention process. Therefore, it is through the study of these interfaces that we ' 
can find the empirical evidence to assess the relevance of rural policy 
implementation. 
Anthropology and Development 
Let us return to one of the opening questions of this chapter: what might be the 
role of anthropology for rural development? One clear contribution of 
anthropology has been the questioning of theoretical models relating to 
development. The traditional reductionist analysis of development economics that 
assumes rural underdevelopment is directly associated with local ignorance, 
political passivity or just lack of economic resources, is one such model that has 
been questioned (Hill, 1986). Conceptualisations of development, either as a 
progressive process towards modern forms of technology and institutions, or as a 
reformative process with the purpose of satisfying the demands of the world 
capitalist economy, have also been criticized for denying the significance of 
ordinary actors in shaping development (Long, 1984; E.P. Thompson, 1979). 
Earlier we pointed to the need to clarify the ways in which rural policies are 
internalised and used by actors, and to evidence that when actors use their social 
conventions to organise interactions, things do not always result as they 
anticipated. While it is realised that actors become entangled in their own rules 
and conventions, this situation generates one of the main anthropological 
problems, namely how to give an account of the contingencies surrounding the 
interactions that constitute a particular interface? 
Besides questioning general theoretical models of development, 
anthropologists have been able to highlight gaps between intervenors and 
intervened in specific situations. For example, Hill (1986) has demonstrated the 
consequences for policy implementation of actions of project officers who only 
accept their beliefs to be correct and real. Her earlier study of the Gold Coast 
Cocoa Purchasing Company in Ghana (1952) serves as the empirical basis for her 
critique of bureaucrats who fail to acknowledge reality to be a social construction 
of everyday practices. She demonstrates how this failure generated a situation 
where producers started to use the local cultural relation debtor-creditor to their 
own advantage. The Company did not discover, until the failure of its 
development strategy became complete, that the rural producers did not share the 
Companies' value that debt was 'improper'. In this case, debtor and creditor (in 
everyday life) were 'commonly friends and never enemies' (Hill, 1986: 3). It is 
in these sorts of situations that applied anthropology can make discrepancies in 
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the values of intervenors and intervened explicit (cf. Porter, Allen and 
Thompson, G, 1991). 
The question here is to what extent can applied anthropology indeed 
contribute to bridging gaps in rural development. Given the contingencies that 
surround everyday practices, we may wonder whether social research would be 
able to solve some of the problems encountered in ongoing policy 
implementation. Is our role solely to criticize intervention ex-post, or can we 
contribute to better implementation? 
The following types of recent contributions can be seen as relevant: research 
in the field of administration (Checkland and Scholes, 1990), rural sociological 
studies on adaptive agricultural research (Box, 1989), studies on farmer capacities 
for sustainable agricultural development (Van der Ploeg, 1990; J. Blauert, 1988), 
research on the capability of rural producers to use institutional environments in 
the organisation of projects (Arce, 1989; de Vries, 1990), work on farmer 
organisations and local adaptation of agricultural science for people (Bebbington, 
1991; Paul Richards, 1985). 
As promising as all this may be, I want to stress that applied social science 
should always be based on the relevance of everyday practices and the ways in 
which actors construct their world using different categories and concepts. The 
majority of the above mentioned contributions have taken into account the 
importance of everyday practices and notions of local knowledge, but there are 
substantial differences in the way people's practices are portrayed in these 
different approaches. The different representations of people's practices do not 
seem to stem strictly from empirical evidence, but seem to serve to legitimise 
particular types of research and/or action. A shortcoming of several of the 
approaches is, in my view, that they do not base their analysis on the actual 
description of how people internalise and are affected by external influences in 
the construction of their world. 
None of the above studies actually connects processes arising from the use of 
contemporary science, state, markets or the international sphere, to the re­
construction of local interactions, where a re-positioning of the actor's knowledge 
and power takes place. 
In order to contribute effectively to policy implementation, anthropology, I 
suggest, should take the study of everyday practices more seriously. In particular, 
it needs to take into account the complex and interrelated concepts of knowledge 
and power. This book attempts to provide ^such an analysis by focusing on the 
implementation of the Mexican Food Policy (SAM). The approach adopted aims 
to bring the life-world of actors back into the centre of the analysis of rural 
development. 
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From an Approach to a Case in Action 
This book, then, looks into the formulation and implementation of the Mexican 
Food Policy (SAM). My account complements other studies of the SAM, but 
different aspects are emphasised. An interface approach is used to observe and 
record real-world problems which could in principle be present in any process of 
rural state intervention. 
In the 1980's, debates about the role of the national state tended to focus on 
the problems of food production for local markets. However, only one Latin 
American country, Mexico, actually was able to adopt a rural strategy on the 
provision of food for its population. This Sistema Alimentario Mexicano or 
Mexican Food System (SAM) was introduced in 1980. The main objectives of the 
policy were to redirect Mexico's rural development towards greater self-
sufficiency and to eradicate problems associated with rural poverty in many of 
the regions of the country. 
The agricultural policy of SAM was mainly subsidised by resources from oil 
revenues (4 billion US$). This policy was part of a change within the state, 
which wanted to achieve a more rational approach to the relationship between 
state administration, rural development and the political issue of local 
participation. SAM provides an important case study for analyzing the extent to 
which a rural strategy can be implemented in a country that traditionally had a 
highly trained bureaucracy of civil servants and planners who used state 
intervention to promote capitalism in the agricultural sector (see Hewitt de 
Alcantara, 1978). 
The Mexican state has been extensively analyzed. One factor that has been 
dramatically emphasised in the different theories on the Mexican state is the 
pernicious influence of corruption within state agencies and the concomitant 
influence of the personal interests of state leaders (see Grindle, 1977; Redclift, 
1980; and Migdal, 1987). This factor has been considered the main obstacle to 
the implementation of rural policies in Mexico. 
The present study assumes a rather different perspective. We argue that the 
problems of policy formulation and implementation in Mexico must be 
understood in terms of the actual social construction of the policy and its 
implementation. Therefore, placing the focus exclusively on the issue of 
corruption among public servants involved in the SAM in Mexico only reveals 
one aspect of the complexities involved in the actual policy process. The study 
claims that the SAM can only be properly assessed if we move away from the 
intellectual tradition that has merely interpreted state intervention as an action that 
favours civil servants' individual interests and has as its main objective to diffuse 
paternalistic relationships among local people in order to manipulate their 
participation and reproduce the dominant political system. 
The objective of this book is not to deny corruption and political manipulation 
in Mexico. For one thing, we accept that by reforming the administrative 
structure of the state and providing more room for participation and 
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accountability at local level, the possibility of achieving the aims of any rural 
policy will be increased. My main interest here though is to analyze the role of 
rural producers and government representatives at different levels during the 
SAM period. In this way we hope to contribute by demystifying the above 
mentioned 'tunnel vision' of the state. 
State authority is needed in rural development to offer resources and 
legitimate advice to rural producers, but state authority is not the only decisive 
factor in the outcome of rural development strategies. The implementors of a 
rural development policy find themselves in situations which are hardly different 
from those faced by other social groups involved in rural development. Despite 
the fact that they can depend on state policy documents and administrative 
guidelines to obtain authority to support their actions, they have to endure and 
make decisions in everyday practice on the claims and counter-claims concerning 
the effects of policies on the life of rural producers. In conclusion, we want to 
argue that the process of state policy implementation cannot terminate or control 
the existence of social problems or the diversity among rural producers and 
bureaucrats. These actors are not passive and their actions, strategies and 
interactions shape the outcome of state policy. Accordingly, state intervention 
strategy is not the only factor that should be analyzed in rural development. The 
rural development interfaces that interlock different interests, strategies and 
thought-styles are also critical. 
Rural development interfaces are concerned with analyzing the relations 
between people, rather than the reified social and economic objectives of a 
document programme. Through these situations (intervention-in-action) we can 
understand how the meaning and relevance of a policy like the SAM lost 
legitimacy within the political community. In the context of SAM, it would be 
difficult to claim that corruption or political manipulation were the only factors 
affecting the social behaviour of actors, or the programme's outcome. 
In my view, the process of state intervention accelerates rapid development 
and influences actors to increase or decrease, explore or avoid new links with the 
market, and to redefine or confront relations with the administrative processes of 
state regulation. State intervention generates confrontations, as well as degrees of 
collaboration and participation. Knowledge, as a relation of power among these 
actors (Fardon, 1985), then becomes an important venue for analyzing conflicts, 
negotiation, corruption and political manipulation. These social organisational 
properties of rural development emerge in the analysis as a result of the process 
of policy implementation, rather than as the causes of the state's failure to 
achieve its policy objectives. 
In this book, the strategy of the SAM is studied alongside the life-worlds of 
those social actors involved in the process of state intervention. While we do not 
disagree with those scholars who see these policies and projects as residual but 
unsuccessful attempts to correct the economic bias against agriculture (Lipton, 
1977; Bates, 1981), we argue, nevertheless, that these interventions generate 
significant new social and political realities at local level. 
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The book is primarily about rural projects, bureaucrats, rural producers 
(ejidatarios) and everyday practices surrounding policy implementation in 
Western Mexico. Yet since policy implementation is connected with discourses 
on policy formulation and planning, it is difficult not to make some reference to 
the other facets of social life of development policies. The main objective of the 
book remains, however, to show what actually happens in the process of policy 
implementation. In order to do so, we shall analyze some of the interactions and 
interfaces which enabled the policy to come into life, its impacts on different 
social environments, and the responses to those impacts. This issue was recently 
raised again by Adams (1990) in relation to failures of development schemes in 
Africa. Although in a slightly different form, his comments on policy making, 
planning and people's responses point in the same direction as Clay and Schaffer 
(1984) and Long (1984, 1989). 
The study of the SAM policy is located in Rainfed District No.l in Jalisco, 
Western Mexico, where I sought to describe and analyze the numerous social, 
administrative, technical, political and cultural circumstances surrounding the 
implementation of the policy. Unlike other studies, the present one does not pay 
significant attention to the higher levels of policy formulation and planning 
(Schaffer, 1984; Apthorpe 1986). Instead, it takes the issues of development to 
the actual level of implementation. It identifies and analyzes different interfaces 
of knowledge, speech-acts and everyday practices which the actors participating 
in the SAM drew upon to organise and shape the action of state intervention 
within their locality. 
The Outline of the Book 
In the chapters that follow, I differentiate between various levels of policy 
implementation. While the material covered in Chapters 2 and 3 is largely 
concerned with the bureaucratic culture, the book progresses to examine the 
interfaces between government officials and rural producers. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7 establish that state intervention is a process which is constituted not merely 
through its relationship to official bureaucratic discourse and practice, but to the 
experiences (reflexivity) of actors in development situations. An analysis of 
policy outcomes must take account of actors' constant assessment of their own 
actions. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the importance of bureaucratic conflict within the 
organisation of the state in respect to administrative practices, professional groups 
and agricultural policy. The chapter identifies different agricultural extension 
practices and the justifications for the agronomic approach in Mexico. This 
chapter centres around a series of administrative experiences of an agronomist 
working in the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidrâulicos, SARH). 
19 
Chapter 3 looks into the first level at which the local implementation of SAM 
is coordinated, i.e. the district level. It provides the background to the 
agricultural administrative processes within the bureaucratic culture and their 'art 
of management'. The chapter argues that, in order to understand the 
particularities of administrative practices, one needs to obtain insight into the life-
worlds and life-careers of the bureaucrats in charge of the programme. 
Chapter 4 examines the institutional environment of the government 
fieldworkers who are in charge of implementing agricultural policies. The chapter 
argues that to understand interaction between fieldworkers and rural producers, 
an important first step is to know the institutional reality of the fieldworker. 
Chapter 5 elaborates the Mexican Food Policy (SAM): its formulation, 
objectives and achievements. After this, the assessment of the SAM from the 
point of view of several fieldworkers, involved in the implementation of the 
policy, are presented and analyzed. The chapter forms the bridge between the 
analysis of the bureaucracy and the case studies of the implementation of SAM at 
the local level. 
In Chapter 6, an ejido, Nextipac, is used as a point of access for 
understanding the problematic nature of rural life, where broader issues of state/ 
peasant relations and a differential understanding of the SAM policy 
implementation come to the fore. 
Chapter 7 focuses on a pilot rainfed project aimed at improving maize 
production through the incorporation of new technology and organisation. This 
project involved the cooperation of a Mexican agency (FIRA) and the Hungarian 
technical mission (AGROVER). The chapter follows this project over the 3 year 
period of its duration. Questions are posed in connection with local participation, 
the (in)ability of these projects to work with the technical knowledge of local 
producers, and the issue of how producers' interests over time shaped the social 
life of the project. 
The book ends with a concluding chapter that draws together the various 
themes and reconsiders the relationship between state intervention, actors and 
rural development. Through an analysis of SAM, the book uncovers the 
importance of analyzing institutional environments and actors' struggles, thus 
highlighting how rural development is constructed by the actors themselves over 
the period of policy implementation. It is argued that a more coherent rural 
development sociology is required for an understanding of the ways in which 
state-induced rural development figures in the contemporary transformations of 
developing societies and people's lives. 
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Notes 
1. This position partly parallels the analysis of Scott in Weapons of the Weak (Scott, 1985). 
However, Scott's position suggests only one alternative, namely that this entanglement cannot 
produce fundamental changes in society. The notion of entanglement can be used to understand 
how different actors internalize external factors and shape, re-shape or even challenge existing 
notions of authority, knowledge and power. 
2. Social interface is defined as "a critical point of linkage between different social systems, fields 
or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative 
value and social interest, are most likely to be found" (Long, 1989:2). 
3. An ejido is a corporately organised agrarian community that obtained land under the Agrarian 
Land Reform Law that followed the Mexican revolution of 1910. Ejidatarios are the 
beneficiaries of the Mexican Agrarian Land Reform Law. The people who farm the ejido land 
are called ejidatarios. 
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2. BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
RA IN FED AGRICULTURE IN MEXICO" 
So far the work of Theda Skocpol (1979) represents one of the most radical 
stands against the simple conceptualisation of the state as an arena of conflicts 
between social and economic interests. Skocpol directs her criticism towards 
liberal and Marxist positions and goes on to conceptualize the state as a 
macro-structure constituted by 'a set of administrative, policing, and military 
organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated, by an executive 
authority' (Skocpol, 1979: 29). In her view the state's main functions are 
concerned with the extraction of resources from society and the deployment of 
these in order to create and support coercive and administrative organizations. 
This macro-structure, which is embedded in class-divided socioeconomic 
structures and an international system of states (Skocpol, 1979: 32), is seen by 
her as having a powerful capability to rebuild state organizations with each social 
revolutionary process. 
The importance of Skocpol's contribution for the analysis of the state is the 
general methodological value of bringing into the analysis the significance of state 
organizational contradictions in understanding processes of state policy making 
and intervention. The focus on the nature of the state's rebuilding capabilities and 
the contradictions surrounding the dynamic of governability may contribute to 
provide an understanding of state power seen as something more complex than 
just the direct outcome of developments in civil society, or the result of the 
dynamic of productive relations and political contradictions. 
An analysis concerned with the state's capacity to change or rebuild 
organizations and forms of governability implies, first, that one does not collapse 
into a single explanation the complex relationship of state and society, and 
second, that one perceives the state administrative process as independent from 
the logic of capital accumulation and from the rationality of the dominant class. 
The state's capacity for change is linked to a complex institutional process 
involving ideologies, rules and administrative styles, where contradictions and 
competition among various state agencies rather than harmony define the forms 
of state intervention. Policy formulation arises out of these contradictions in an 
attempt to solve social problems, and through this process styles of governability 
are defined which become important inputs into the development process. 
Thus, policies represent specific attempts to re-adjust the relations between 
state and society. They constitute procedures for controlling and managing new 
national and international economic and socio-political circumstances. Policy 
formulation constitutes the way in which state decision makers and practitioners 
interpret and try to alleviate existing economic and social constraints which 
hinder the effectiveness of their actions. Public policy reflects a collective type of 
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conceptualisation, where scientific knowledge and the relations of power between 
different units of the state, define and devise a feasible and workable framework 
for action. 
This perspective leads me to focus attention on the actual process of policy 
formulation. In the following chapters, the focus will shift to the analysis of 
policy implementation, as has been emphasized by Grindle (1980: 15). While 
implementation may be crucially important for studying the transformation of 
policy, it also remains important to understand how public decision-making 
processes take place. Relationships of power, the use of particular scientific 
knowledge and state organizational traditions, set within an administrative 
context, constrain the range of alternative courses of action open to the state. 
These are crucial factors affecting the ability of the state to intervene in the 
formulation and implementation of policies. 
From this perspective, policy implementation is seen as being 'formatted' by 
policy formulation and mediated by different levels of administrative action. 
These processes reveal the essential contradictions affecting state power in its 
process of governing society. The understanding of these factors involved in the 
input stage of policy making becomes vital for approaching the content of policy, 
the role of agents of implementation and the reactions of various social interest 
groups to the actions of the state. 
Policy formulation and policy implementation in Third World countries 
should be understood, therefore, as an interconnected process and the role of the 
agent of implementation interpreted as part of the relations that organize and 
exercise power in society. In this vein, administrative transformation becomes the 
carrier of different strategic approaches (for an overview of the characteristics 
and structural consequences of differing state strategies, see Long 1977: 144-192, 
and Long 1980). The government apparatus presents itself, then, as able to 
change styles of administration and to carry out reforms in accordance with the 
organizational alternatives that exist inside the bureaucratic management 
structure. 
In this chapter, I present material that illustrates this process of policy 
formulation. I seek to analyze the factors involved in determining the rainfed 
agricultural policy of Mexico. The agricultural policy pursued by the Mexican 
state from the mid-1970s to the 1980s was a result of an interaction between 
changes influenced by a general administrative reform and the rise of the 
agronomic approach to development. This interaction led to the re-organization of 
the Ministry of Agriculture (Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidrâulicos, 
SARH) whereby the agronomists became the dominant actors operating within a 
framework of a notion of 'efficiency'. This concept was central to the 
government's objective of regaining political effectiveness during the 1980s and 
influenced the need for administrative reform. Thus the need to modernize 
rainfed agriculture was located within a wider framework of economic and social 
policy and was accorded a priority position in the state's strategy called the 
Popular National Alliance for Production (S.P.P, 1980). 
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This significant departure from previous agricultural policies in Mexico (see 
the historical account of Mexican state strategy in Hewitt de Alcântara, 1978) 
presented rainfed modernization under the Mexican Food System (Sistema 
Alimentario Mexicano or SAM) as technically and politically necessary. The need 
for such an orientation was justified as part of the new criteria adopted by the 
Mexican state to improve its management of the country. This so-called 'rational' 
approach introduced new forms of allocating resources and new planning devices. 
Efficiency was adopted as the central criterion expected to guide administrative 
operations. The implementation of the administrative reform inaugurated a period 
of bureaucratic contradictions, during which a new style of agricultural 
administration was delineated. The experience of this process constitutes an 
important case for illustrating the complexities of public policy formulation in 
Third World countries. 
In post-revolutionary Mexico, the importance of state intervention in 
agriculture laid in gradually combining political and economic factors so as to 
control and manipulate the aspirations of those agricultural producers who, whilst 
not considered economically important, were seen as politically dangerous (Arce, 
1986: 70-121). This traditional form of bureaucratic management was in need of 
re-organization because, for the first time, the capability of the state to protect 
and maintain economic growth was questioned and this highlighted the need for a 
change in the style of administration (Ramirez y Diaz, 1983). This process 
assumed the character of a transition from a political to a technocratic style of 
administration and was, to a large extent, conditioned by structural determinants 
of Mexico's development. 
The need for comprehensive planning created a situation wherein 
administrative reform was seen as the government's means of achieving new 
levels of management. In the agricultural sector this was presented as the search 
for efficiency. An agrarian policy based on increasing the production levels of 
basic crops was formulated, moving the focus of agrarian development away 
from land distribution. 
The implementation of this new administrative approach transformed the 
existing agricultural government agencies, generating several important 
institutional conflicts among bureaucrats. This process is studied in detail in the 
present chapter. I argue that the reform of the institutional context contributed to 
the generation of a new state approach to agricultural problems and to the 
consolidation of a new type of agricultural administrator. 
The agronomists, a group highly critical of past agricultural policies, defined 
their first priority as the transformation of the Mexican rural structure. Increased 
production became their mission and the modernization of peasants their practice. 
They emphasized that the diffusion of fertilizers, mechanization and high-yielding 
seeds would solve poverty in rural areas and defuse the rising frustration that was 
creating political instability. The emphasis on technical alternatives to political 
problems made this group an influential professional sector during the regime of 
López Portillo (1976-1982), and they became an expression of the new character 
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assumed by public administration in relation to development policies in Mexico. 
By examining the importance of the state's administrative reform and its effects 
on agricultural services, this chapter provides an insight into policy making in 
Third World countries. In methodological terms, it uses an actor-oriented 
perspective to assess the structural implications of these changes. 
Administrative Reform and Government Agricultural Services 
The first aim of the administrative reform was to make government bureaucracy 
more efficient but, at the same time, it became an important source of power for 
the new generation of Mexican decision makers, those officials that Roderic 
Camp has called 'the technocrats' (Camp, 1983). 
The person who assumed the role of political modernizer of Mexican public 
administration was Licenciado Alejandro Carrillo Castro, son of Alejandro 
Carrillo Marcor, an important politician who was the former Governor of 
Sonora, an ex-parliamentarian in both legislative chambers during 1940-1943 and 
1970-1976, and ambassador to Egypt during the 1960s. Like the majority of high 
ranking Mexican officials, Carillo studied law at the National University of 
Mexico and obtained his Ph.D in public administration in the Faculty of Political 
Science at the same. In 1963, when Carrillo was still a university student, he 
started to work as assistant to the Presidency. He was 27. Two years later he met 
the future President, Lopez Portillo, who came to chair the Consultative and 
Legal Office of the Ministry. From this encounter, a working relationship 
evolved into a close friendship. In 1965, Lopez Portillo assisted at Carrillo's 
professional viva examination and later became a witness at Carrillo's wedding. 
Carrillo has publicly recognized that he owes his training as a public servant to 
Lopez Portillo (Carillo, 1982: 227). 
From 1971 to 1976, Carrillo was General Director of the Administrative 
Studies Office in the Presidency, and during Lopez Portillo's government was 
designated General Coordinator of the office. Thus, at the age of 38, he was 
made responsible for the implementation of administrative reform. Carrillo's 
career fits the case of classical success within Smith's model of Mexican 
executive network positions (Smith, 1979). 
Developing a political career has not been so important a factor in Carrillo's 
life, although he became a member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (the 
PRI) just prior to starting his university studies. As Carrillo recalls, two personal 
reasons influenced his decision to join the party: "first, because General Corona 
was directing the party, a very capable politician who was interested in working 
closely with young people and, second, because in the direction of the Youth 
Action section of the PRI was my good friend and generational contemporary, 
Miguel Osorio Marban, with whom I often went and visited General Cardenas" 
(Carrillo, 1982: 321, my translation). 
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In 1964, when Licenciado Carlos Madrazo assumed the direction of the PRI, 
the then head of the Youth section, Rodolfo Echeverria (nephew of Luis 
Echevarria and Minister of the Interior during Lopez Portillo) invited Carrillo to 
be his deputy. Over time, this was to become Carrillo's most important political 
post inside the party. 
The ideology of Carrillo Castro is much more illuminating than his political 
career. He argues that it was only after a trip to Europe that he became aware 
that the PRI was the best option for those Mexicans who wanted to fight in 
favour of a more free and just country without dogmatism of any ideological 
label (Carrillo, 1982: 321). This stance of Carrillo takes a more important 
dimension when he interprets the legacy of the Mexican Revolution as essentially 
a form of pragmatism which uses administrative means to seek negotiated 
political solutions. Carrillo sees the development of a mixed economy in Mexico 
as the only solution to the political conflict that resulted from the revolution. He 
explains: 
"I have learned the concept of mixed economy in Mexico from the fact 
that Emiliano Zapata demanded restitution of the ejidal property, because 
Zapata was an ejidatario himself, a representative of his ejido. Villa, on 
the other hand, wanted the distribution of the large properties 
(latifundios) because he knew these in Chihuahua. So his position was to 
achieve a more equal distribution of rural property. Obregón, with a 
different position from the other two, supported private property because 
he came from the North West- of the country. From these different 
tendencies originated the concept of the mixed economy established in 
Article 27 of the Constitution and which does not owe its existence to 
pretentious principles of universal validity" (Carrillo, 1982: 322, my 
translation). 
In Carrillo's view the political-economic system of Mexico is the outcome of a 
bargain struck among different and fragmented interests, often with ill-defined 
ends, associated with particular regional experiences. In this context the 
Constitution is no more than a political blend of these differences. This 
substantive interpretation of post-revolutionary Mexico means that policy 
implementation, guided by this perspective, presents serious problems of 
administrative organization. It is in this light that Carrillo argues that his reform 
is not just a technocratic exercise but an action to provide the appropriate 
administrative instruments for government, thus allowing the government to 
honour the political objectives assigned to the state: "We must have the best 
technical knowledge to put at the service of political decisions" (Carrillo, 1982: 
310). 
Following the tradition of governments of the 1960s, Carrillo sees the 
Constitution as containing the ideological base for government programmes and 
for the ideological platform of the PRI (Carillo, 1982: 310). This is argued in an 
attempt to claim neutrality and legality for the administrative reform. 
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Around 1979, this position started to be criticized by a group of traditional 
politicians, who singled out the administrative reform as the target of their 
discontent. This group achieved its maximum impact with the speech delivered at 
a meeting in Acapulco on the 5th of February 1979 by the Minister of the 
Interior, Jesus Reyes Heroles. Reyes Heroles advocated the need to make civil 
society more political, as a means of preventing the state from becoming too 
dominant and imposing itself upon society. He added: "A more political society 
prevents the administration replacing government and the administrators 
substituting politicians, because when administration is transformed into 
government, government could get isolated from the electorate" (Carrillo, 1982: 
127, my translation). This public disagreement was followed by the resignation of 
Reyes Heroles from the government of Lopez Portillo. 
Confronted with this opposition, Carrillo argued that the role of 
administrators was to provide the government with the instruments to implement 
decisions, because these decisions represented the opinion of different sectors of 
society. The government had to translate these into policies, so, if participation 
was going to have a political significance in Mexican life, the state machine had 
to improve its degree of efficiency and rationalization. A less bureaucratic and 
passive government system was needed in the country. 
However, Carrillo was forced to recognize that administrative techniques 
have to be subordinated to political direction, although he only saw the Mexican 
Constitution as providing such direction. He pointed out that politics should not 
replace administration, since traditionally it has forced administrators to 
improvise, encouraging inefficient management and corruption (Carrillo, 1982: 
128). 
The debate about administrative reform opened up an exchange of ideas 
within government concerning the proper way to govern society, bringing two 
different generations and styles of decision makers into conflict. 
A traditional group understood political mediation among autonomous groups 
as the function of government, while others saw administrators as a group of 
experts who would put an end to the bargaining tradition of Mexican society. In 
this way the political importance of the PRI would be diminished by a group of 
people with good technical qualifications but lacking party political experience. 
The new group of decision makers were specialized professional people with 
high academic qualifications. Their careers were made inside the public 
bureaucracy rather than within the PRI. They argued that the need of government 
was to apply technical knowledge and to improve civil servant training. This, for 
them, was the only way of dealing simultaneously with the economic, social and 
political problems of Mexico. From their viewpoint, the administrative 
environment, rather than the political arena, was the field of operation for high-
ranking officials. Nevertheless, the party still remained important to them through 
their kinship relationships that, by ascription, made them members of 'the 
revolutionary family' of Mexico. 
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According to Camp (1983), who studied the rise of the Mexican technocrat in 
government decision making, the specialists had always been part of the political 
scene in Mexico, but from the 1930s on they systematically increased their 
influence to the point that university degrees and postgraduate studies became 
essential requirements for holding a post of Minister or vice Secretary in the 
government. Until the 1960s, the technocrats, in spite of their bureaucratic 
power, still acted as advisers to the politicians, but today the group has started to 
make its own decisions. 
In this context, administrative reform became identified with the person of 
Carrillo. He was seen as the archetypal administrator coming to replace the 
traditional politician. The defense of reform in public administration became a 
justification for technical orientation. The acceptance of this orientation as the 
only possible way open to government to solve problems in society was 
transformed into an established belief among Lopez Portillo's collaborators. 
Development was reduced to a problem of efficiency, and administrators became 
the shamans of a technological approach to modernization. Carrillo argued that 
resistance to any type of change should normally be expected from people who 
put their own personal interests above the broad interests of society. He claimed 
that such people could not understand that to serve society sometimes meant 
transforming the operational mechanisms of the system, even when those 
mechanisms may have been, in the past, very important for incorporating 
political clientele. Cutting the link between administration and political control 
became the target of the reform. The ability simply to mediate or manipulate 
conflicts was not seen as cost effective given the dimension of the crisis. Reform 
in government administrative organisation was presented as the first step in 
re-establishing competition among the different productive sectors in Mexico, and 
economic growth was seen as the solution to national problems. 
The political problems and production difficulties affecting the agrarian 
structure made agricultural services a priority area of attention for administrative 
reform. The first measure adopted was the unification, in 1977, of the Ministry 
of Hydraulic Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. According 
to Carrillo, this reversed a decision taken in 1946 by President Alemân, who had 
established a separate agency for the support and organization of irrigation 
policy. 
Alemân's decision had developed a dual approach towards agriculture that 
created administrative problems, whereby, according to Carrillo, it had become 
practically impossible to plan agricultural activity. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock had the responsibility for the agricultural plan, but it had to ask the 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources about what they were intending to do in the 
irrigation districts for the next year just to complete information (Carrillo, 1982: 
85). Apparently, inter-agency competition had made this exchange of information 
difficult. Carrillo saw in these practices the constraints affecting the evolution of 
agricultural services which had never been able to advance beyond the 
bureaucratic solution of adding individual projects to a plan. According to 
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Carrillo, the administrative reform would provide the means to tackle agrarian 
problems within a common institutional framework. 
The re-organization of the agricultural services aimed to achieve a better 
coordination within the traditional departments in charge of programme 
implementation. Carrillo argued that it was common for departments with offices 
facing each other to choose to carry out contradictory programmes among the 
same population, which nullified the expected benefits of both programmes 
(Carrillo, 1982: 86). 
Coordination was an important issue in the effectiveness of centralization, 
because the different public agencies that were operating in the agricultural sector 
had individual objectives, a factor that complicated the implementation of 
policies. This project-by-project approach was to be replaced by more 
comprehensive planning based on a sectorial re-organization of agricultural 
government services. In this way the rainfed districts were established as the 
basic units wherein projects were worked out in consultation with government 
agencies and producers, executed by local technical staff, and through aggregated 
planning at the regional level. 
In 1980, at a meeting with the Parliamentary Commission for Information, 
Management and Complaints, Carrillo defined the administrative reform as the 
process that reviewed, simplified and articulated the relationships between the 
administrative machine and government policies. Its aim was to contribute to the 
two main objectives of the Global Plan: first, to guarantee the rational use of 
Mexico's natural resources, such as oil; and second, to achieve self-sufficiency in 
basic food crops. 
With respect to the first objective, he maintained that there were few 
administrative difficulties, because only one Ministry was operating in the energy 
sector. But the situation was more complicated in the agrarian sector; here, 
traditionally, three main Ministries operated (Secretaria de Recursos Hidrâulicos, 
Secretaria de Agricultura y Ganaderia, and Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria). 
Consequently, the institutional environment in this sector militated against 
collaboration. Producers were organized in different ways according to the aims 
and supervision of the specific agencies. Training, financial support and 
agricultural extension were just some of the problems needing solution. Carrillo 
explained this situation as resulting from the incremental development of 
government agencies that, from 1930 onwards, moved the centre of decision 
making from the original Ministry of Agriculture to more specialized agencies 
such as those dealing with finance. Successive governments, instead of coordina­
ting their actions, opted to create new agencies as the quickest administrative 
means of implementing their policies. This path avoided possible costly political 
confrontations between the interests of the bureaucracy and the executive. 
Carrillo pointed out that this practice, after 50 years of use, had generated more 
than 90 different government agencies operating in the agricultural sector (1982: 
284). 
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The administrative reform, then, was not only aimed at unifying the approach 
of the two agricultural Ministries, but also attempted to coordinate such activities 
as the storage of agricultural products, grain regulation and rural insurance, and 
to increase production. Often, the directors of these agencies refused to accept 
any coordination arguing that their agencies were under the direct orders of the 
President. Carrillo pointed out: "It is this type of situation which the 
administrative reform intends to solve through organizing agricultural 
development in sectors and through the establishment of an integrated federal 
public administrative system" (1982: 284-5). 
In Carrillo's view, a new state approach to agriculture had to start with a 
re-organization of the agencies operating in the agricultural sector so as to 
produce a shift in their responsibilities and to justify public investment. These 
measures were directed to recover government effectiveness (i.e. the power to 
carry out policies). In this way Carrillo saw administrative reform "not just as a 
technocratic or a neutral exercise, but as a contribution to the solution of several 
problems that have a high political content" (Carrillo, 1982: 288). 
This approach generated important changes and a chain of reactions among 
agricultural bureaucrats which transformed the form and mode of state 
intervention in rural Mexico. In the next section, I examine the effects of this 
administrative reform as seen in the creation of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Hydraulic Resources, as well as in the birth of the new 'agricultural' orientation 
to rainfed agriculture. 
Sr. López and the Institutional Change 
Sr. López, the central figure of this case, is an agronomist working in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources. He read agronomy at the 
University of Guadalajara, obtaining his degree in 1971. He belongs to the third 
generation of Guadalajara University agronomists. He did social service in the 
agency of the Ministry of Agriculture in Jalisco from July to September 1969. He 
worked as an extension assistant in Ixtlahuacân del Rio, one of the poorest 
municipalities in the Guadalajara area. The other six months of his social service 
were spent working at the Agricultural Bank of the Western Region in the 
municipality of Cihuatlin in Jalisco, in a project concerning fruit trees. 
Sr. López's Official Career before the Administrative Reform 
Sr. López recalls that it was not difficult for him to find a place in the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Livestock, because, as he said, "Real competition for places 
among graduates from other universities like Chapingo, Juarez and Narro only 
happened at the level of the most important posts in the institution and these were 
mainly concentrated in Mexico City. During this period, people were needed in 
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the regions, but there was not much interest in these places then", and he 
continued: 
"My first job was in the general agency in Nayarit, as delegate of 
agricultural extension in the municipios of San Bias and Santiago 
Ixcuintla, from August 1971 to July 1972. That period was very 
important for me. It gave me experience and the practical opportunity to 
experiment with different seeds. From that experience I wrote my degree 
dissertation. 
Agricultural extension was virtually impossible to implement. It was 
left to individuals and it was done by very few professional people. We 
used to have large areas to cover and no permanent base from which to 
organize our work. Constantly moving from one place to another, we had 
no specific plan to perform and the service we delivered were some 
pamphlets and films to the producers. 
Without places to sleep, we frequently used the local municipal 
building and that usually meant that we were subject to influence from 
local politicians or authorities. I still remember that our obligation to 
control crops and livestock was never very significant, because powerful 
local groups always made sure that our decisions never affected their 
interests. As extensionists we did not have fixed working hours and many 
of us used to work Saturdays and Sundays. That style of extension was 
full of personal sacrifice but highly inefficient. " 
After this experience, Sr. López was put in charge of agricultural extension in 
Nayarit, and then he was promoted and transferred to Michoacân, where he 
arrived in August 1975 as state delegate of the planning department: 
"Planning in the agency did not exist. Programmes were directed from 
Mexico and their implementation was the responsibility of the regional 
direcciones. Instructions were general and the regional structures did not 
have the means to operate. These were difficult times because of the 
general lack of institutional organization. I still remember the arrival of a 
fellow agronomist from Guadalajara University who was interested in 
PIDER's [Programme of Investment and Rural Development] experiences 
and he started to talk about the importance of using the new concept 
'micro-regions' to organize agricultural assistance to the producers. It 
was then that he initiated research to explore possible administrative 
benefits from planning agricultural assistance. I was in an executive posi­
tion, so I supported the micro-region idea and discussed it with the 
General Agent of Michoacân, who was an agronomist from Chapingo 
University, with whom I had a very good personal relationship. As I was 
in charge of planning, my suggestion was to use the micro-region concept 
to collect precise information to facilitate planning. " 
The Michoacân agent supported Sr. López' proposal and delegated to him the 
task of selecting an area as a case study. When Sr. López and his friend selected 
one of the most isolated areas in the region, Lazaro Cardenas, they immediately 
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realized why these producers very rarely used the Ministry's services. It took 
peasants at least six hours to come to Morelia, the capital of the region, where all 
the offices dealing with projects were located. Once in Morelia, producers had to 
find the delegate dealing with their project, since there were separate delegates 
for livestock, forestry, plant control and agriculture extension. This took some 
time, but the worst part was that when producers finally managed to locate their 
delegate, he had no authority to solve their problems. Every single programme 
was centrally controlled from Mexico. Each producer's request had to go to 
Mexico for approval and producers were sent from office to office waiting for 
the reply from Mexico. Moreover, an affirmative answer from Mexico usually 
generated new difficulties rather than solutions, because of the lack of 
coordination among the departments. During that period, the Ministry of 
Hydraulic Resources was a totally different institution and was opposed to any 
sort of collaboration. Sr. López remembers: 
"These were the reasons why these producers, when confronted with 
problems, never came on time to us. Their position was to delay their 
visit to our offices, because a visit to Morelia was not worth the money 
and time they had to spend to get there and ask for some service. The 
case study demonstrated that institutional action was only implemented in 
critical situations in the area and concluded that this type of crisis service 
did not bring any substantial benefit to producers, because we were in 
need of a service based on innovation in techniques rather than on 
supervision. With these conclusions we presented a case for effective 
coordination at regional level, at the time when some voices in the 
Ministry were starting to ask for de-centralization and the creation of 
regional sub-agencies, as a way to concentrate institutional action in some 
priority areas. 
The conclusions of our report and the current trend of opinions 
probably helped in the decision of our general agent to support politically 
our project and defend our side against a strong opposition from the other 
delegates in Michoacân. These were afraid that a regional coordination 
could cause them to lose their political control over the budget and their 
political access to Mexico's general offices, where the political game was 
concentrated. " 
Because he was from Michoacân, the general agent knew the magnitude of the 
regional problem. He managed to overcome local unrest and finally took Sr. 
López's proposals to Mexico. According to Sr. Lopez, this experience 
demonstrates how important it is that regional decision-making posts be in the 
hands of people born in the particular state. Sr. López added: 
"Finally, we thought we were on the right track towards the solution of 
our institutional problems, because until then, as a Ministry, we used to 
attend the areas of agriculture, forestry and livestock in isolation, case by 
case and only in the rainfed area. We did not control the irrigated area, 
even when in the law the need for coordination between us and Hydraulic 
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Resources was specifically mentioned. This separation between Ministries 
meant that irrigated districts were run only by Hydraulic Resources. They 
formulated their own agricultural programmes and we used to be invited 
to the annual meeting, just to accept their agricultural programme. We 
had no crop policy between institutions and we had no access to irrigation 
producers, who were under the control of irrigation engineers, through 
pure commercial programmes that were aimed to recover government 
investments. " 
Sr. Lopez said that these administrative difficulties were based on a common 
belief among both bureaucracies, or as he put it, a 'tacit agreement', that 
institutional action was divided between rainfed and irrigated agriculture. In 
1975, after six months of deliberations, the central office in Mexico authorized 
the Michoacân agency to go ahead with the organization of a sub-agency in 
Lâzaro Cardenas. A new post was created as a gesture of support from the 
Minister towards the Michoacân agent, because they were close friends, 
contemporaries in the Ministry and of the same university generation from 
Chapingo. 
Sr. Ldpez as an Actor in the Administrative Transformation Drama 
Sr. Lopez was promoted in April 1976 to the post of Sub-agent in the Michoacân 
regional office. In December of the same year, the implementation of the public 
administration reform resulted in the unification of the Ministries of Agriculture 
and Livestock, and Hydraulic Resources, a measure which became effective in 
January 1977. 
This integration immediately established the irrigation districts as the most 
important area in the new Ministry. The bureaucrats from Hydraulic Resources 
became the dominant force, thus continuing the successful tradition of 
administering commercial agriculture. This gave them the opportunity to control 
the majority of the regional representations in the country. 
"Three quarters of all representations were in the hands of irrigation 
engineers and they continued with their approach of favouring irrigation 
projects. They were determined to channel Ministry actions to improve 
even more of their irrigated districts, so we, as agronomists, had to 
confront them. The extensionist group started to argue that existing 
agrarian development in Mexico was the institutional result of a policy 
that did not provide attention and services to the majority of peasants, 
that the cultivator in rainfed agriculture had to become the subject of 
attention, since he had been producing local maize varieties and beans 
under traditional conditions and was therefore marginalized from moder­
nization programmes. Our proposal was to direct technical assistance and 
resources to that group of producers. 
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The irrigation engineers saw in this position a political challenge to 
their authority, and began to use the process of unification as a way of 
isolating the influence of the ex tensionist group. 
The conflict that started was such, that to save the image of the new 
Ministry, a compromise formula was implemented. In those offices where 
the regional post was in the hands of personnel from the ex-Hydraulic 
Resources Ministry, the post of deputy was given to personnel from the 
ex-Agriculture Ministry. In the few areas where agricultural personnel 
were in control, the deputy's post was given to an irrigation engineer. 
This solution contributed an appearance of normality, but, in reality, the 
situation was quite the opposite because the control of the Ministry 
worked against the agronomists. 
The irrigation engineers removed extensionist influence from the 
regional representations and the result was that these people took refuge 
in the General Directorate of Extension in Mexico. This became the 
fortress of the agronomists from where they initiated actions to disrupt 
the activities of regional representations and to prevent the irrigation 
engineers from absorbing or controlling extension personnel. This period 
was unbelievable. Everyone was involved in the fight for control of the 
Ministry: the unification solution resulted in a paralysis of all institutional 
programmes. The situation was one of total crisis. 
Michoacân was one of the only three regional representations where 
the ex-agricultural agent was designated regional representative, so that 
meant that my post, which was second in importance, was occupied by 
an irrigation engineer and I was sent to organize the department of 
regional agricultural extension. At the national level, and probably as a 
result of the political crisis, the agronomist group started to plan a new 
form of administration, which was specifically oriented to rainfed 
agriculture. 
Sr. Castillo Perez, who was an agronomist from Chapingo 
University with long experience of working with the Rural Credit Bank, 
proposed several new ideas, one of which was to make extension a 
central service in the strategy to transform existing traditional production 
systems. Several of these ideas of Castillo were derived from his visits to 
Israel and China. Sr. Castillo was one of the main forces in the creation 
of rainfed districts. 
In my commission to organize agricultural extension, the regional 
representative asked me whether I would like to experiment with districts. 
I was appointed Regional Coordinator of rainfed districts in February 
1977. This was not official, but a regional attempt to prove that the 
agronomists still survived in the Ministry. I had no guidelines about what 
a district should look like or how it should be organized, so I decided to 
use my own experience acquired from the Lâzaro Cardenas sub-agency 
case study. 
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My first task was to generate a coordinated structure that would 
provide basic agricultural services to producers and for that I divided 
Michoacân into ten administrative micro-regions and created small, but 
well integrated zones, in which to initiate an integral process of rural 
development. It was then that the personnel from the former Ministry of 
Hydraulic Resources reacted. They interpreted my proposal as an attempt 
to resist their influence and accused me of segregating them from rainfed 
development. On the other hand, the regional staff from agricultural 
extension saw my project as an individual effort, which could undermine 
their political relations with the General Directorate in Mexico. So I was 
faced with local official opposition from both nationally antagonistic 
groups. They argued that district organization had no institutional 
authority because they had not been created by a presidential decree, as 
were the irrigation districts. The legitimacy of the project was severely 
questioned at regional level. Confronted with this situation, I decided that 
my first priority was to make the districts operational and organize the 
necessary personnel. 
Personnel recruitment proved to be a tricky problem under these 
conditions, but using my personal relations, I managed to recruit from the 
technical staff a group of people and offered them posts of responsibility. 
These people were all agronomists who had shown interest in the project. 
In relation to field personnel, I opted for the recruitment of some young 
agronomists who had just graduated from university and had to serve 
their year of social service. " 
It was after Sr. Lopez completed the organization of these districts in Michoacân, 
that, in January 1977, a decree from President Lopez Portillo made the rainfed 
districts the new official administrative units for coordinating agricultural services 
and maximizing the use of local resources. As Sr. Lopez put it, "this decree 
boosted our morale; even so, it never explained exactly how to implement it, 
only stressing that institutional research would establish the general procedures of 
the districts". 
Sr. Lopez remembers that for the first time, his decisions acquired a totally 
new meaning within the official framework. One of the first measures he 
implemented was the transformation of the ten micro-regions into nine proper 
rainfed districts. According to Sr. López, this decree intensified the internal 
institutional struggle and, from several quarters, bureaucrats asked for the 
resignation of the Minister, Merino Rabago. As Sr. Lopez expressed it, 'they 
wanted his head'. 
The personnel from ex-Hydraulic Resources perceived the new districts as 
providing political and working space for the agronomists in the institution. They 
rejected this new administrative organization because they could not maintain 
total control over the Ministry. For their part, the extensionist group believed that 
the formation of these rainfed districts was a political measure to marginalize 
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their power in the Ministry, their final assault being to establish control by 
irrigation engineers in the General Directorate of Extension. 
Contrary to these positions, Sr. Lopez interpreted the results of the decree 
positively, since the authority of Merino Rabago was felt for the first time, and 
the staff had to start to carry out his instructions. As coordinator of the rainfed 
districts in Michoacân, Sr. Lopez was now concerned with the organization of 
the operational rainfed units, creating new methods of management for the 
agronomists and systematically recording these experiences for the national 
direction. 
During this period, Sr. Castillo, who was then the General Director of the 
Rainfed Districts Directorate and an old friend of the Michoacân representative, 
came to visit Morelia. Sr. Lopez recalled: 
"We remembered his important role in the protection of the agronomists' 
positions during the conflicts, so we received him with a very good 
dinner. During the course of the meal we provided Sr. Castillo with a 
complete report of our advances in the organization of the districts and 
then we asked for his support to go ahead with the actual implementation 
of the rainfed district's objectives. I still recall the favourable impression 
he had of our work and that evening he gave us the green light. " 
Sr. Lopez was chosen to direct a pilot project to assess the benefits of the new 
administrative units. In this new situation, ex-supervisors, who in the past had 
been opposed to Sr. Lopez's proposal, became active, accumulating information 
and exercising pressure in order to-be selected as heads of the districts. Sr. 
Lopez explained: 
"As I was responsible for the official appointments I tried to find a 
balance between those people who supported me during the conflict and 
the new personnel. To avoid complications, I made it clear that the 
person who wanted to direct a district had the obligation to set up his 
home inside the district boundaries. With this requirement, only the most 
dedicated personnel remained in the competition. I managed to secure 
efficiency for the districts with this requirement because from that 
moment there was always a qualified member of the Ministry in the area 
to provide assistance to producers. " 
However, institutional conflicts did not disappear and the General Directorate of 
Extension, which was fighting to remain as a Direction, started to claim that 
rainfed districts were units with only a normative character (i.e. with advisory 
functions only). Therefore, the personnel working in them should follow the 
policies of the General Directorate of Extension and inform it of their activities 
while continuing with their regular work in rainfed districts. Sr. Lopez pointed 
out that this was an attempt by the officials of the Directorate of Extension to 
control the Directorate of Rainfed Districts and to neutralize any possible 
negative effects on their bureaucratic positions. 
As a result of this action, a process of bargaining was initiated at the national 
level, whereby regional representatives, who wanted to make sure that rainfed 
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districts actually operated, had to designate as head of such districts, 
ex-supervisors from the Agricultural Extension Service; otherwise that 
representative would suffer constant opposition from the central office in Mexico. 
According to Sr. López this tactic was used by agronomists to win back their 
influence at the regional level. 
In Michoacân this was not so because it was an agronomist stronghold. 
Nevertheless, the extension supervisor, a person close to the central government 
office who had a history of frequent clashes with the regional representative 
concerning rainfed districts, was finally sent to work at the General Directorate 
in Mexico City. With this move, Sr. López became recognized as the only person 
in charge of the rainfed districts in Michoacân and 'the direct line of 
communication with the central office'. 
Sr. López made several people from the extension service local heads of 
rainfed units. He also had the responsibility of providing the rainfed districts with 
basic infrastructure. He rented local houses, obtained desks, typewriters and 
essential support personnel, such as secretaries. This process took him a year. 
The rainfed districts started operations with a very simple organization: a head of 
the district with two assistants, one responsible for gathering information and the 
other for supervising field operations. Below this level, the person in charge of 
activities in the field was the head of what was called the rainfed unit. 
Policies were still highly centralized, Sr. López being responsible for the 
implementation of instructions from the central office. Any local adaptations had 
to be communicated to the central office, where they had to be approved before 
implementation could take place. 
Sr. López recalled that the whole process of rainfed district consolidation 
took approximately two years. During this period, the rise and fall of the political 
power of the irrigation engineers indicated the beginnings of the agronomists' 
era. In administrative terms, the rainfed districts were given financial control 
over their programmes and regional representations, and this meant that in many 
respects they, and not the Direcciones in Mexico City, became the centres of 
local decision making. Sr. López suggests, though, that some General 
Direcciones managed to survive until 1981 just because they had presidential 
support and not for practical reasons. 
Finally, two national evaluation meetings in 1979 and 1980 on rainfed 
districts, and the presidential decree to review the existing operational systems in 
the Ministry, ended the General Directorate of Extension and established the 
rainfed districts as the administrative structure aimed at modernizing agriculture. 
In January 1978, Sr. López was designated head of rainfed district No. 3 in 
Morelia. In this post, he continued performing the same functions and remained 
there until July 1980, when he moved to the representation in Jalisco. 
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Sr. López's Last Comments on the Administrative Reform 
Sr. López argues that with the implementation of the rainfed districts, the 
political influence acquired by the irrigation engineers through the integration of 
the Ministries was reversed. The new administrative organization made it 
possible for the agronomists to link their ambitions for political influence with the 
new policy of intervention in rainfed agriculture. The rainfed district became 
established as the most important Dirección in the Ministry: they had more 
hectares to cover and modernize than the irrigation districts. But, according to 
Sr. López, this official argument was an excuse used by the Minister, Sr. Merino 
Rabago, for initiating the final offensive against the old irrigation bureaucracy, 
and for changing the personnel in charge of regional representations. This action 
consolidated rainfed agriculture as the priority of the Ministry and established the 
agronomists as the administrators of the new policy, a fact that gave them control 
of the Ministry. 
While the consolidation of the rainfed district was a political victory for the 
agronomists, the actual implementation of the rainfed organization varied between 
the different regions of the country. For instance, Sr. López comments: 
"Jalisco, which had a powerful group of livestock producers, had to delay 
the operation of the rainfed districts for a considerable period. These 
began to operate only when national strategies, like the Mexican Food 
System (SAM) was implemented and priority from the central 
government was given to increasing basic grains." 
A General Overview of the Administrative Reform in the Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Now, on the basis of the above case material, I would like to outline some of the 
effects of the administrative reform on the modernization of the agricultural 
services. Sr. López's experiences confirm Carrillo's view that changes at the 
institutional level were needed in the Mexican public system to bring about a 
change in policy orientation. During the 1970s, the bureaucracy was open to 
university graduates who were prepared to work in the provinces. But the posts 
in Mexico City which lead to a political career were only open to people from 
the most prestigious university, Chapingo. Thus, for those like Sr. López who 
had graduated from a provincial university, the possibilities of being appointed to 
the centre were zero, due to the importance of the system of escuelismo 
(networks of influence based on university friendship) in Mexico. 
Hence for a whole group of young professional agronomists, the provinces 
were the only alternative. In the provincially-based agencies, these university 
professionals were left to organize the service as best as they could. Sr. López 
described the type of agricultural extension that he knew during this period as 
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one 'full of personal sacrifice but totally inefficient'. During this time, 
agricultural extension had the following features: 
a service which had no clear objectives about what to do in the field, 
a service that was left to the fieldworker's individual initiative, 
a service that was provided by very few university graduates in agriculture, 
a service that demanded from the fieldworker the supervision of large 
agricultural areas, 
the fieldworker had no permanent base (office), 
the fieldworker was not compelled to organize his work, 
the fieldworker had no officially assigned functions to perform, 
the diffusion of knowledge was not by means of practice, but through devices 
like pamphlets and films, 
local political authorities could influence the activities of the fieldworker 
because he had no official support, 
the fieldworker had to supervise crops, livestock and to report any plant or 
animal disease, 
the fieldworker had no fixed hours of work. 
This list provides us with the reasons why administrative reforms saw the 
re-organization of the agricultural services as a prerequisite for any new 
agricultural policy. Producers also saw the services as inefficient and costly in 
terms of money and time. They doubted the capability of fieldworkers to solve 
their problems. This attitude on the part of producers helped to create among 
technical personnel and fieldworkers the preconception that the ejidatario 
producer did not want technical assistance, because they were traditional people 
who rejected modernization. 
The administrative reform's criterion of efficiency generated a transformation 
that called for the emergence of a new organizational structure which could 
mobilize, channel and regulate resources in favour of rainfed agriculture. 
Institutional conflict within the bureaucracy was strong and this eventually led the 
agronomists to develop an approach in which agronomic criteria based on 
technological packages replaced the irrigation engineers' emphasis on irrigation 
infrastructure. In this way, the administrative reform produced substantial 
changes in the operations of the agricultural bureaucracy. Nevertheless, we need 
to examine the extent to which this effort improved the interface between 
bureaucracy and the peasants, affected the internal composition of the 
administrative units, and took into consideration the interest of the rainfed 
agricultural producers. 
The Origins of the Mission and the Missionaries 
From the beginning of the century, the mission of the agrarian bureaucracy in 
Mexico had been to increase production. After the land reform programme was 
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initiated, one of the first government attempts to support production was through 
agricultural credit, which became in the 1930s, the primary promoter of 
development. The conception that agricultural credit had to have a cultural and 
social function was promoted by the ex-Ministry of Development (Ministerio de 
Fomento), an institution which was the direct predecessor of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources. 
The failure of these credit programmes to achieve the expected increase in 
production allowed the Ministry of Finance to argue that credit should be given 
according to technical criteria rather than according to its social value. This view 
led to the separation of credit from the Ministry of Development, its 
administration being transferred to the Ministry of Finance. Until the 
administrative reform, this latter Ministry had been responsible for the 
supervision of 82 percent of the official credit given to the agrarian sector. 
After 1935, credit control ended the notion of credit as an agent of 
development and presented the Ministry of Development with the need to find a 
new institutional means to improve production on the ejidos. In 1933, the General 
Directorate of Agriculture organized the Department of Agricultural Research 
Stations and later the Department of Agricultural Development. Their activities 
were concentrated on the selection of seeds and their distribution to the ejidos. 
Imported technology was rejected and the creation of a national technological 
system was to address itself to the practical problems of the producers with a 
network of agricultural schools set up to provide training for the peasants. In 
1947, this group created the Institute of Agricultural Research which operated 
until 1960 (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1978: 31-2). This began the first agronomist 
tradition in Mexico and was the origin of the extension service. 
The second tradition was established in 1943 when the Rockefeller 
Foundation created the Oficina de Estudios Especiales, which, under the direction 
of North American agronomists, experimented with new seed varieties in order to 
develop technological packages that would improve crop production. This 
research was based on the assumption that agricultural technology was easily 
transferable from the United States to Mexico. In contrast with the earlier 
Mexican tradition, technology was seen as independent of economic, social and 
cultural constraints, and capable of solving the problems of underdevelopment. 
This research succeeded in generating high-yielding varieties for wheat but was 
less successful for maize, due to the more difficult conditions under which this 
crop is cultivated. 
The Rockefeller programme did not give importance to extension and it was 
only in 1947, when some producers started to enquire about the qualities of the 
new seeds, that an office to satisfy private demand was established. Later, in 
1955, a public office to provide agricultural information was created. 
The research on High Technological Packages was mainly implemented in 
irrigated districts where the government, first in 1940 through the Commission 
for National Irrigation and later, in 1946, with the Ministry of Hydraulic 
Resources, created the infrastructural conditions to support commercial 
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agriculture. This irrigation policy favoured 10 percent of Mexican rural families 
and concentrated public resources in the north-west of the country. Two-thirds of 
the public investment in agriculture was allocated to this region (Duran and 
Bustin, 1983: 19). This benefitted the descendants of the revolutionary leaders 
who used public funds and this research to finance their entrepreneurial activities. 
In this context, the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources became the most 
important agricultural agency, allocating public resources and politically fostering 
the development of an entrepreneurial agricultural sector in the north-west of the 
country. This sector, according to Hewitt de Alcantara (1978), in spite of its 
market orientation, wasted considerable resources and there was no government 
control over production decisions until 1953, when deplorable management and 
low crop yields finally led to the formation of the Executive Committees of 
Irrigation (Comités Directivos de Irrigación). 
These executive committees tried to involve the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, the agricultural banks, private credit institutions 
and the producers in the formulation of an annual plan, in which the needs of the 
country, both institutional and those of the producers, would be related to the 
availability of water (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1978: 58). Control of water was under 
the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, and the organization of the plan under the 
charge of the Ministry of Agriculture. A bitter institutional conflict arose between 
these two Ministries based on a difference of criteria about national priorities: 
whether water resources should be used to satisfy internal crop demands and 
equitable development or to support the more profitable irrigated units. Once 
again, the social aims of the agronomists were blocked by the economically 
effective policy of the engineers, who controlled water distribution and the 
irrigation districts, and in this way destroyed the attempts at coordination. 
The agronomists criticized the economically effective criteria of the engineers 
arguing that it lacked any conception of rural development. Property was 
concentrated and land use patterns established according to market demands and 
not in relation to national need or in terms of the technological limits of the soil. 
Nevertheless, the agronomists' critique had little echo in official circles 
because the results of the Rockefeller programme showed that improved seeds on 
irrigated land, plus fertilizers, pesticides and increased mechanization, could 
increase food production. Thus the effects of the 'green revolution' reinforced the 
importance of the irrigated districts and the institutional dominance of the 
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. 
It was not until 1961 that the government attempted to reconcile these two 
traditions of agricultural thinking. The formation of the National Institute of 
Agricultural Research (INIA) was created to increase agronomic knowledge. But 
unfortunately INIA was unable to generate an autonomous line of research, 
different from the specialized seed technologies. By 1968, little research existed 
for the non-irrigated lands in Mexico. These were left aside because the 
technological packages did not perform well in those areas. 
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According to Dahlberg (1979), the publication of Theodore W. Schultz's 
Transforming Traditional Agriculture in 1964 revived the issue of the transfer of 
agricultural technology with the argument that producers were not bound by 
cultural tradition. It was at this point that Mexican agronomists discovered 
agricultural extension as a new way of fostering development in rainfed areas. 
Agricultural education, rather than research, became the central aim of this 
orientation and the dissemination of existing knowledge its first priority. 
The leading agricultural university in Mexico, Chapingo, closely studied the 
experiences of the North American Agricultural Extension Service, and a 
generation of agronomists went to North American universities to seek 
postgraduate training. This process culminated in 1963 with the formulation of 
the Chapingo plan (Martinez, 1983). This plan was a replica of the Land Grant 
College curriculum from the United States, and Martinez (1983) suggests that this 
was the Mexican version of integrating education and agricultural research. 
Whereas the Land Grant Colleges' objectives during the 1950's and 1960's were 
to diffuse innovations in order to generate technological changes, the Mexican 
agronomist's function stressed the need to study existing family practices with a 
view to improving production and the welfare of the rural population. 
In 1967, institutions like the agricultural school of Chapingo, the Chapingo 
Postgraduate College, INIA and the Department of Agricultural Extension from 
the Ministry of Agriculture combined to train the new type of professional 
agronomists. The new agronomist was trained in solving rural problems by 
applying a combined approach, in which technical and social elements interacted. 
He was taught that biological, technical, social, cultural, psychological, economic 
and political aspects were all relevant (Martinez, 1983: 98). Such professionals 
were endowed with a belief that they were the only group with an integrated 
approach capable of solving rural problems. Their power was to be based on an 
understanding of social problems, specialized technical agronomic knowledge and 
the will to modernize rainfed agriculture. 
This professional training lasted until 1975, when the General Directorate of 
Extension returned to the Ministry of Agriculture, and the new professionals had 
begun to regain political influence in the bureaucracy. From 1970 onwards their 
influence steadily grew through the implementation of programmes, like PIDER 
(Programme of Investment and Rural Development), which made them frontline 
actors in the bureaucratic competition for the controV of rural development 
programmes. 
The establishment of agricultural extension as an important instrument in 
organizing agricultural policies meant that several agencies included it in their 
services. The Bank of Rural Credit (BANRURAL) and the Ministry of Hydraulic 
Resources were just 2 of the 30 official agencies that had extension. As 
Lamartine (1978) reports, this situation created a confused institutional 
environment in terms of responsibilities, coordination and objectives. When it 
was finally decided to which agency extension services should belong it was the 
Ministry of Agriculture which kept them. 
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The agricultural extension service acquired more experience with the Plan 
Puebla. This plan, begun in 1967 at the initiative of the International Centre of 
Maize and Wheat Improvements (CIMMYT) and founded by the Rockefeller and 
Ford Foundations, was taken over in 1973 by the Mexican government and run 
by the extension service. The approach was based on the dissemination of 
innovations with the objective of generating controlled technological and social 
change among producers (Montoya, 1979: 11). Timely credit, the supply of 
fertilizers and pesticides, plus agronomic supervision in identifying the higher 
yield corn seeds provided a needed experience for the extension service. 
Dahlberg (1979) argues that Plan Puebla was a shift away from the approach that 
focused on single factors. He states, 'the Puebla program has two major thrusts: 
carrying out research and demonstration work, and seeking better support and 
delivery systems for inputs' (1979: 196). 
Plan Puebla can be considered as the first attempt in Mexico to implement 
the green revolution technology in rainfed agriculture. As such, it has a historical 
importance for the agronomist's influence on the formulation of national 
agricultural policy. The long march of the agronomists finally achieved their 
mission among the bureaucrats and, during Echeverria's government, they 
launched several development programmes to benefit poor peasant areas. 
The mission of the agronomists has always been identified with rainfed 
agriculture since bureaucratic competition with rival agencies was sharpened with 
the creation of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. This polarized the situation 
into two professional groups which split the agricultural service between the 
irrigation engineers and agronomists. Each was in control of one Ministry, with 
little or no dialogue between them. With the constant decline in the production of 
basic crops and the recognition that agricultural extension was the new means to 
modernize agriculture, the agronomists emerged out of the administrative reform 
as missionaries who, at last, had been given the opportunity to fulfil their 
long-denied mission. 
The inter-bureaucratic conflict that later resulted from the integration of the 
two Ministries can be explained by this existing professional opposition between 
irrigation engineers and agronomists. The difference of approach was only 
resolved institutionally after the government accepted the agenda of the 
agronomists and launched a programme directed at the rainfed areas. 
The Agronomic Approach to Rainfed Agriculture 
The decree that authorized the creation of the rainfed districts started by 
recognizing that the lack of official attention had contributed to the lack of basic 
infrastructure, agronomic research, technical assistance, training, producers' 
organizations and credit in rainfed agriculture. These factors were identified as 
accounting for the decline in production and the misuse of human and natural 
resources. Officially, this situation was explained as due to previous government 
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policy that concentrated resources and infrastructure in the irrigated sector 
(DGDUT, 1978). Nevertheless, official documents claim that this was the right 
policy at the time because the Federal Government had limited resources to invest 
and furthermore it was in the irrigated areas that there existed 'a more positive 
economic response to government policies' (DGDUT, 1979). This paradigmatic 
disenchantment with past agricultural policies presented the new approach as the 
more rational solution to agricultural problems. 
Agronomists argued that with proper institutional attention, it would be 
possible to increase the rainfed rate of productivity by unit of investment. This 
was identified as the main constraint that had kept agricultural performance low. 
This reasoning led to an institutional justification in which official intervention 
and efficiency in management was seen to reverse the existing social and 
economic conditions of rainfed producers (DGDUT, 1978). 
The model of rainfed development was clear. Agronomists would solve the 
existing bottlenecks in production if they had the resources and power to 
intervene, just as, in the past, the irrigation engineers had done in the irrigation 
districts. This position, unthinkable in the 1940's, indicates that traditional 
bureaucratic stereotypes about rainfed peasants resisting change because of 
ignorance or traditionalism had been abandoned. 
The agronomists' experiences in the rural development programmes of the 
1970's provided them with a new perception. They began to consider exploitation 
in terms of the linkages between local people and the rest of the society and not 
just as cultural idiosyncrasies of the rural environment (Hewitt de Alcantara, 
1982: 258). This understanding was complemented by the agronomists' 
acceptance of concepts from studies of peasant economy in the design of their 
own agricultural proposals. The agronomists' aim in incorporating the rainfed 
producer into the market was to use state intervention to diminish peasant 
production risks (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1982: 260). 
The influence of academic training in North American rural sociology (The 
Chapingo Plan and the diffusion of innovations) and the practical experience of 
the agronomists during the 1970's contributed to an approach that aimed to 
transform rainfed agriculture. This approach initially focused upon individual 
modernization in agriculture (e.g. on the distribution and supervision of 
agricultural inputs, mechanization, credit, etc.), rather than directly attacking the 
social structural conditions in which producers found themselves. The Plan 
Puebla experience was important in the sense that it contributed to a more 
comprehensive understanding of these factors effecting agricultural change. 
Nevertheless, the agronomic identification of needs, while advocating a new 
policy of intervention and the generation of more effective administrative instru­
ments to carry out controlled changes, did not move away significantly from the 
'residual' or 'improvement' approach to development. 
The organization and development of rainfed agriculture became more and 
more dependent on state intervention than on producers' responses to change. 
The agronomists presented themselves as the only sector of the bureaucracy able 
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to implement modern public administration techniques, such as systems analysis, 
in order to achieve their mission and remove the technical obstacles to rural 
modernization. In this orientation, the rural producer was in effect reduced to a 
mere economic factor, following the economic rationality of maximization and 
subject to the administration of the state. It was assumed that the producer could 
be easily quantified and manipulated if programmes and projects were rationally 
formulated. 
This rational approach proposed the classification of the national rainfed areas 
according to different climatic conditions and variables. Thermo-pluviometry, 
illumination and atmospheric relative humidity became the independent variables 
of an optimum model to identify the physical potential of agronomic resources. 
This model was further elaborated with calculations on the availability of labour 
force, financial costs for inputs and services, as well as regional and national 
market constraints. The objective was to determine 'technically' (contrary to the 
old political style of management) all aspects of administrative action to be 
implemented. 
The aim of these new administrators was to formulate realistic aims from 
projections (the 'mystical' powers of planning) and contribute to the 
determination of a growth model entailing state commitment to rural change. The 
creation of the rainfed districts was not just a reallocation of roles and statuses 
among the professional members of the agricultural bureaucracy, but also the 
consolidation of a new institutional logic of administration which altered the 
perception on Ministry priorities and redistributed political decision making 
according to this logic. 
Irrigated agricultural production concentrated on crops that could not be 
cultivated in the rainfed districts. The coordination and control of the agricultural 
plan did not permit the deviation of any producer (DGDUT, 1978). Producers' 
participation was accepted through their local democratically- elected representa­
tives, though municipal and regional authorities contributed local, social and 
political knowledge in order to 'persuade and control local forces' (DGDUT, 
1978). 
The concept of 'Rainfed District' stressed the use of favourable ecological 
conditions to increase agricultural production, and was first publicly debated in 
July 1979, in Lagos de Moreno, Jalisco. At this public meeting the following six 
main criteria were identified in the formation of the rainfed districts: 
1. uniformity in defining agro-ecological and socio-economic areas for planning 
and implementation purposes, 
2. acceptance of political-geographic jurisdictions - the districts should include 
whole municipalities and be restricted to the state limits, 
3. adoption of the existing internal communication system, in order to facilitate 
the movement of the personnel working in the area, 
4. integration within the district boundaries of regional bank branches operating 
under the official rural credit system, 
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5. inclusion of the administrative divisions that states have used to coordinate 
their development, 
6. distribution of the official work load according to cultivation areas, number 
of producers, their degree of relative development and crop priorities 
(DGDUT, 1980). 
The socio-economic and cultural conditions of the cultivators were not given 
analytical importance in the formation of rainfed districts. Crops were seen as 
independent of social processes. Hence rural producers did not receive the same 
degree of institutional attention as the natural elements which were perceived as 
the only ones constraining the agricultural efficiency in the model. The main 
objective of this process was to establish a standard type of agricultural 
management, but this management ignored the historical circumstances of the 
rural producers, their cultural, social and technological adaptations, and market 
differences. 
This official appraisal highlighted the absence of cooperative projects among 
rainfed producers. Producers obtained' their agricultural inputs from several 
different sources and so it was recommended that adequate programmes of 
production should be promoted which would establish certain basic norms and 
operational policies (DGDUT, 1978). Again, the notion of order was the central 
element in this development policy. This was to be achieved by programming the 
distribution of agricultural inputs through support measures or incentives from the 
Federal Government, and by rules and projects established by the specific 
agencies in charge of intervention. 
The agronomic model attempted a vertical coordination of resources, national 
targets and local-level production, but it failed to acknowledge that household 
production, rather than following a tendency towards crop specialization, often 
adopts a horizontal set of flexible strategies where the combination of economic 
activities constitutes the core of producers' responses to change. Hence, the 
agronomic approach did not consider the social organization of the rural producer 
and ended up supporting a centralized style of administration where transforma­
tions were defined by planning according to sectoral aims. Agronomic criteria did 
not provide room for grass-roots consultation or for ascertaining local 
requirements. It neglected local knowledge. As will be shown in the following 
chapters, the gap between theory and reality, clearly expressed in the procedures 
adopted for forming and organizing the rainfed districts, became the basis of the 
difficulties that later confronted implementors and fieldworkers of the Ministry 
when the Mexican Food System (SAM) was launched. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that fundamental contradictions within the organization of 
the state agricultural bureaucracy led to change in management structure. 
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Administrative reform promoted the rise of the agronomists as a district 
professional group, who emerged as the primary social carriers of the new 
rainfed policy. Using efficiency criteria as their political weapon, the agronomists 
displaced the traditional professional and political influence of irrigation engineers 
in Mexican agricultural policy, whilst presenting themselves as new and efficient 
managers that could succeed where the previous bureaucrats had failed. 
The agronomists identified the agricultural problems of Mexico as best solved 
through increasing inputs into rainfed agriculture. They focused their strategy on 
the redistribution of income, which, according to them, would decrease rural-
urban migration and achieve a more balanced pattern of regional development. 
This policy was seen as providing solutions to the decline in the production of 
basic crops and as a means of regaining the government's political initiative. 
Accordingly, the agronomists were the driving force in the formulation of the 
Mexican Food System (SAM), under the presidency of Lopez Portillo. The SAM 
represented a comprehensive plan that put into practice the alliance for production 
between the state and the producers of basic crops. 
In the process of the creation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic 
Resources (SARH), the agronomists' political stance substantially altered. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the agronomist tradition was associated with a social critique on 
the economic orientation of engineering practices, which concentrated investments 
in large irrigation projects. However, by the time the agronomists gained 
influence in the Ministry, it concerned a new university generation of 
agronomists. These were indeed technocratic in outlook and equally interested in 
achieving efficiency in the countryside. Nonetheless, with the introduction of 
rainfed districts the fact remains that this implied a redirection of state funds 
from large irrigation projects to investments in small producers aimed at 
increasing the production of basic staple foods. 
The agronomic model supporting technological change in agriculture through 
resource allocation and research was the backbone to implementing increased 
'efficiency'. The criterion of efficiency postulated that agrarian development, 
rather than land redistribution, was the central factor initiating a new era of 
production in Mexico and the way forward to tackling the serious problem of 
rural poverty. This policy resulted from intra-bureaucratic conflict. The conflict 
became the catalyst for the acceptance of a new form of 'scientific knowledge', 
and for a power struggle within the state organization itself. The outcome of this 
struggle was the generation of an ideology wherein the agronomists provided the 
means by which to carry out the transformations needed by the state in order to 
regain its political initiative in steering development. 
In this chapter, then, I have focused on state organization and the dynamic 
properties of administrative structures when confronted with changing economic 
and social circumstances. The direction of such change may be explained in 
terms of the state's response to the need to secure conditions through whatever 
new modes of operation are established. However, as shown in this chapter, the 
formulation of new policies and the administrative reform that accompanied it did 
47 
not follow a simple problem-response pattern. While the impetus for change may 
have come from the changing political, economic and social circumstances, the 
emerging agencies of state intervention in rainfed agriculture were the result of 
political processes surrounding the different practices, interests and world-views 
of competing bureaucrats. 
Notes 
1. A slightly revised version of this chapter has been published in Arce (1987). 
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3. ADMINISTRATIVE REALITY AND BUREAUCRATIC 
CULTURE: A GAZE INTO THE ART OF MANAGEMENT 
My aim in this chapter is to provide a background to agricultural administrative 
processes. At the outset, we are faced with the problem of how an anthropologist 
can penetrate the practices of a complex organisation like the Ministry of 
Agriculture (SARH). The first thing is to examine bureaucrats as members of an 
epistemological community. Since they share a language, degree of knowledge 
and behaviour that somehow distinguishes them from other communities in 
Mexican society. This implies that the researcher has to spend time within their 
environment, observing the way bureaucrats work and communicate, i.e. how 
they actually produce their papers, write their memorandums and analyze their 
data. The second point is how to make sense of the interactions the bureaucrat 
creates within the 'administrative' culture, which are influenced by all sorts of 
factors, such as policies, administrative reforms, institutional politicking, personal 
interests, conflicts and careers. The interpretation of how the bureaucrat 
translates and makes sense of these contingent factors depends very much on his 
social background and experiences. In short, in order to understand the 
implementation of policies, we need to observe the behaviour and penetrate the 
social life-worlds of the bureaucrats. 
This chapter complements my previous analysis of agrarian policy 
formulation with a more localised view of institutional actors. I discuss factors 
affecting their behaviour and operation. The chapter links administrative action 
and actors' experiences to the capacity to implement state political agendas. One 
crucial aspect of the chapter is the analysis of how bureaucratic culture impinges 
on the implementation of policies. 
Although the ability and skill of local officials to organise and orientate their 
services to the producers is an important dynamic in Mexico, state intervention, 
as centralised policy action, antagonises practices which are embedded as routines 
in local districts. The relevance of everyday bureaucratic practices in my analysis 
relates to the significance of understanding bureaucratic habitualization (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966). It also encompasses the impact of administrative responses 
and the adaptability of bureaucrats in implementing central policies. While lack of 
resources may constitute a general constraint on district actions, staff attitudes 
and performance in relation to producers' demands generate a set of everyday 
practices through which the district agricultural bureaucracy explicitly shows its 
degree of social power and ideology in making their administrative domain. 
Let me first describe the district under study, and then depict the daily 
routine in the district office. I will elaborate upon three salient aspects of this 
routine - the manipulation of documents, visits by representatives of the 
producers to the district office and the social gatherings of office staff 
(convivencias). Finally I present an interview to show the relation between the 
life-world of one district bureaucrat and his enactment of state policies. 
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Characteristics of District No.l, Zapopan 
Zapopan consists of eleven municipalities in central Jalisco. It is organised into 
eight operational agricultural field-units serving 54 agricultural zones and 33 
livestock areas. The district occupies 5.9 percent of the total area of Jalisco and 
is located in a neo-volcanic zone to the south of the Sierra Madre Occidental. 
The landscape is flat or gently undulating and covers an area of 503,213 
hectares, classified into 150,382 hectares of cultivable land; 212.370 hectares of 
pasture land; 47,668 hectares of forestry and 92,793 hectares of non-productive 
land. Of the agricultural land, 60 percent supports rainfed agriculture, 32 percent 
a humid type of agriculture, and 8 percent is irrigated. The pattern of crop 
cultivation is based on maize, wheat, sorghum, beans and chickpeas, but fruit and 
vegetables also contribute to the district's production. Annual crops are cultivated 
on 97,6 percent of the agricultural land, of which 72.1 percent is dedicated to 
maize. The rest is occupied by fruit trees, artificial pastures and sugar cane. 
The district has, inside its boundaries, the best road network of the whole 
state. It is the centre of commercial and transport activities for Jalisco. A 
regional road system links the interior via dirt roads to all municipalities and 
productive areas. 
Maize and sorghum have traditionally constituted the main products of the 
district and their production has increased since 1977. The absolute increase in 
the production of maize has been greater than that of sorghum whose decline was 
mainly a result of state intervention in the district. According to district 
information the fertility of the soil favours agriculture. An internal document 
(1983) estimated the relation between net and gross income for maize to be 
higher than 41 percent and 45 percent for beans. The production of maize is also 
favoured by the district's proximity to Guadalajara. In the period from 1977 to 
1982, rainfed maize production increased by 619 kilos per hectare and extended 
its harvested area by 15.5 percent during this period (SARH, 1983). Sorghum, 
on the other hand, in spite of its increase in terms of productivity has diminished 
in harvested area in the district. Rainfed maize has been the only crop to double 
its production value. It is the most important crop in the district and the rainfed 
producers are the main clients of the SARH. 
Agricultural Modernisation in the District 
District No.l, Zapopan, is not one of the largest in Jalisco, although it has the 
highest proportion of its land under maize cultivation. It is cultivated using 
modern agricultural practices. The district has a high percentage of its land 
committed to institutional modernisation programmes. Until 1980, the two main 
institutional programmes of modernisation were based on fertilization and 
mechanisation. From that year on high yielding varieties were increasingly used 
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in the district, completing the use of a powerful technological package for maize 
cultivation. 
The high yielding seeds were not firmly established until more than half of 
the district was mechanised, and fertilizers were used on practically all cultivable 
land. The use of fertilizers marked the end of extensive fanning practices and 
inaugurated a new era of productivity, characterised by the intensive farming of 
maize. The administration of technological packages was the device through 
which the district increased its institutional and administrative control over the 
local productive space. The area of the technical extension service increased from 
1977 to 1982, with the largest advance during the period 1981-1982. 
In 1981, technical extension spread to more than twice the area of the 
preceding year, with a consequently greater area for the fieldworker to cover. 
This expansion of technical assistance accompanied the implementation of the 
SAM programme and the extensive introduction of high yielding seed varieties in 
the district. This stage of agricultural modernisation was characterised by 
institutional reform and the introduction and diffusion of technological packages 
of modern agricultural inputs. It coincided with the SAM policy of increasing the 
use of modem agricultural practices in rainfed agriculture. The implementation of 
this aim facilitated a closer relation between district practices of intervention and 
the producers' need to learn how to effectively use modern agricultural inputs. 
Constraints on ejido production were from this moment on perceived as a 
technical problem of input management, and input management thus became a 
principal function for the district agronomists to fulfil. 
Government Agencies in the District 
The district under study has a privileged geographical location. Due to its short 
distance from Guadalajara, the state capital, it is serviced by all the government 
agencies related to agricultural development in Mexico. 
In 1980, the National Agricultural Bank, BANRURAL, provided credit for 
12 percent of the total planted area of the district, and in 1981 increased this to 
30 percent of the rainfed area sown. This was one of the years of highest official 
government credit to producers of the decade. In addition, FIRA (Fidecomisos 
Dependientes del Banco de Mexico), another government credit institution, which 
is directed to developing rural property and improving the existing level of 
machinery, brought credit from private banks to the district. Between 1980-1982, 
72 percent of such loans came from private banks and 28 percent from 
government banks. The level of credit in the district is high compared to that of 
other districts. Several factors account for this, including the district's 
agricultural potential, and the fact that its road network and existing storage 
capacity make it suitable for investment and state intervention. 
By far the most important official agency is the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Hydraulic Resources (the SARH) which implements, in the field, government 
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agricultural intervention through four main programmes: Agriculture extension; 
Livestock and Forestry; Planning; and Hydraulic Infrastructure. These 
programmes are carried out using operational plans by field operational units. 
The operational plans are organised by the district technical assistance service, 
which, with the personnel working in the field-units, constitutes the backbone of 
district intervention. 
District Operations of the SARH 
District operations depend directly on the amount of available resources in the 
official budget. A major increase in the district budget took place between 
1979-1980, coinciding with the launching of the SAM strategy. This tendency 
continued in 1981 until resources stabilized at the 1981 level in 1982. 
Technical assistance received the major slice of district economic resources 
until 1977, after which budget allocations favoured infrastructural projects. This 
tendency did not change during the implementation of the SAM, indicating that 
district intervention during the 1980's was primarily oriented to increasing 
possibilities for production rather than to social development. 
The allocation of resources was based on conflicting criteria. On the one 
hand was the economic viability of projects, and on the other, the social and 
political goals of the agricultural extension services. Projects such as irrigation 
schemes were usually based in areas where state investment was likely to bring a 
maximum return in production. Extension services, on the other hand, operated 
more according to the institution's political need to control rainfed maize 
producers. 
Municipalities were blocked from receiving agricultural assistance and 
therefore achieving agricultural development if the area was not considered viable 
for fulfilling district production targets. Budget allocations did not favour 
programmes such as technical assistance, producer organisations or agricultural 
research. Instead, the budget provided more resources to infrastructural projects 
and conservation, replicating former government interventions implemented in the 
irrigated sector (see Chapter 2). 
The selection of productive areas became a powerful instrument for the 
SARH for controlling producers, a necessary condition to.safeguard the economic 
and technical resources invested in project areas. The official assumption behind 
this policy of intervention was that where comparative advantages existed, local 
producers would transform their local practices to take advantage of the 
infrastructural benefits provided by the district. 
Investing public resources in productive areas defined rural development 
during the 1980's in Mexico. The policy met market demands rather than 
satisfied existing social needs (such as the welfare of producers). Infrastructural 
projects employed local labour and linked agricultural development with the 
urban structure of Guadalajara, from where inputs and services were obtained. 
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Infrastructural projects, such as roads, store-houses, dams, and wells for 
irrigation, promoted socioeconomic development that integrated rural localities 
into a regional market dominated by Guadalajara. 
Socio-Economic Characteristics of the District 
In 1981, 65 percent of the total cultivable area in the district was controlled by 
small private property owners, while 35 percent of the land was ejido property. 
The municipalities of Zapopan, Tlajomulco de Zuniga, and Ixtlaucan del Rio 
were the principal producers of hybrid maize in the district. 
The demographic density of the district in 1970 was 327.7 inhabitants per 
square kilometre. In 1979 the population had grown to 2,615,985 inhabitants, an 
annual population growth of 5.6 percent. The municipality with the fastest 
increase of population was Zapopan, with 11 percent per year. Municipalities like 
Tlajomulco de Zuniga and Junacatlan, in which an important part of the rainfed 
district programmes were concentrated, experienced only small increases in 
population. Isolated municipalities, like San Cristobal de la Barranca, in spite of 
their recent incorporation into the district, significantly decreased in population 
(-1.5 percent a year). 
The majority - 99.5 percent - of the district population lived inside the 
boundaries of the Metropolitan area and were thus considered urban. However, 
this figure provides a misleading guide to the pattern of urbanisation in the 
district, since only 4 percent of the municipalities had more than 2,500 
inhabitants. In fact, 68 percent of the municipalities consisted of settlements of 
less than 99 inhabitants. The rural producers in these settlements found 
segmented markets in the metropolitan area to sell their products (Roberts, 1987). 
The majority of the population in district No.l, 56 percent, was younger than 
20 years, with 40 percent in the 20-60 year age group. Of the economically 
active population, according to the 1980 population census, 22 percent worked in 
industry, 15 percent in commerce, 6 percent in the building industry, 5 percent in 
agriculture and 4 percent in transport, accounting for 52 percent of the active 
population. The relatively small importance of agricultural employment in the 
district was due to the disproportional concentration of industry, commerce, 
building and transport in Guadalajara city. But while some municipalities had 
become part of Guadalajara's economic dynamic, and had diversified 
economically, others were still heavily dependent on agriculture for their 
survival. 
There were some municipalities in the district (Tlaquepaque, Zapopan, 
Tonala, and El Salto) that had historically diversified economically, generating 
huge desequilibria in Jalisco's geographic and economic space. The rural 
development programme of the state had been highly influenced by this historical 
desequilibrium, reinforcing the differences inside the municipalities that 
constituted the district. 
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Projects were located in those municipalities in which agriculture was 
commercialised and whose productive potential meant that public investment 
could be recovered. The rainfed district (Zapopan) provided control and direction 
to the field personnel that organised operations at municipality level. In selecting 
municipalities, the district criteria had been to chose those municipalities with an 
existing degree of commercial development, while preventing the creation of 
political instability in the district. 
During the administrative re-organization of the SARH, and later, in the 
implementation of the Mexican Food Policy (SAM), local political support had to 
be mobilized by SARH personnel to strengthen the legitimacy of official 
initiatives and to neutralize any threat to the administrative structure from local 
politics. Political considerations were not an extra burden for district officials, 
they knew the game well and had long been involved in the regional political 
game. 
This last aspect had the effect of politically enhancing the importance of the 
officials running the district. In order to coordinate the implementation of rural 
policies and the demands of the local political system, they had to extend their 
network of influence to the municipalities and this was done through the activities 
of the field-units. This type of administration favoured group trust and the 
circulation of reliable institutional information on a very personal basis. Internal 
bureaucratic groups were always competing to gain control over the most 
important posts at district level or among the field-units. 
The district was the structure that promotes projects, and it was its 
responsibility to achieve expected production targets. Nevertheless, the district 
was constrained by central administrative procedures and by the economic and 
social conditions of the ejidos. These two factors constituted a social field in 
which the district had to manage a precarious balance between national and local 
political dynamics and the cultural factors of bureaucratic practices. 
It is in this process of mediation between general administrative rules and 
what the local official could do in practice, that I begin my analysis of the 
process of state intervention at district level. 
Bureaucratic Culture: the Routine in the District 
After the administrative re-organization described in Chapter 2, a hierarchical 
structure was formalised for the implementation of state policies with regard to 
rainfed producers. The first level in this line of command was the regional office. 
The regions were further sub-divided into rainfed districts, which contained 
different field-units. The field-units were responsible for the actual 
implementation at municipal and ejido level. In this section, I will concentrate on 
the practices at district-level since the district office was the locus where state 
policy and implementation at ejido level was mediated. 
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At the headquarters of district No. 1, the most important rainfed district in 
Jalisco, the formal working day began officially at 8:00 am and the staff punched 
a time clock on arrival. Personnel who were late had to report to the head of the 
department, who then decided whether to report the fault. When personnel had to 
organise meetings in the field and, due to distance, could not clock-in at the 
office, they had to arrange this with the department head a day in advance, 
preferably in writing, otherwise they might lose a day's pay. Despite these 
restrictions, in practice rules regulating punctuality were flexible. 
Between 8-9am in the office, the staff gossiped and exchanged opinions about 
important national events while going through the regional newspapers. It was the 
moment when they commented on institutional rumours. Personal anecdotes 
involving the behaviour of the staff working in the regional office regularly were 
the focus of attention in these informal morning gatherings. 
On one such day, around 9am, the head of the operational department, who 
normally had just had his first meeting with the district head, burst into the office 
and called his staff around his centrally located desk. He overlooked five other 
desks, four of which belonged to officers in charge of field operations, that is, 
the organisation of producers, plant control, mechanization, data gathering and 
data presentation. Another desk was occupied by the department secretary. These 
officials constituted the staff of the operational section of district. 
With the staff around his desk the head planned the day, assigning to each 
assistant some specific task to be carried out. Some of the assistants complained, 
arguing that the tasks were not their responsibility. The head then took time to 
explain to his subordinates the importance of the assigned tasks. There followed a 
heated exchange of opinions about the disorganised character of the district's 
operations, which led to a discussion of the real objectives of the department. 
The situation ended with the tasks finally delivered to the staff and the authority 
of the head restored, as the last word of authority. 
Immediately, the personnel dispersed for work, some going out to other 
institutions, such as the bank or to coordinate tasks in the field. Meanwhile, the 
department head concentrated on analyzing the statistical data coming from the 
field. He was responsible for spotting any contradictions between the field data, 
district objectives, and regional targets. The head was always vigilant that past 
information did not contradict new information. Filtering field information was 
important for maintaining district credibility. When contradictory information was 
spotted he took responsibility for re-adjusting the data, and in such a situation he 
never asked for a second opinion or for field verification. The head of the 
department explained to the younger staff how to record statistical data in the 
official format, stressing that they should consult with him over any 
readjustments needed. 
Around 11am, some officials in charge of the field-units arrived in the office. 
They came directly to the district personnel in charge of programme organisation 
to ask them to speed up their institutional request and to keep good relations with 
them. These officials usually conferred with the head of the operational 
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department while waiting to see the head of the district office. These visits from 
the units were important because they were associated with attempts to obtain 
more resources for field personnel. 
Officials from the more important field-units visited the district office up to 
two or three times per week, requesting field resources from the head of the 
district, such as their car allowances. SARH field personnel had to use their own 
car for work, but the district paid the petrol and maintenance. This money could 
take a long time to be paid. It was a constant source of complaint against the dis­
trict, so a unit head who managed to get this allowance promptly to his field 
personnel was regarded as showing concern for his staff. In addition, a fast 
solution to official bottlenecks demonstrated that the field-unit head was on good 
political terms with the head of the district office. 
Meetings between the head of the district and the personnel from the field-
units were important institutional moments, in which political information was 
exchanged and ways were discussed of counteracting political initiatives from 
institutional groups which were not politically controlled by the network of the 
head of the district. 
Around midday, some community leaders were wandering around the offices, 
inviting the staff in charge of the programmes to visit their communities to see 
for themselves how the projects were going. These were invitations to 
convivencias (social gatherings) in their localities. Occasionally a Municipal 
President would visit the head of the district to ask for more economic support. 
All visitors were scrutinized by the officers present, who routinely made open 
comments against these people, whom they perceived to be clients just looking 
for favours. This attitude allowed the staff to generate a discourse by which they 
differentiated themselves from their clients, in a 'community of fate' similar to 
those reported by Goffman (1974). However, as will be elaborated below, 
officers also used this exchange of information on visitors to classify the 
importance of the visitors. Their attitude towards visitors would depend on the 
political power they subscribed to the particular person. 
Between 11am and 1pm, 'memos' from the regional representative arrived 
and the department head began to answer official paperwork. By this time, the 
secretaries were starting their break. Their ritual was to concentrate in one office 
and have a soft drink and a long chat. Meanwhile the staff went to have a break 
(un taco). This took around fifteen minutes. 
Towards 2pm, office activity began to slow down. The first to leave the 
office were the secretaries who started the ritual of asking members of staff for 
lifts to Guadalajara. The staff replied with sexist jokes which were received with 
good humour. Only one person, the head of the department stayed in the office 
until 2:30pm, the official lunch hour. 
On rare occasions the staff returned to the office in the afternoon. They 
claimed that this was the time they visited the units. In fact, this was the time the 
district staff carried on their private business or teaching duties at the university, 
in a word, the traditional and widespread Mexican second occupation. The 
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working week in the district was from Monday to Friday. The staff only came in 
on Saturday under extraordinary circumstances, and the head of the department 
usually appeared for a perfunctory round, but no proper work was done. 
Although the staff were not in the office on Saturdays, they often met at 
convivencias, as will be described below. 
Documents and Information 
This description of district routines gives a glimpse of the importance of 
bureaucratic practices in the organization of state intervention. Bureaucratic 
practices are not just endowed with intentionality towards a target population. In 
fact, they are the agency that provides meanings to state intervention. One of the 
significant features of these practices is the manipulation of information and 
documents. This local political modus operandi shows that project results mainly 
have a political function, which can be attributed with different meanings at the 
diverse levels in the Ministry. 
An important function in any administrative style is the performance of the 
institution's basic maintenance practices. The district has practical arrangements 
for monitoring the district's operational plans. This is mainly done by carefully 
registering every activity in official memoranda. Memoranda are the records of 
the district. Their primary function is to support institutional continuity, and 
coherence among district operations. 
Secretaries might not be experts in maintaining a filing system, but they soon 
learn through practice to become gatekeepers of the files. In spite of the time 
devoted to paperwork, records are rarely used to make decisions. In the 
department under study, it was difficult to find records more than two years old. 
Neither are secretaries trained in what information to collect, the reports based on 
this information are therefore unreliable. Official memoranda are mainly used to 
demonstrate that a particular job has been carried out. Records have an 
administrative, rather than a practical value. Staff regard these documents as a 
'clean' nevertheless untypical expression of the district's achievements in 
implementing policies. 
When I was examining some district memorandum, the staff in the office 
would come to my desk, and with a combined mixture of experience and 
cynicism, say to me; 
"We have to write memorandums and reports to satisfy expectations from 
the national and regional offices. You see, they love to dream at their 
desks and we can't disappoint them. Otherwise, we could end up having 
financial troubles. So we have to match their objectives in our reports, 
through constant readjustments and data manipulation. The nature of our 
information is changed according to its destination. Documents are 
important for our institutional image, but they don't provide any accurate 
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information about our activities. The only way to know our reality is by 
going to the field. " 
In other words, official district documents are important devices in terms of 
institutional administration, mainly because the Ministry's central command 
control is based on the routine of showing project results, and not on the actual 
process of explaining how outcomes are obtained. 
Official documents are central to maintaining a district's image vis-à-vis the 
national and regional structure of command. This structure did not accept 
modifications to its project aims or favour criticisms from the operational level. 
Therefore, manipulation of information going to superior levels follows a pattern 
where actual practices and performances are never reported. Every report has the 
object of obtaining some institutional advantage, rather than improving the 
process of delivering services. 
This system of document circulation operates in a symbolic interaction, in 
which the high levels exercise their authority, and the low levels cover up their 
practices through manipulation of the district's paperwork. This practice keeps 
the operational levels protected from central bureaucracy, because the local level 
can always demonstrate that its goals are obtained and the expected results of the 
central policy achieved. 
Visits 
When on one situation, the Municipal President of San Cristobal de la Barranca 
arrived for an interview with the head of the district, one of the members of the 
staff immediately commented, "this President is not a very good politician. A 
friend told me that he went to the education department to ask for chairs for one 
of his schools and he was made to wait for hours before seeing the 
representative. I think he has no political influence". 
A second member of the staff came in with - "he does not look as if he has 
the physical strength and calm to get things done". A third opinion added "he is a 
teacher and won the municipal election because the party was divided and the 
PRI, to save its image, had to support him". The person who initiated the 
conversation offered further "Yes, I remember our technical field assistant in San 
Cristobal thought he was going to be elected and was furious when the teacher 
was selected". 
This exchange of information and opinion concluded with the staff agreeing 
that the Municipal President from San Cristobal was not going to get too much 
institutional help or support from the district during this sexenio (the Mexican 
presidential period of six years). 
Such institutional treatment of visitors can be seen as a kind of team 
assessment of the people who seek favours in the district. It is an important 
practice, the attitudes formed contribute to a particular pattern of administrative 
conduct among the staff when they later have to deal with some of these clients' 
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requests. The Municipal President of San Cristobal de la Barranca was judged as 
having failed in his efforts to mobilize support for his area before he had even 
started his meeting with the head of the district. 
Convivencias 
Saturday was the day when office personnel organised their convivencias. These 
were important occasions when personnel came together for outdoor activities 
followed by heavy drinking and abundant food. Food was organised by the 
female component in the office, the secretaries. On these occasions the women 
preparing food formed a separate group from the men, who normally played 
football or were just drinking and talking. Everyone in the office was expected to 
attend these convivencias and contribute financially. 
The meeting place for the convivencias depended on existing invitations from 
ejidos or from the field-units. However, the participation of local people was 
limited to the ejidal president and important local community leaders, who, while 
playing the role of host, took the opportunity to ask for favours from the official 
in charge of programmes. 
Convivencias were important occasions that facilitated face-to-face contacts 
among Ministry personnel working in the district and enabled different 
administrative levels to meet and generate a sense of organic solidarity within the 
agency. The head of the district normally attended these gatherings and he had 
drinks with his staff. This was the moment when staff openly made jokes about 
institutional incidents. They mocked the more embedded practices of the system. 
Although the atmosphere was relaxed, there was a constant search for 
institutional information, such as about individual promotions and political 
conflicts within the Ministry. 
Convivencias were not very different from the common 'traditional' Mexican 
holidays, in which families spend their weekends drinking and eating at the beach 
or in the countryside. In convivencias, the sexual roles established in society were 
reproduced, and the pattern of food and drinking were no different from those of 
the middle class of Jalisco. The only special feature was that the participants in 
these gatherings were members of a government agency and they used their 
collégial ties and official practices and routines, as a social field of reference to 
facilitate communication. The informal situation provided the ejido leaders 
present with the opportunity to secure their interests or ask for favours. 
Convivencias were a long-established tradition of Mexican government personnel 
for whom face-to-face contacts are important elements in a system which uses 
personal relationships to build a sense of institutional cohesion. 
The daily routine in the office was affected by these collégial relations, which 
mediated formal administrative practices. They were part of Mexican political 
culture, reconciling structural or functional discrepancies and inducing individuals 
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to an apparent social conformity in a culture where change is normally associated 
with troublemakers. 
The fact that people in authority had to show the 'nature of their power' in 
social gatherings, meant that convivencias represented a symbolic boundary 
between the bureaucrat's life-style inside the state and his life-style as a member 
of civil society (Cohen, 1985, 1986). It was in these 'unstructured' performances 
where the ability to manage the district was actually constructed. District 
consensus depended on the support and cooperation of desk officers and 
secretaries, so convivencias provided an environment for communication between 
different levels of relevant staff. So, in order to build group cohesion, people in 
'authority' had to manipulate convincingly, and simultaneously, several 'logical 
spheres' of human action within the constraining framework of the institution. It 
was only by direct reference to these 'institutional practices' (the formal and 
informal) that I began to understand the significance of 'connections' within the 
bureaucratic environment. Against a background of complex institutional 
discontinuity, complementarity was still a fundamental quality kept alive by the 
actors' everyday practices in the district. 
The Life-World of Bureaucratic Actors: an Encounter with a State Official 
In the interview with a district officer that follows, we can identify some of the 
fundamental issues that dominate the organisation and style of rainfed district 
operations. District actions, as we shall see, are the product of individual and 
collective experiences. How bureaucrats respond to institutional and wider 
political forces is part of a process of familiarization and transmission of 
experiences which is based on their silent observation of staff interactions, their 
rituals, games and strategies within the 'culture' of the office. These institutional 
interactions allow actors to explore and identify the existing room for manoeuvre 
within the bureaucratic system. 
The information gathered by actors is organised in a context. This 
contextualisation of information is an analytical condition, actor-constructed, that 
involves the super-imposition, assemblance and manipulation of different 
perceptions, thoughts and actions. This process makes everyday bureaucratic 
practices a locus where actors internalise the differences and complementarities 
between people, society and government institutions. 
Bureaucratic practices are very much related to the bureaucrats' own life 
circumstances, experiences and world views. The relationship between experience 
and daily institutional action leads bureaucrats to re-use existing rules and social 
conventions within the Ministry. Their actions provide social and political 
meaning for agricultural policy on a daily basis. The district bureaucrat's 
knowledge of the institutional and rural worlds provides meaning to policy that 
reaches far beyond the aims of policy documents. Therefore the deciphering of 
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an institutional style is as much related to making sense of an actor's past 
experiences, as it is to understanding their contingent problems. 
It is impossible to penetrate and understand the paradoxical outcomes of 
bureaucratic practices if one just evaluates bureaucratic actions and what 
processes these give rise to in policy implementation. Practices are not the 
aggregated result of the administrative structures, nor the individual eccentricities 
and deviations of some actors. Practices are limited or enhanced by the actors' 
public and private spheres of actions. The historical and social construction of a 
context, in practice, is the basis for both the human un-predictability of social 
change, as well as the simple reproduction of an administrative process. 
The case that follows, uses this approach to examine the life-world of an 
important district official, Engineer Pedro Solis. The aim is to provide an 
entrance into the situations and circumstances of institutional actors who organise 
local intervention. The case draws upon the history of this man's career. 
The Officer in Charge of Programme Operation: His Life and the 
Contextualisation of his Practices 
Pedro Solis is the head of the operational department and deputy head of the 
district office. Here is his story as told by himself: 
"I have worked for the SARH since 1967 and I have been in two districts 
during this period, District No.6 and No.l in Jalisco. After I graduated 
from university, I found a post in the Ministry. At that time, the rainfed 
districts were just being created and agronomists were in much demand. 
From my group of fellow students, 25 of us started our professional life 
in the SARH. I began as deputy head of district No.6, and so far I have 
not been promoted nor demoted in all those years. In my first job, I saw 
the head of district change four times. In this district I have only 
witnessed two changes at district level, one of these motivated by the 
sexenial changes. Presidential changes are the most important situation 
for institutional rotation, and it is the moment when new policies are 
formulated for the next six years. 
When I started work, I felt that the post was too big for me. 
Nevertheless, as time went by, I became familiar with it, and today I like 
it. Some of my contemporaries, bored with the office work and in spite 
of having a position on the staff, ask to be sent back to the field. Others, 
thanks to their political contacts, have positions in the central offices in 
Mexico city. In the Ministry all staff are subject to transfers, but to be 
promoted to head of a district or regional representative, a person has to 
have very good political contacts. In fact, from the position of district 
representative upwards, technical agronomic knowledge is secondary to 
politics. From the head of the district downwards, the most important 
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merit is to be good in la cosa practica [practice]. As you have observed, 
in my department, we don't play politics. 
In my situation, because I have no political contacts I don't expect 
promotion. The only chance I have is if one of my generational friends 
reaches an important post. In the Ministry, if you are a member of the 
PRI and the party supports your case, you can surely get promotion. 
After all these years, my only wish is to hold on to this post and stabilize 
my position, and perhaps just to work the minimum to protect my place. 
But I keep hoping that something may come tomorrow, so I still keep in 
touch with my own generational group, and often we analyze the 
institutional situation. 
As head of the operational department I must keep good relations 
with other districts. It is my responsibility to maintain good contacts with 
other agencies operating in the agricultural sector. I don't have problems, 
but difficulties exist at the level of implementation of policies. It is in the 
field where coordination among institutional agencies is difficult. 
Different agencies interpret policies differently. To explain this is 
complex. Take for instance the case of BANRURAL. When it was 
created, three different banks were merged and the respective groups 
initiated a process of internal competition. Finally the most powerful 
group imposed its rules on the others and a peculiar situation was 
established in which different interpretations of rules have survived in 
different regions where the bank operates. These different interpretations 
of rules influence the implementation of policies while favouring internal 
group struggle. 
In the process of the formation of the SARH, two ex-Ministries were 
merged, this action generated internal disputes over institutional power. 
The effect of that confrontation still survives among the older personnel 
of the Ministry. You will find that staff over 45 years and people in high 
positions, remember this conflict very well. For the younger generation, 
subject to a different type of institutional experience, this past means 
little. For them collaboration is a more pragmatic question. Today, we 
don't oppose coordination. 
Besides the lack of resources, our problems in the district are more a 
question of the relationship between technical assistance and agricultural 
producer. We have advanced a lot in planning and our staff have a good 
basic level of agricultural training because the majority of them come 
from the university. But this basic field relationship still needs improving. 
Policies we organise from here still have problems in the field. 
As a Ministry we have not solved the problem of how to use the 
experience of our field personnel. The Ministry policy is to provide an 
average of three courses per year to up-date training, and the staff in 
charge of implementing programmes have to attend these courses and 
later they communicate the 'new ideas' to the rest of the personnel. 
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These courses, in theory, last a month, but the district cannot afford 
to allow an official in charge of a programme to disappear for so long. 
So, in practice, they never last more than three days. In my opinion, no 
one benefits from this situation, and the contribution of these courses to 
training is very relative. 
It is in this type of situation that problems are created. The up-date 
of training [in relation to the technological packages] has always been 
insufficient. Today, with the economic crisis and cuts in public spending, 
training has been the first to be affected. These last two years we have 
had no national courses, and few have been organised at local level. 
Another problem is how to deal with the individual motivation of 
personnel. Their behaviour determines the kind of relationship that exists 
between the district and producers. This relation is a reflection of our 
policy effectiveness in the area. I can assure you, that no fieldworker 
wants to have more training, or work more intensively in the field if he 
continues to receive the same salary. So while training is important, the 
individualism of fieldworkers, which is a result of the low salaries, 
contributes to constrain the scope of our delivery of policies. 
Field personnel don't want to change things. For instance, they don't 
always like becoming staff, at least in this district. I know this, because I 
have a direct involvement in promotions here and I know everyone by his 
merits. When a post is created in the regional office, the management 
usually phone to ask me if I can suggest the names of people who could 
be promoted. At the level of the units, promotions are the responsibility 
of the head of the field-unit. The heads of field-units are people of 
confianza [trust] to the district representative, therefore, such promotions 
tend to support the political position of the rainfed district representative. 
Promotions in the SARH are not institutionally regulated, and continuous 
working within the institution is not an element that by itself can secure a 
promotion. Promotions are linked with the political clout a person has, 
and to whom he is being recommended by his superior. 
I want to be honest with you. Political influences are important, and 
even I sometimes can't escape these. In the past administration [López 
Portillo] a couple of recommended people arrived in this office, one from 
the Governor's office and the other from an important local member of 
parliament [PRI] ...ni modo... I have to accept them. These people never 
came to work in the office and they used the district just to claim a 
federal salary. One of these people was receiving a second salary from 
the municipality. The economic crisis has made these practices more 
difficult, but they have not disappeared and they have a negative impact 
on the morale of the personnel. 
One of the central jobs in my department is related to collecting and 
presenting statistics. Because institutional programmes are all politically 
orientated, these statistics are very important for demonstrating the 
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success of district policies. Sometimes we have to inflate the figures to 
show a good result, this is expected from regional and central offices. 
Because agricultural programmes are politically orientated, we can never 
admit failure. The only exception has been the SAM, because it has been 
acknowledged officially that it did not achieve its objectives. 
Financial restrictions have curtailed our machinery yard. It has 
created important institutional problems, because the actual value of our 
machinery is not producing the results calculated by our regional office 
where they can't accept that their calculations relate to normal financial 
circumstances. Today, they need to modify their objectives to suit the 
new financial conditions. Instead, they keep reducing our budget to 
punish our inefficiency. The notion of efficiency or inefficiency under 
normal circumstances, and under a public policy of financial restrictions, 
can't be the same. 
The staff of the Ministry are subject to change at any moment. But 
this cannot always be understood as a negative thing. In my case, if the 
regional office should give me a position ip a field-unit, I would work 
just 6 hours and after that I would teach in a school or have my own 
business. In economic terms, I would be better off. The problem with 
institutional transfer or change is not one related to economic benefits, 
but to the fact that superiors make political use of this rule. The fact that 
you can be moved implies that you always have to be on good terms with 
your superior. You can never antagonise him, even if you disagree with 
him. 
District operations are supposedly linked to the regional budget. This 
is prepared once a year and has to include personnel costs, salaries, 
transport etc. This is submitted to the general office of rainfed districts, 
and, there, our budget is weighed against those of other Jalisco districts, 
following the principle that resources are allocated to satisfy minimal dis­
trict requirements. 
The sum is first worked out for the whole state. Last year I think 
they gave to Jalisco something like 7 million pesos. This amount arrives 
at the regional office which controls financial resources. Immediately 
after this, the original regional budget is 'forgotten' and the head of the 
region distributes resources through programmes and sub-programmes in 
the different districts. They always try to avoid political disputes, so they 
usually divide the general budget 'equally' among the Jalisco districts. 
This system is practical, but it is not just. Those districts that are in 
remote areas of the state, and lack roads facilities, have higher 
operational costs than districts like ours. I still remember, in district 
No.6, just to make a field visit took us six hours, plus high costs on 
transport. In that district, if they have insufficient financial resources, the 
normal procedure is to cut down the number of field visits that personnel 
make to the producers. The consequence of this is a deterioration in 
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relations between producers and the SARH. Staff become isolated and the 
implementation of policy suffers. In a critical financial situation the office 
work can't be stopped, so field operations have to be cut back. 
People say that the Ministry is today in an administrative crisis, 
mainly because of the cuts in public spending. It is a fact that new posts 
have not been created since 1977. I remember that the economic situation 
was difficult before 1977, but in spite of public restrictions, rainfed 
districts were created and a lot of agronomists had the opportunity to join 
the Ministry. Now it looks unlikely that something like that will happen 
again. Financial restrictions will make our institutional problems more 
evident and increase the administrative difficulties of all agencies working 
in the agricultural sector. All these problems I am talking about are 
general to the Ministry, although perhaps some differences exist in 
particular locations. " 
The Connections Between the Actor and Administrative Practice 
Engineer Solis apparently obtained his position as deputy head of the district 
because of his professional training. Having studied agriculture at the University 
of Guadalajara, he is special in the way he perceives his career within the 
Ministry, and how he assesses 'political interference' within the local 
administrative system. In his accounts it is possible to identify some of the main 
features of the administrative practices at the district level: 
1. Administrative practice is presented as technical, but it is clear that in 
everyday routines it has obvious political undertones. Politics tend to be 
institutionalised in administrative practice, so these stabilize and generally 
support the local political regime. 
2. General institutional practice (of the SARH) is based on the achievement of 
operational agreements (coordination) between different agencies operating in 
the district. The communication and coordination of agencies are affected by 
the institutional groups internal interpretation of policies and their competition 
for power. Both these factors are important for administrative practice, 
because these situations, which usually end up in open conflicts, are 
commonly experienced by officials as 'generational' events in which the 
bureaucrats' identity (escuelismo, regionalism etc) and status are questioned 
and contested within the institutional field. 
3. While politics is the sensitive factor that can be invoked to blame the lack of 
administrative efficiency, the district has been so far unable to integrate field 
experiences with the training received by the officials from the university. 
4. District practices are highly vulnerable to national public spending policies. 
Regional budget constraints directly affect the district's training courses, 
personnel behaviour and the implementation of programmes. Since allocations 
of resources are made for political considerations and not according to 
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operational criteria, this helps to secure political justifications as the main 
procedure for agricultural management, ignoring historical circumstances of 
the localities, their cultural, social and technological adaptations, and market 
differences. 
5. Administrative practices are susceptible to influence from local political 
authorities. These are usually heavy knocks to the morale of the officials. 
Bureaucrats usually criticise such political influences, attaching corrupt 
interests to the political networks of heads of districts and regions." 
Underlying this view is a notion of 'collective responsibility' for the 
country's limited national resources. This is an administrative coding, a way 
of perceiving the complex problems that are created by 'external polities'. 
6. Administrative practices are internalised by actors as institutional processes. 
These processes filter the actor's interpretation of his institutional career. 
Although they present themselves as 'impartial' technocrats, they evaluate 
their opportunities in a complex political environment, where the combination 
of competition and personal relationships determine their construction of 
probable and possible scenarios. 
It is necessary to remind ourselves that the practices described here are concerned 
with the actors' knowledge and information of the institution both locally and 
nationally. The actors' probabilities therefore correlate with what is going on in 
the local and national world of politics. So, administrative practices are related to 
the reproduction of the social organisation of district bureaucracy and to the type 
of experiences and meanings that actors' currently attribute to their experiences. 
Conclusion 
In discussing administrative practices and bureaucrats' routines in this chapter, I 
have argued that district operations and officials' behaviour need to be related to 
the culture of the office and the life-world of the officials. This perspective is 
supported by our look at the routines and social gatherings of the district. Further 
evidence of the relationship between actors' meanings and practices is found in 
the life-world narrative of the bureaucrat in charge of programme operations. 
There is strong evidence of a relation between the actor's attribution of meanings 
to his past, the analysis of his present and his vision of the future. In each of 
these time perspectives the institutional context was a significant part of his 
cultural frame. While variations from bureaucrat to bureaucrat are to be 
expected, the central thrust of the argument is that a process of internalisation 
exists between the life-world of bureaucrats and the way the administrative 
structure operates. 
Thus, it is possible to say that the organisation of institutional options are 
situated in a whole series of logical spheres of human action. These operate 
simultaneously within the constraining framework of administrative tasks, because 
the actor's information and knowledge of the institution are more or less shared 
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by the members of the 'bureaucratic culture'. It is the process of attributing 
meanings to everyday practical agricultural issues that is the main factor affecting 
the administration of policies and programmes. As a consequence of this, we 
have to regard administrative practices as a complex social function, which is not 
a consequence of policy documents or social indicators of the social structure, but 
devices specific to the way power is exercised at local level. Administrative 
practices are individual political tactics. 
Instead of treating rural policy formulation and bureaucratic experience 
simply as two separate logical spheres of action whose overlap appears to 
generate the emergent property of 'administrative practice', it might perhaps be 
interesting to ask whether the interface has some common origin with the process 
of how Mexican society operates and how Mexicans act to support or oppose 
state rural intervention. 
The next chapter takes the analysis further to the level of actual policy imple­
mentation at the base of the bureaucracy, i.e. in the field-units. We have seen 
that several actors mentioned field operations as the level of 'reality' that could 
provide us with another point of entry for studying the process of policy 
implementation, and with it the analysis of the delivery of technical assistance to 
producers. Technical assistance in practice constitutes a whole body of scientific 
agronomic knowledge. In this sense, this book is not just concerned with the 
effects of a policy like SAM, but with the analysis of who the people are, who 
are invested with the power to carry out modernisation in rural Mexico. 
In the following chapter we will analyse the field-workers' life-world, how 
they came to be part of the government agency and their perceptions of the rural 
producers. Using these elements, I will explain later in Chapter 5, why these 
actors, when confronted with a policy document like SAM, come to identify 
factors for institutional intervention, which do not correspond to the policy -
document guidelines, but with their own perception of the local rural 'reality'. 
The next chapter lays the foundations to argue that intervention is related to 
different sets of practices, one at the operational level (the district), and the 
second at the field-unit level. This approach allows us to see policy 
implementation as a multilinear process, one affected by the interactions and 
life-world of the bureaucrats. Implementation is full of tensions and 
contradictions, which partly centre around the conflicting interpretations or social 
constructions of the different actors. In the next chapter I try to see how the 
social construction of bureaucrats actually takes place, i.e. how bureaucrats 
develop their attitudes in the process of institutionalisation and through their 
experiences with rural producers. 
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Notes 
1. Although personnel criticise the existence of political networks within the Ministry, the next 
chapter shows that in order to survive in the Ministry, they cannot escape from playing politics 
themselves. 
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4. AT THE BASE OF THE BUREAUCRACY: 
FIELDWORKERS, SOCIAL BACKGROUND, 
PRACTICES AND CAREERS 
The rainfed district's operational unit is the organisational level responsible for 
delivering government guidelines and agricultural services to producers in the field. 
This institutional level is a social field, where different parties are constantly 
interacting. Administrative representatives, fieldworkers, politicians and producers 
all make sense of policy discourses and the development condition according to their 
own life-worlds, that is, from their previous experiences, understandings, values and 
expectations. This process of actors defining and translating the social field of rural 
development has a significant bearing on the room for manoeuvre that a field-unit 
will actually have in its operations. Thus the pattern of interaction between 
fieldworkers and the way they focus their attention, reflect on and monitor the 
different sets of interests surrounding the process of policy implementation, are 
central to the process of state intervention. 
Fieldworkers are not neutral. They owe their allegiance to the government, but 
to achieve programme goals they have to compromise between the usually 
conflicting interests of government and rural producers. The fieldworker is in charge 
of mediating (translating into practice) the enforcement of agricultural policies in 
localities, and as policies are not self-executing, they are the agents who arrange the 
presentation of official goals according to the conditions of the locality. This gives 
the fieldworker a discretional space in which to take decisions which influence the 
rural social environment. 
Fieldworkers cannot solely depend on their bureaucratic status to intervene in 
localities. Ejidos are not part of the bureaucratic 'ethos' and fieldworkers must enter 
a field of acting social relations that producers use to meet the needs of their 
households. Hence, the fieldworker must select a point and form of intervention, and 
this central individual decision can determine the level of efficiency of policy 
implementation. 
Fieldworkers are accountable to an administrative system, where the field-unit 
head and district staff constantly influence their decisions and the way they tackle 
a particular situation. These interactions accumulate over time, and an individual 
knowledge acquires a new property, 'experience'. This experience heavily influences 
the decisions fieldworkers make and their relations with producers. 
Studying the practices of fieldworkers is a way of analyzing the factors affecting 
their definition of the social field in which they operate. However, observing and 
describing practices is not enough. We need to analyze how actors themselves 
assemble the multitude of processes that impinge on their life-world, to understand 
how they socially construct their own practices. When talking with fieldworkers, 
they seem eager to assume an active role in solving the problems of the rural 
producers within the context of a national policy. However, observing their actual 
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activities in the field, they do not seem to be able to achieve the aspirations put 
forward in their discourses. 
This may be partly attributed to the district administrative routines described in 
the previous chapter. The district routines seem to be one factor that constrains low 
ranking bureaucrats from reflecting about their experiences. Nevertheless, the 
situation is more complex. While institutional factors are important, the social 
background of the fieldworkers, their personal experiences within the institution and 
their everyday experiences with the agricultural producers are a series of related, 
contingent factors that in their specific combination delineate the heterogeneous 
definitions and practices of the fieldworkers. These are some of the issues we want 
to explore in this chapter. 
The Study and the Source of Information 
Two operational units from the district under study were analyzed. The information 
is drawn from 16 interviews conducted by myself during 1983 in Guadalajara. The 
age of the fieldworkers interviewed ranged from 25 to 40 years, the majority of 
them being in their late 20's or early 30's. Although there are a few female 
fieldworkers, these interviews all concern men. The group was roughly equally 
composed of married men and bachelors. Eleven of the fieldworkers had studied at 
Guadalajara University, two at Nayarit University and three at agricultural technical 
schools. Of the latter, two were from Jalisco and one from Michoacân. Of the 14 
fieldworkers with university training only two had successfully completed all 
requirements, the other 12 had not completed their final dissertations which 
conferred the title of Engineer. 
The composition of the sample by regional origin was twelve fieldworkers from 
Jalisco, two from Nayarit and one from Sinaloa. Only one fieldworker was a recent 
recruit (4 months), the rest had served in the Ministry for an average of two years, 
with the exception of one who had more than 11 years service. The period worked 
continuously in the units varied. Three had been in their units for less than a year, 
five for between one and three years, six for three years, and two for five years. 
A significant number (7) admitted having a second job. Three pointed out that 
they did not have a second job because their wives were providing a second income, 
and five said that they were in no need of a second job because they were university 
students and had additional income from their student grants. Only one tecnico 
declared himself to be exclusively dependent on the Ministry's salary. Fieldworkers 
with a second job were quite aware that their actions constituted a breach of the 
Ministry's regulations, but they argued that the low salary presently being paid in 
the district made the practice unavoidable. They said the office staff had to accept 
this reality, otherwise they would face difficulties attracting people to work in the 
units. 
The fieldworkers were all well disposed to relate their experiences of the 
administrative structure of the Ministry, and furthermore, openly invited me to 
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observe in the field their work with the producers. The general opinion was that 
their experiences had not been taken into consideration in shaping the procedures of 
the administrative reform of 1976, nor had they been allowed to contribute to the 
formulation of SAM policies. There existed among them a feeling of alienation from 
policy formulation, based on the perception that their position in the organisation had 
not changed, that their experiences had not been considered important in 
programming the new national agricultural aims. This explains why they felt the 
failure of the SAM was predictable. The following analysis explores the institutional 
relations that influence the tecnicos ' decisions to assume a particular attitude in their 
relations with producers. 
The information was gathered through participant observation, living, talking 
and observing the fieldworkers in the field and in other social contexts. The result 
of this strategy is a massive quantity of ethnographic data, of which only some will 
be presented here. 
The Institutional Process 
In the following sections, several institutional processes are identified and described, 
i.e. recruitment patterns, administrative protocol, the professional role of tecnicos, 
and bureaucratic politics. In describing these processes it becomes apparent how 
fieldworkers are 'institutionalised', i.e. how they learn to operate within the 
bureaucrat culture and internalise how to 'play the game' of being a representative 
of the state. 
The Recruitment Patterns 
Recruitment for fieldworker personnel is determined by a combination of contacts 
and opportunities. The personnel selected in the district came from a group of 
agronomists 'waiting' for a post inside the Ministry. Selection procedures are highly 
subjective and the incorporation of personnel is linked to whom the candidate knows 
in the Ministry, to qualifications plus an entrance examination of their agronomic 
knowledge. 
Although formal requirements like the examination are not a central factor in the 
final selection, every fieldworker has to go through the experience of being 
evaluated. In my interviews with the fieldworkers, it was clear that none of them 
believed in selection by merit. The different ways in which they had fulfilled the 
formal requirement criteria provided me with an insight into the pattern of 
institutional recruitment. After all, everyone had a story to tell about how they had 
made it in the end. Fieldworkers' experiences with the examination procedure show 
the flexibility exercised by the administration in the selection process. 
71 
a) First Form of Recruitment 
"To join the Ministry was not easy, first I had to work for them during my 
servicio social in the Ameca unit". After that I had to sit an exam which 
I successfully passed. Even so the district never gave me final approval for 
a position. They kept delaying my case for months, arguing that some 
papers were missing from my file. In the end they decided to 'review' my 
case. At that moment I knew that I had lost the post. The following year I 
sat exams again, but by this time I had previously made some contacts with 
agronomists already working in the Ministry who supported my case with 
a strong recommendation from an influential university lecturer of the 
Guadalajara University. This time they gave me the post. I would only say 
that to be recruited by the Ministry a tecnico has somehow to be politically 
involved. In my case if I hadn't had the contacts I would never have made 
it." 
This form of recruitment experience was commonly reported to me. One of its 
variations was that the candidate would be called several times to the central offices 
in Mexico City, just to be re-assured that it was only a matter of time before his 
contract would be approved. If the candidate cannot support his application with 
political contacts, he may eventually be offered a different post in the Ministry, 
usually in a different region from where he lives. As this process takes time and 
money and may require at least two or three trips to Mexico to secure a contract, 
candidates that have successfully passed their exams, but lack political contacts often 
choose to withdraw their applications. In short, this form of recruitment pattern 
compels any candidate interested in pursuing a career in the Ministry to enter into 
a system of group affiliations. 
b) Second Form of Recruitment 
"I joined the Ministry in 1980 when I was in my fifth year at the university 
as a student of agronomy. This was possible because I had good 
recommendations. For me it was easy to enter in the Ministry, but I can tell 
you that this is not the rule for the majority of applicants. I did take the 
exam, but my political contacts through my family and in the PRI (I did my 
social service in the Brigades Dominicales) had already secured a place for 
me in the district. " 
In this second case the candidate was aware beforehand of the importance of 
political contacts to secure a place. In this situation the formal requirements were 
irrelevant and the applicant was offered a place because of his contacts. 
Political patronage constitutes a common and discretionary form of selection. 
Candidates who enter this way are usually very well situated to step into a political 
career. These candidates look for a quick institutional career and their road to the 
top is dependent on their political pull. Local university power groups use this form 
to extend their network inside the Ministry. 
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c) Third Form of Recruitment 
"When I joined the Ministry in 1972,1 did not sit an exam because the post 
was so poorly paid there was no competition for it. I was called by the 
Guanajuato Representative and he said to me if you want the post it's yours. 
At the time I did not like the post but I thought that the principal thing was 
to enter the Ministry and then look for a better position later on. This offer 
was made to me after being in Guanajuato for a year as representative of the 
private agricultural producers. " 
In this situation the applicant was offered a low salary post by the representative of 
the Ministry, by-passing the formalities of the examination, demonstrating that 
middle level personnel have the capacity to co-opt people who they think can be 
useful to the agency. 
d) Fourth Form of Recruitment 
"I entered the Ministry (1975) after two years of working with the Ministry 
of Agrarian Reform and I did not sit the exam. To be honest, I never 
thought I was going to be an agronomist. My first desire was to be a fighter 
pilot in the Mexican Air Force. Unfortunately, I failed the physical and my 
father, who is an important pork dealer (porcicultor), persuaded me to study 
agronomy at Guadalajara University (1967). There the influence of some 
lecturers was very important because until then, an agronomic career was 
practically unknown in Mexico. 
During my first year at the university my father bought me a fruit 
farm, just to allow me to practice. After that experience I bought a rancho 
and started to deal in pigs. These agronomic ventures provided me with a 
lot of contacts that combined with my professional qualifications and family 
background finally to help me enter the Ministry." 
In this last case, recruitment procedures were linked to family ties and social class 
position of the applicant rather than political affiliation. The social background of 
the fieldworker was his main asset in gaining entrance to the Ministry. 
In summary, the four experiences presented here indicate the existence of an 
administrative structure which does not apply universal rules to recruit personnel. 
In this situation, merit alone does not serve the political needs of the Ministry, and 
as the majority of the candidates had university training anyway, technical 
considerations were less significant than political ones. 
Political recruitment in Mexico is common practice. However, the question is 
how to explain this practice. Is it the way individual bureaucrats try to create a 
network of followers in order to strengthen their own power positions? This would 
be the explanation put forward by those who perceive corruption to be the major 
driving force in Mexican bureaucracies. The cases presented here, however, suggest 
an additional explanation. It seems that political influences operate in different forms 
as a device for maintaining the reproduction of the bureaucracy, rather than an 
individual avenue to just benefit some individuals. The political form of recruitment 
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corresponds with the institutional need to select those people who will commit 
themselves to reproducing the Mexican political system. The recruitment practices 
seem to serve as a political filter of candidates. Moreover, in general terms, 
'politics' is the only device that the bureaucracy has to select candidates within an 
educational system that has made the professions more accessible, leading to an 
over-supply of candidates. As some fieldworkers pointed out, only if candidates 
were in short supply, did technical prevail over political criteria. 
The Administrative Ritual 
After a fieldworker has been recruited by the Ministry, he has to learn the 
bureaucratic rules of the game. This may be a difficult process for a young 
agronomist who has a genuine desire to serve the country and the rural producers. 
As one fieldworker said to me "one of the first lessons in the Ministry is that ideals 
fade away with time" (los ideales con el tiempo se desgastari). Behind this 
observation lies the impact that administrative practices have on the fieldworkers' 
social and cultural attitudes towards development. It is through such individual 
experiences that one begins to appreciate the significance of administrative protocol 
in influencing the way in which fieldworkers understand agricultural policies, and 
how much personal commitment they are willing to give to implement a policy. 
Three stages were identified as influencing the life-world of the fieldworkers. 
First, the stage of adjustment to the institutional structure; second, the establishment 
of the professional role; and finally, the realization that institutional reward was 
linked to bureaucratic politics. These stages are closely bound up with the 
administrative practices of the field-units and districts. Below, I examine some life 
experiences in the light of the fieldworkers' institutional routine and its consequences 
for policy implementation. 
Tecnicos' Initiation into the Ministry 
One of the most important periods in the official life of a fieldworker is the time 
between his arrival in the unit and his final acceptance by his colleagues. This 
process of acceptance may take up to three years, and during this time, the 
fieldworker must develop both his sense of identification with the bureaucratic 
environment and the practical skills needed to master relations with producers. 
During this initiation period, a fieldworker must learn how to manage the day 
to day activities and internal practices of the organisation. For example, he must 
learn the proper way to cover up for a colleague's mistakes, and the importance of 
participating in the social activities and heavy drinking sessions and convivencias. 
At the end of this period, professionals emerge with a higher status and a clearer 
understanding of the sort of relations that operate in the Ministry. They are able to 
manipulate, neutralize or exercise pressure within the immediate sphere of influence. 
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During this period of adjustment, they experience situations that will deeply affect 
their future motivation for public service. The following two cases illustrate this 
point. 
Case 1. 
"When I started to work as a tecnico I always had to spend extra time in the 
field, mainly to get to know the producers well and also to show them that 
I work hard. During that first year I was committed to making a good 
impression and delivering the technical services in the best manner possible. 
I can tell you that none of this personal effort was noticed by the head of the 
unit. Furthermore, during the first two years, I had to work in the office 
during Saturdays and Sundays, because I had to 'volunteer' to write reports, 
so to satisfy the information requirements of the district office. 
These odd jobs were always done by the three new arrivals of the unit. 
Traditionally, it is the young personnel who must cooperate more. In my 
case my motivation was to contribute to the Ministry. In return, I expected 
institutional recognition. Through time, I realised that recognition is never 
acknowledged in the Ministry, so I began to change. 
In retrospect I can say that tecnicos work very intensively at the 
beginning. But this is because they lack experience. As one becomes more 
familiar with the Ministry and with producers, the institutional problems are 
seen less and less as personal issues. " 
The fieldworker remembers his process of incorporation into the organisation as an 
overall experience from which he learned that intensive work is not the proper way 
to get institutional recognition. His exposure to this administrative environment 
produced a change in his attitude towards the value of delivering a good service to 
the producer, and to the degree of personal involvement he was willing to 
contribute. The adjustment period affected his motivation, made him more 
individually orientated and contributed to his decision to diminish his personal 
efforts. He started to get involved in bureaucratic politicking at the expense of his 
commitment to solve producers' problems. 
Case 2. 
"I work in one of the poorest communities within the administrative area 
covered by my field-unit. Just to give you an idea, until I came producers 
were only using natural fertilizers, and this in spite of the fact that the 
Ministry always had a tecnico in this community. I am not new in the 
Ministry. I entered in 1977, although I had no practical experience, because 
until 1982 I worked as a member of the district staff. My first experience 
in the field (January 1983) shocked me. I could not believe my eyes when 
I saw the standard of living of producers, mainly because I was in the 
ex-hacienda del Lazo, which is a locality not far away from Guadalajara. 
I came to the community with an integral approach. To me it was clear 
that the lack of productivity was a result of Ministry policy, which has 
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usually only invested in areas where there is good soil. In this community 
the soil is not very fertile, moreover the presence of social problems, such 
as alcoholism, consume huge amounts of the producers' resources. 
My first task was to put forward the case of my community to the field-
unit, and to mobilize resources from the field-unit for the ejido. I talked 
with the people and explained to them that the money they were spending 
on tequila [a local spirit] was damaging the future of their families. Only a 
few producers listened. But those producers who did follow my advice were 
worth my helping. So I provided them with free building materials for their 
homes which I managed to get from Guadalajara friends. 
These were all personal contributions and not part of my responsibility 
as a fieldworker. These activities went quite well until on one occasion I 
promised a producer a corrugated metal sheet for his roof. Unfortunately, 
I was unable to obtain it. He reacted very angrily and thought that it was my 
duty to provide him with favours (favores). He went to complain about my 
work to the unit. 
Well... that was it. The head of the unit took the complaint and 
severely reprimanded me. He blamed me for using the wrong approach with 
the producers and pointed out that as a fieldworker my responsibility was 
just to assist people with agricultural problems and that I had no right or 
authorization to do anything beyond that in my community. This experience 
taught me a lot about producers and how the Ministry runs its affairs. From 
that day I have only been concerned with solving the agricultural problems 
of the ejido. " 
Administrative capacity to inflict sanctions on the fieldworker's behaviour was an 
important factor influencing the attitude of someone with several years of service in 
the Ministry. But the most important point in this experience was the institutional 
stand of the unit head, who on discovering that the fieldworker had confused social 
and agricultural demands in the course of delivering extension services, restrained 
him from intervening in the social life of the community, and insisted on a 
fragmented and specialized delivery of services to the producers. The head of the 
unit saw the fieldworker's approach as a dangerous precedent, which favoured a 
different assumption of intervention. Such an approach suggested that community 
problems were not just the result of a producer's inability to cope with agricultural 
and technological problems, but were, in fact, a consequence of broader social 
problems directly associated with the state of agricultural backwardness. 
The head of the unit was annoyed to see a producer making social demands on 
a 'technical agency'. He perceived this as a threat to the specialized function of the 
unit and therefore sanctioned the fieldworker for exceeding his functions. The 
negative character of the sanction was demonstrated by the fact that the head of the 
unit did not suggest to the fieldworker that he could direct producers to other 
government agencies more directly responsible for solving social problems. The 
main objective of the sanction was to insulate the fieldworker from such problems, 
rather than to reorientate producer/field worker relations. The fieldworker felt he had 
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been sold out by the producer's ingratitude, and this negative way of assimilating the 
experience helped him to change his previous good disposition towards the 
producers. 
In the two cases presented, contact with institutional practices produced 
important transformations in the fieldworker's sense of how to deliver agricultural 
services. It is an adaptation process through which fieldworkers learn the limits of 
their individual actions and discover how much room for manoeuvre exists within 
the administrative structure. These experiences contribute to the generation of 
critical views of the administrative organization, but do not lead to a challenge of 
administrative practices. Instead, a fieldworker learns to accept integration into the 
administrative environment and obedience to the authority of the head of the unit as 
something which is normal in the institutional style of operations. 
The Professional Role of the Tecnico 
In accommodating to the administrative form of operation, fieldworkers internalize 
the daily routine of the field-unit. In my research, I focus upon this accommodation 
process as a way of understanding the fieldworker's professional role and 
motivations. 
Fieldworkers arrived at the unit at 8am every morning and as the majority of 
them lived in Guadalajara, they had an average 30 to 45 minutes journey to get to 
work. The two units studied were located in accessible places with excellent roads. 
A great number of fieldworkers owned a car (volkswagen) acquired with a loan 
facilitated by the Ministry as part of an agreement that the vehicle would be used in 
their fieldwork. The Ministry pays for petrol and what is called a 'rent for the car', 
but its maintenance is the responsibility of the fieldworker. This system of loans for 
a car was established as a way of solving the mobility problems of the fieldworkers 
and helped reconcile the time/space conflicts between the interests of urban-based 
fieldworker's and their rural duties. 
In the field, activities were organized around the administrative tasks of the head 
of the unit. His political knowledge and skills in dealing with the district staff, and 
the style of his leadership were important elements in stimulating the work of his 
subordinates. Programme implementation was directly dependent on the experience 
of unit heads within an area and their personal relations with the fieldworkers were 
very important. As one head of a unit said: 
"To operate in a unit one has to have a lot of good common sense and know 
when to give in to the fieldworker's demands and when to tighten up 
discipline. These two things are essential to effective management. 
Nevertheless, differences between unit heads are mainly accounted for by 
the political influences that a head has with district and regional 
representatives. It is the political pull of this relation that will decide 
whether a head implements an unpopular administrative measure ordered 
from Mexico, either in its entirety, partly or just ignore it. A head of a unit 
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with no political support and who has to implement every single regulation 
by the book is bound to have problems controlling the fieldworkers. " 
Head of units are part of the central line of command. They are the last authority 
before policy implementation takes place in the field, and the first to receive the 
feedback from field personnel. A main function is to stimulate fieldworkers to work, 
in spite of administrative limitations and the lack of resources. He has to administer 
human resources to the best of his abilities and create an operational team. 
One of the most unpopular administrative rules in the Ministry was the 
regulation that every fieldworker had to sign the office 'control book' four times a 
day. Fieldworkers bitterly complained against this rule, arguing that spent more time 
coming and going between the office and the ejido than working with producers. 
They pointed to the expenditure on petrol "just to satisfy the need for administrative 
control". I observed that the implementation of this rule was executed differently 
among the units in the district and varied from total compliance with the rule to 
numerous internal agreements between the head of the unit and his personnel. In 
other words, a unit head perceives the implementation of regulations of this nature 
as a matter of personal discretion which can be used, or not, to create a favourable 
environment and a good disposition among the fieldworkers. 
Fieldworkers all agreed on the importance of a unit head, that a good unit head 
made a lot of difference to the fieldworkers' performance and to the way they 
approached their duties. One fieldworker explained that it was necessary to realize 
that, in the last instance, it was the head of the unit who was responsible to the 
district. A good relation between head and tecnicos always resulted in a better 
disposition to fulfil institutional tasks, and this directly benefitted the political career 
of the unit head. So, according to the fieldworker "it is in his interests to maintain 
good working relations with us". 
Fieldworkers were highly critical of the administrative structure for not 
providing them with opportunities to exercise their knowledge of agriculture, but did 
not blame the head of the unit for the fact that they spent around 60 percent of their 
time doing office work. It was understood that he had to organize staff requirements 
and was not able to oppose institutional policies. 
A unit head needed to know how to drink with his personnel and when to 
organize a convivencia. In other words, he had to take care of human relations in 
the unit, be good at giving commands, and convincing when he talked to the 
producers. Among the fieldworkers there was general agreement that a head of a 
unit could ease the integration of a fieldworker into the administrative system, but 
could not remove the structural factors which really frustrated them and in this 
respect he was seen as having no real power to decide on issues of policy 
formulation. It was recognized that although he was nearer to the reality of 
fieldworkers in the field, he was nevertheless part of the official political system of 
the Ministry. 
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Fieldworkers' Professional Frustrations 
I focus here on the frustrations of fieldworkers as I believe they allow one to 
identify the key element in their professional dissatisfaction within the institution. 
Frustration seemed to be embedded in the institution's everyday operations. The 
following case shows the difficulties of working as a technical expert in the Ministry 
and establishes the political factor as the more important parameter of the 
agronomists' sphere of activity. Fieldworkers blamed institutional politics for their 
professional frustrations and their lack of efficiency in achieving a reasonably good 
level of professional performance. Institutional politics should now be emerging 
sufficiently strongly in this study to direct us towards the implications of this for the 
individual, an issue I will explore farther in the following section. 
"In the Ministry, fieldworkers are personnel of a thousand uses (los 
milusos), but not those for which you studied and specialized at the 
university. I am an expert in seed propagation and until now I have never 
been used in that role. If you have a Masters degree then the Ministry may 
accommodate you in a more appropriate institutional position, otherwise you 
have to accept the Ministry's style of operations. 
I feel myself limited in the Ministry and my agricultural knowledge has 
deteriorated, because the Ministry is not interested in stimulating the 
improvement of our skills. Next month I will go on holiday to the U.S.A., 
and I intend to use that opportunity to buy some books, but it is not just the 
lack of training in the Ministry that affects us. It is also the fact that a 
fieldworker cannot get promotions if he has no friends with political 
influence. It is this sort of practice, that always subordinates merit to 
'polities', that dampens a more positive response towards the Ministry's 
policies. 
Sub-programmes are always changing and the objectives of programmes 
are never clearly defined. Our main job is usually to monitor technological 
packages, collecting field data and writing favourable reports to satisfy the 
political considerations of the staff. With this description of our reality you 
may now be in a better position to understand our professional frustrations. " 
In a word, this fieldworker believed that the institution had not given him any 
incentive to acquire a 'love of his duty'. This professional frustration was linked to 
the political nature of institutional rewards. Little expert knowledge was required of 
the fieldworker since the institution established the use of agricultural technological 
packages. This change forced fieldworkers to perform administrative rather than 
agronomic tasks. 
In short, professional disposition among fieldworkers was negative because they 
did not perceive themselves as participating in the administrative structure as 
agricultural experts. Official programs did not use their agricultural training in a 
productive way. It is ironic, to conclude that the mixture of institutional politics plus 
the adoption of modernization techniques (packages) had resulted in procedures that 
denigrated the useful role of these Mexican professionals. 
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Fieldworkers and Bureaucratic Politics 
Bureaucratic politics was, and presumably still is, an institutional process that 
provides some fieldworkers with selective rewards such as access to high posts and 
political responsibility. This dynamic is independent of expert knowledge or 
professional merit, and plays an important integrative function in the system, acting 
as a regulative mechanism among fieldworkers between their sense of bureaucratic 
membership and their ambition for higher status recognition. 
This process is directed to the maintenance and continuation of the administrative 
structure. Therefore, it constrains political and technical professional values that 
could primarily serve the interests of agricultural producers. Bureaucratic politics 
constitute an important filter for the interpretation and execution of public policies, 
because it relegates the importance of agricultural practice to a secondary level of 
importance. In this perspective, the particular style of Ministry administration erodes 
the technical efficiency of the state's agricultural policies. The following case 
illustrates the impact of these factors on fieldworker attitudes towards the 
achievement of policy goals. 
The Case of Tomas 
Tomas joined the Ministry in 1980 when he was in the last year of his university 
studies. He sat for exams, but his personal recommendations and contacts were the 
main factors that secured the post for him. For two and half years he worked in 
Zapotlanejo and after that period he was transferred to Tlajomulco de Zuniga as a 
result of institutional politicking (grilla). 
"My transfer was due to the fact that a member of the staff decided that my 
post would constitute an excellent opportunity for a friend of his who was 
in Nayarit and wanted to move to Jalisco. So he started a campaign to force 
me out of the unit. Suddenly I started to receive an incredible amount of 
work, and because it was done officio [a legal registration system to record 
individual efficiency within the agency, subject to the control of the head of 
the district, or whoever is responsible for the programme], he managed to 
build up a record of my work with which he finally me reventó [blew me 
away]. I was presented with the alternative of accepting the transfer or 
resigning from the Ministry." 
Tomas emphasized that such actions were not uncommon in the administrative 
environment of the Ministry and added: 
"We have to learn to live with this. As fieldworkers, we can't apply 
pressure on the administrative structure, because we have been reduced to 
administrators of technological packages. So we don't play any important 
function in those factors which are presently considered important for 
increasing production. In a word, we have become dispensable in the 
agency, and the district staff use this to their advantage. Our trade union is 
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absolutely a charro organisation [i.e. it sells out to government interests] 
usually more concerned with pacifying us than defending our rights. " 
Tomas complained that fieldworkers were not respected as agricultural experts and 
saw the agency as wasting their agronomic training. What is more, he saw himself 
as having no capacity to threaten the institution by withdrawing his expert knowledge 
since the institution made no virtue of individual agronomic skills. Only politically 
orientated action could link personal ambitions, authority, power and promotions 
within the SARH. The fieldworker believed that technical problems did not concern 
Ministry administrators: 
"After all we have no control over the instruments affecting production, we 
have to follow objectives set up in Mexico and fill the office with reports 
describing the wonderful outcomes of programmes, even when in reality 
none of the projected aims have been achieved. We are experts in inventing 
expected figures, as feedback, that supports the political requirements of the 
national programmes. " 
Tomas maintained that these institutional practices were a consequence of the 
political character of the agency and that nobody working in this environment could 
escape these influences. He identified four main areas that, according to him, 
affected a fieldworker's activities: 1) la grilla (institutional politics), 2) salary, 3) 
that fieldworkers had no specific role as professionals, and 4) that their work did not 
provide a social service to the community. 
In order to demonstrate the sequestration of his hopes and the roots of his 
anxieties, Tomas talked about bureaucratic politics and his own career as a 
fieldworker. 
"As a student at the university we learnt several important skills to practice 
agriculture, but as fieldworkers we never use them. Our job in the Ministry 
is not organised around the training we received at the university. In the 
Ministry we are the corre, ve, y dile [run, see and tell]. They, the staff, 
have us just to gather data. Like a policeman we have to report areas where 
problems may arise. I can tell you, to perform this kind of function I did not 
need any training at the university. 
Work in the Ministry teaches you something about administration and 
organisation but not agriculture. Politics in the institution is our main worry. 
La grilla produces constant insecurity and anxiety among us, affecting our 
daily work. If you add to this the low remuneration we receive, you have 
the reasons why we don't bother with the institutional results of the 
programmes. Politics is the dynamic that may help us win a higher position, 
so we have to play la grilla, because we have very few possibilities open to 
us. Professional careers do not exist in the Ministry and la grilla is one of 
the few avenues through which a fieldworker can make it. 
When I joined the Ministry, I did it in administrative category 9. After 
two years and a half, I am still in the same grade. Competition to advance 
in the Ministry is politically tough, intense and places are few. For a 
fieldworker, an important promotion is to be field-unit head. As these are 
81 
not given by merit, a fieldworker has to have friends, because dedaso (top 
down cooptation) is the only way to gain promotion. A fieldworker can 
make contacts in the Federacion Agronomica del Estado (Agronomic 
Federation of Jalisco), or in the Graduate Society of Guadalajara University. 
These two groups are organised according to power relations, and their 
influence spreads from Guadalajara University to the Ministry. In this way 
they control professional people at all levels in the Ministry. These today 
play an important function in controlling access to staff posts in Jalisco. 
Political grouping is an important institutional activity, fulfilling the 
needs of individual political affiliations and the sense of belonging to a 
solidarity network. If a fieldworker is accepted into one of these networks, 
he will go up in the organisation as the group gains in influence. In Jalisco 
these groups are directed by the first generation of agronomists who 
graduated from Guadalajara University, and they hold the most important 
posts in the region. The leaders of these networks make alliances and 
commitments among themselves to solve particular problems, but most of 
the time they are involved in institutional disputes. They have powers of 
decision making because of their institutional positions and they exercise 
political pressure or the capacity of protection in the peripheral areas of the 
institutional struggle, such as the posts of the fieldworkers at field-unit level. 
In a word, we are pawns in their confrontations, so every fieldworker has 
to have someone protecting him, and we survive until the luck of a 'friend' 
changes in the structure. 
Because all the units of this district are near Guadalajara, all the groups 
try to move their people here for political reasons. We are always afraid of 
being subjected to sudden changes. If you are married and have your 
children at school, and perhaps own your own house, then it is difficult to 
accept, just like that, a transfer for example to Vallarta. But such things 
happen in the service when a group is politically defeated. So good people 
with years in the Ministry are forced to move or resign. We have to be 
aware of the institutional struggles and to be quick in changing sides 
according to the possible outcomes of the struggle, just to protect our posts. 
In my opinion, all these affect our attention and time, so it is not surprising 
that our professional performance has never been good. " 
Tomas's experiences illustrate the effects that administrative practices have on the 
fieldworkers involved in the implementation of government programmes. Their 
professional frustrations are motivated by factors such as the lack of job recognition, 
restrictions on practising their agricultural knowledge and issues associated with the 
Ministry's decision to introduce the use of technological packages. On the other 
hand, the importance of political games highlights the existence of deceptive 
bureaucratic practices which have eroded, for instance, the whole system of 
promotions and has favoured internal dissention. 
The practices described are the Ministry's organisational routines and they have 
acted against the formation of a cohesive administrative system. This has affected 
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the implementation of policies and has militated against fieldworkers delivering a 
good professional service to agricultural producers. 
Institutional struggles, and the constant manoeuvring to achieve group objectives 
has interfered with the organization and managerial functions of the Ministry, and 
it is this institutional dynamic which is a determining factor at local level in shaping 
the fieldworker's interpretation and implementation of government policies. 
Fieldworkers' Speech-Acts 
The material so far presented, has emphasized the significance of institutional 
procedures in the everyday life of the fieldworkers. However, this picture has 
ignored the ability of the fieldworkers to resist, accept or modify administrative 
practices. Fieldworkers search for room for manoeuvre within the institution. 
Although their efforts are improvised according to situations, it is in such actions 
that the fieldworkers translate the policy into the process of implementation. In the 
fieldworkers' task of diffusing policy among rural producers, the policy is 'filtered' 
according to the definition of the fieldworker of the local situation. 
The attitudes and actions of fieldworkers are not only responses to the 
institutional environment. They also develop a process of reflexivity, through 
consistently assessing government policies against incoming intervention experiences. 
This process provides the guideline for adjusting the nature of agricultural policies 
at the implementation level. In this sense, policy implementation is partly constituted 
by fieldworkers knowledge of how to manage the institutional procedures and the 
interests of producers, and partly by the fieldworkers' values and interests that 
accompany this process of practical policy translation. 
In operation, government officials divert institutional influence and resources for 
intervention in a manner that is different from the aims and administrative 
constraints of the policy. Fieldworkers take pleasure in cunningly creating room in 
which to show their own capability for manoeuvre (power) through the action of 
intervention. With this they confirm their degree of commitment to the rural 
producers. 
Far from being a regression towards what existed previous to the administrative 
reforms and the creation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(SARH), these fieldworkers are sure that they do not want to return to a practice 
which they thought "full of personal sacrifice but totally inefficient". On the 
contrary, they believe their knowledge should be used to improve rural policy 
formulation and implementation as a whole. A fieldworker's knowledge of rural 
policy and policy implementation, introduces the issue of how important human 
agency is in planned rural development. 
In this section, I want to show, then, that in spite of the normative context of 
policy discourse and bureaucratic culture, fieldworkers' representations and actions 
depend on 1) how they perceive the reality of agricultural producers, 2) how they 
assess peasants entitlement to receive state resources, and 3) the nature and function 
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they attribute to ejidos. All these factors influence the intentionality of fieldworkers 
and their choices of action within the administrative system. 
Fieldworkers are not passive subjects of administrative structures. Their specific 
and personal responses to a policy or programme are meaningful actions, that are 
influenced not only by the three factors above, but also by their individual social 
positions within Mexican society, their own life-worlds and their direct experience 
with producers. It is my contention that the fieldworkers' social background and 
their work experiences are the two main aspects influencing their interpretation of 
policies (meanings) and their patterns of interaction with agricultural producers. 
The fieldworkers' interpretation of policies and their individual concerns with 
producers orient them to relate to an agricultural policy in quite different ways. This 
practical knowledge constitutes a cognitive map, where policy implementation takes 
shape. Their home ground (the field) is the locus where the 'other side' of the 
intervention (civil society) becomes visible. This provides fieldworkers with a set 
of options and a certain degree of confidence in how to act in the field. The 
differences between fieldworkers are not random, they depend on the notions and 
concepts they have at their disposal and use in their everyday life to define the 
meaning of intervention. The point here is that among fieldworkers there is not just 
one way of defining their professional activity. They have different perceptions 
about what the priorities of Mexican agriculture are and where the scarce resources 
of the state should be allocated. The differences are not just responses to external 
(political) demands made upon them by individuals and groups, as the study by 
Grindle (1980) suggests. The basic dimension of these differences is reflexivity, a 
reflexivity constituted through a combination of experience within the institution, 
within their own socialization, life-worlds, career ambitions, and direct experience 
with producers. 
Drawing upon these experiences in situations of policy implementation means 
that fieldworkers organise their practical knowledge towards the improvement of 
their intervention effectiveness, and to problematic situations. The institutional 
system demands from them a capacity to intervene with clarity and precision. Yet, 
as we have seen, the application of their knowledge is constrained by the limitations 
of the technological package approach that in the end blurs for the fieldworkers the 
actual purpose of their actions. On the one hand, they are unlikely to be able to 
practice much agricultural expertise, and neither are they able to deal with the social 
problems surrounding agriculture. 
Despite these constraints, fieldworkers mobilize their reflexivity and experiences 
, into action. This is manifest, among other things in their individual speech-acts. 
Speech-acts are seen by me as a feature of the actors' ability to connect, in action 
at the interface, speech, meaning, knowledge and performance.2) These speech-acts 
represent fieldworkers' assessment of opportunities, options and potential problems 
in their everyday activities. Speech-acts reflect, not necessarily consciously, practical 
'knowledge' that constitutes the individual fieldworkers' ground for operating. 
Unlike Grindles' analysis, which supposes politics to be an external variable that 
can explain administrative behaviour, here politics is perceived of as a consequence 
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of a tension between the complex combination of the fieldworkers' life-worlds and 
experiences and how they operate with this in the real world. Any external pressures 
or demands upon the fieldworkers are likely to be interpreted in terms which do not 
necessarily conform with the local dominant political reality. In this sense, we are 
suggesting that fieldworkers' action are not just guided by political pragmatic 
reasons, but also by a series of personal and social events. Fieldworkers' speech-acts 
encapsulate these combination of experiences, and influence descriptions of 
macro-rules and social conventions in new contexts, regulating their performance 
when they are implementing a policy. These points will be illustrated in the section 
that follows. 
In practice, three main types of speech-act were identified among the 
fieldworkers: The authoritarian, the paternalistic, and the egalitarian. The 
information presented here consists primarily of material obtained directly from the 
fieldworkers. 
The Authoritarian Speech-Act 
Fieldworkers expressing an authoritarian attitude towards the producers were a 
minority in the group under study. These 'authoritarian' fieldworkers were drawn 
largely from family backgrounds involved in livestock activities (i.e from rancher 
families) who combined city living with periodic residence in their rural homes 
(ranchos). 
In practice, they perceived small-scale private producers as most accepting of 
Ministry policies of modernisation, and the ejidatario, as a suspicious producer who 
distrusted their technical assistance. These fieldworkers were against government 
policy to support basic grain production. They perceived such policies as dangerous 
political experiments that usually ended up eroding 'order' in society and wasting 
the scarce resources available to the government for supporting agricultural 
development. 
In the following case, the fieldworker's authoritarian speech-acts express 
resentful feelings towards government policies, because a local leader of the Liga 
Agraria has challenged his position both as an agricultural expert and member of the 
bureaucracy (the Liga Agraria is a political association of rural producers, controlled 
by the PRI). The fieldworker's speech-act constitutes a scheme of articulate practices 
and an account of his rules, actions and doubts about government policy. The 
formality and informality of everyday fieldworker practices are encapsulated in his 
narrative, as a memory of the practical interface between officials and producers. 
This narrative, which is based upon his life-world, identity and professional status, 
reveals to us his lack of trust in agricultural intervention and his 'power' relations 
with producers. 
"This Senor Hernandez (producer) hates us and his game is to boast around 
that every single project in Tlajomulco, like the wells, has been the result 
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of his political influence. He does this to gain support among the producers 
and he is always trying to control us [the fieldworkers]. 
One day I was walking in Tlajomulco when Sr. Hernandez came and 
invited me to drink una copa with him. In a very improper way he said to 
me. 'Well now, you tecnico, you have to drink with Hernandez! You have 
to have a good drinking session with me! (pegarte una buena conmigo)\ I 
was sharp in my reply, because I knew him by reputation, so I just said: 
'sorry, but I don't drink'. My answer transformed him into a very 
aggressive person and he said to me, 'Ok, it's your decision, from now on, 
you will have difficulties being accepted by the producers (entrarle a los 
productores). I can assure you they will reject you'. 
After this incident I had several other problems with this person, so I 
decided to report these incidents to the head of the unit. After a while, I was 
surprised to hear that instead of the Ministry giving me support, the district 
head stated that it was my job to avoid conflict with Senor Hernandez. In 
other words, he had more influence than me at district level. 
This experience still annoys me, because I cannot believe that a 
producer would be more influential than a professional at the Ministry. All 
this is possible because the district staff are a bunch of people who ignore 
the realities of work in the field. They are able to deny support to a 
colleague just for political motives. This is wrong, because Hernandez is a 
cabron (son of a bitch) who loves to interfere with my responsibilities to 
provide technical assistance to the producers. " 
The above is an example of a case in which the actions of a producer do not 
coincide with what the fieldworker expects of a local leader's attitude. Moreover, 
when he did ask for institutional support the political reality in the field provided a 
local meaning to the interaction, which led to the district refusing institutional 
support to the fieldworker. As a result, in this interface, the fieldworker felt stripped 
of his status, because he assumed that the district would support him, as a matter of 
principle, against producers. 
The need to deal from a position of social distance with producers was further 
illustrated, when later, in an informal gathering, the fieldworker told me: "it is not 
true that I don't drink, but I like to choose with whom I do it". This affirmation of 
will was followed by a statement that revealed the fieldworker's social background. 
He said, "in Sinaloa producers know their place ... they are not like here in 
Jalisco". 
The fieldworker's social background, rooted in the Sinaloa system of social 
relations where once he had been a ranchero dealing in livestock, may explain why 
he wanted to remove personal relations from the immediacy of his professional 
sphere. The event with Senor Hernandez confronted him with an unfamiliar political 
context. But more than that, he felt that his own image as an expert had been 
diminished by the incident. 
The fieldworker's father worked in the district office, and did not give support 
to the son, who relished his ranchero status. He dressed like a rich charro 
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(cowboy), was one of only two fieldworkers who owned a pick-up truck in the unit 
(a symbol of high economic status in the rural area), and in his area of work he was 
well known to producers for always trying to spot and buy good horses, that he 
could later sell for charro activities in Guadalajara. The fieldworker, who saw 
himself as a representative of those who in Mexico control economic and political 
power, never expected an attempt at political co-option from one of his low status 
clients. After all, he was from the charro culture*, and a member of the 
professional agricultural sector. 
How a rural producer would have the capacity to challenge either of these 
statuses was, for him, beyond comprehension. So, when he realised that not only 
was it possible for producers in Jalisco to challenge a fieldworker's status, but that 
this was accepted by the agency, he blamed the incident on government policies. 
"These policies that have encouraged the producers to grow maize, are economically 
a failure, because the only profitable activity in the countryside is livestock. These 
policies only provide more ammunition to those political producers who like to 
challenge Ministry activities in the field". 
In his opinion ejidatarios often deceived fieldworkers with fake economic 
information. Lack of trust and a weak knowledge of the social nature of the 
ejidatarios were the main reasons why government wasted resources, and 
programmes never appeared to yield the expected results. 
The fieldworker's position was against the course of actions dictated by the 
district. According to him, these did not support fieldworker activities or provide 
clear institutional authority for the fieldworker to impose his expert view on 
producers. His disappointment with this situation made him decide that after 
graduation from the university he would return to his rancho in Sinaloa. 
This fieldworker identified in his speech-acts institutional practices as a main 
constraint in his job arguing that it was even harder to find support among the 
people of his unit: "the head of the unit can't support us, because he is not free to 
do so. His main loyalties must remain with the head of programmes in the district, 
so we have no protection". The fieldworker was convinced that the lack of 
institutional authority was the main reason why the quality of the fieldworkers' 
performance was constantly declining. 
The Paternalistic Speech-Act 
The paternalistic speech-act is the most general 'language-practice' among 
fieldworkers. Those holding paternalistic attitudes have normally an urban middle 
class background, and they see agricultural producers as uneducated people who lack 
motivation to improve their social situation. Among these fieldworkers it is not 
unusual to hear opinions such as the following: 
"The problem with the producer is that they don't work hard, they don't 
invest to improve the value of their plots because they prefer to drink and 
show off to other producers and friends that they have money to spend. 
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These practices don't help their families nor improve their condition as 
producers. I don't like to defend the government. It is criminal and exploits 
people, but that fact doesn't change the producers sin: they are lazy. 
Producers only want to receive free things from the government, and if it 
does not give these to them, they complain and complain." 
Such language portrays agricultural producers as unable to make any use of the 
fieldworker's services due to their culturally backward condition. This condition 
relates to a perception that producers are unwilling to defer gratification. This 
perception carves out a role in society for the fieldworker as an agent of progress, 
someone who can teach producers to behave in a civilized way. This speech-act 
rejects authoritarian impositions as an approach to producers. 
However, there exist different opinions about how close a relationship a 
fieldworker needs with producers in order to achieve positive results. One group 
believes in the need to approach producers with a friendly attitude. Thus a central 
point in their interactional approach is to gain the producers' confianza (trust), and 
for them, this requires the need to construct a personal relationship between the 
fieldworker and producer. This group emphasizes that drinking with producers, or 
passing inside institutional information to them are essential symbolic tokens through 
which fieldworkers become accepted by their clients. Another group argues that too 
much involvement in personal relations is counter-productive, because producers in 
the end become disrespectful to the fieldworker. Drinking sessions with producers 
are seen as particularly risky situations, as they are providing producers with too 
much information. For these fieldworkers, social distance and respect for their 
expert status are important components in the constitution of trust between 
fieldworker and producers. 
These two variations of the same type of speech-act favour a paternalistic 
interaction with producers. In their practice, such fieldworkers show an apparent 
disregard for the macro-norms and rules coming from the administrative structure, 
emphasising flexibility in order to help producers. The two cases that follow, 
illustrate each type of variation, as directly observed by me in the field. I suggest 
that although there is a parallel between these approaches, there is an important 
difference in how fieldworkers use their power (capacity) of intervention. 
In the first situation inside institutional information is given to prevent local 
people from losing resources. The fieldworker capitalises trust without suffering any 
institutional action. In the second case, the fieldworker expresses a desire to 
represent the producers' interests. But in this, he is forced to move his expert 
knowledge beyond the protected space of the ejido into the risky domain of the 
institution. At this level, the fieldworker has to balance the dilemma of being the 
representative of the producers with his personal ambitions to advance in the 
institution. 
The fieldworker's final decision shows us the nature of his capacity for 
intervention. While he is trying to do well for his clients, in the end he does not 
achieve what the producers wanted. In this case, the power trajectory of institutional 
practices stop the fieldworker from taking the risk of exposing institutional 
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corruption. The fieldworker in fact withdraws his trust from the producers' 
allegations, in order to avoid personal risk, while keeping alive his personal 
ambitions. Somehow his authority is made passive. 
1) How to Gain Producer Trust 
One day the head of the unit suggested that I could go and visit the ejido San 
Sebastian. The fieldworker immediately approved because, as he said, he had just 
been assigned to the place and he did not have a car, hence it was difficult for him 
to go constantly to the ejido. During the car journey, which took around 20 minutes, 
the fieldworker complained that producers did not go to the meetings, in spite of the 
fact that the ejido had great agricultural potential. He said that the previous 
fieldworker had done a bad job, so producers had lost confidence in the Ministry. 
When we arrived, it was clear that the only people he knew well were the 
community authorities, and the following dialogue occurred between the tecnico and 
the Secretary of the ejido: 
Tecnico: We have several issues to solve. 
Producer: Yes, but that is your fault, because you didn't come to our 
meeting even when you promised us your presence for last 
week. 
Tecnico: I'm sorry about that. I had a serious car accident in Nayarit, 
and that was the reason why I didn't come to the meeting. 
Anyway, we have to decide who are the producers who want 
to participate in the PIPMA programme. We have to find at 
least 1000 hectares to be able to implement it. 
Producer: Yes, I want the programme, but we have to organise a 
meeting first, to see the advantages and problems of the 
programme, and to let the producers decide for themselves. 
Tecnico: Ok, but I only say that if you don't give me your decision 
quickly the programme will go somewhere else. 
Producer: We want the programme, but I don't know how many other 
producers want to participate in the programme. 
Tecnico: Come on man! You as Secretary must set the example. You 
can incorporate your 20 hectares into the programme, and the 
benefit is for you, because you will receive an increase in 
credit. Now, you only receive credit for 10 hectares, with the 
programme, because it is me who administers it, it is no 
problem to cover all your land. But you have to convince your 
father, family and cuates (close friends) to participate. We 
have to bring this programme to the ejido. All we need is 
land. It doesn't matter if all these hectares are not from 
ejidatarios, because private small producers can participate as 
well. 
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Producer: Yes I understand the importance of the programme, but we 
have to be careful about commitment. We are the ones who 
will later pay for the results. 
Tecnico: We have to organise a meeting soon, and I will invite the head 
of the unit. For this I have to be sure that all the people will 
come to the meeting. Not like the last time, when the head 
only saw a few people. You have to drive (arrear) the 
producers, and we have to use this new opportunity. Ahhh... 
before I forget, I will give you a tip. At the moment we have 
a terrible infection among goats, so next week the people from 
the district will come to take samples from the animals and 
destroy the ones with disease. So tell the producers, and they 
can send the animals to the hills, saving them from the health 
control people. " 
When we came back to the car the fieldworker said to me: "I had to help these 
people, and I know that if I can gain their trust I will be able to do good work here. 
I need to get to know them well and show them I am on their side. The tip about 
the infection control campaign is economically more important for them than for the 
district. It could take me a long way in my relationship with them. " 
In this case, the fieldworker was using inside information to gain acceptance 
(trust) in the ejido. His main concern was to bring a new programme into operation 
and, for this, he had to show his commitment to 'defending producers' interests' and 
the 'tip' was an important device for doing so, first because the health control people 
were not directly connected with his unit, they were district people, and second, the 
fieldworker felt it was more important to support 'his programme' than other 
programmes of the Ministry, especially since the health control people had the 
reputation of coming into the ejidos and shooting animals without any warning and 
then disappearing, leaving the fieldworkers with the task of facing angry producers. 
The warning was helpful in constructing good relations with the producers, even 
though he was invalidating the effects of the health control programme. 
After this visit, which took no more than two hours, the fieldworker was 
absolutely convinced that he had helped producers to benefit from his capacity to 
intervene, in spite of the fact that he had violated official norms. 
2) Respect as a Fieldwork Device 
One evening the fieldworker Herberto invited me to *see his work in the field. 
During the journey to the ejido, which took an hour, he openly talked about his 
disagreement with those agronomists who believed that the only way to get 
producers' trust was to drink with them (echarse unas copas con ellos para ganarse 
su confianza). Herberto said "I have never done that. If you do it they lose respect 
for you. In my book it is always necessary to keep work apart from having a good 
time". The fieldworker was a person of sound principles and his attitude, according 
to him, had created some problems in his relations with producers. Herberto said: 
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"When I was assigned to the ejido I had problems with the President of the 
community. He was a grilloso [actively involved in politics] and in all ways 
behaved like a small-time cacique [local boss]. The first day I arrived he 
invited me to have a drink and as I refused, he rejected me. Producers never 
went to meetings and when I had to return to Guadalajara at night, I was 
always expecting a shot from the road. Although I was afraid, it was 
important for me to stick to my principles and I didn't give in. I was 
determined not to accept being integrated into their community on their 
terms. After some weeks, I managed to make contact with an old man who 
became close to me, mainly because he was a practising Catholic like me, 
so we used to meet and talk about religion quite a lot. 
Eventually, this producer told me what the situation was in the ejido. 
I was often in his house. This relation was misinterpreted by the President 
of the community, who thought I was trying to prepare this producer to gain 
the next election in the ejido. When that election took place and only one list 
was presented, the whole community realised that my intentions were not 
to intervene in local politics. The new President, who is a relative of the last 
one, is much more open with me, and so far we have kept good relations. 
I believe that now my work has really started. After six months of rejection, 
I am trying to organise the ejido. This is not my work, and the district could 
punish me at any moment, but I believe that these producers, without a 
minimal level of organisation, are not going to be able to benefit from my 
technical assistance. So I decided to start from the base, because I don't 
want my work to be a sterile effort, but a real contribution. 
Last year, the association programme for the district was here, but 
apparently the promotores [people in charge of the producers' association] 
were unable to do anything practical, and of course the producers got fed 
up with their meetings. 
The nature of the problems I have to solve are difficult, but I pray to 
the Lord that people from the district don't realise the actual nature of my 
work, so I have enough time to set the basis of my contribution well in the 
producer's mind. I don't need anything from the district, but I don't want 
obstructions or grilla from them. My aim is to organise a good ejido and 
provide producers with an internal code of practice that would be legalized 
by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, so I could use that document later, to 
help producers to formulate their own petitions to the district. 
For me, that moment will be the hour of truth, because the district will 
start to investigate who the fieldworker is who is working on that, because 
they don't like producers' petitions. If they approve my work then I will be 
fine, otherwise they may sanction me for taking responsibilities beyond my 
work as fieldworker, but if that happens, they will not be able to reverse the 
level of organisation among the producers. " 
When we arrived in the ejido, the fieldworker called the community producers to 
a prearranged meeting. He used the church loud-speaker to announce his presence. 
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The meeting started more than four hours later because people were doing 
communal work, and twenty-five producers were absent. 
One producer explained to me that the twenty-five were all members of a 
political faction opposed to the ejido President, and that was the reason why they did 
not want to come to the meetings. He tried during the meeting to get the twenty-five 
condemned politically, including the fieldworker. But the latter, perceiving the 
move, called for unity and the need to work for the collective benefit of the ejido. 
When the fieldworker finally started the meeting he said, "I am afraid I have 
bad news for you. A letter from Mexico has arrived saying that those producers who 
don't pay their debts to the bank (BANRURAL), may be subject to seizure by law, 
and their house, belongings and even their freedom may be taken in repayment for 
the debts". The fieldworker went on to explain that these measures were the result 
of the national economic crisis and that Mexico needed the support of every Mexican 
in order to survive. The fieldworker's words were received without comment, 
although smiles appeared on the faces of some producers. 
After this information, the fieldworker announced the rules for the high 
productivity competition, and he encouraged producers to participate in the contest. 
The fieldworker then asked producers whether they were happy with the 
implementation of the desempiedre programme organised by the Ministry (removing 
stones from the soil), a work done by private contractors in the ejido. At this point 
there was a heated discussion and a denouncing of several cases of corruption from 
the people operating the machinery. The most frequent charge was that the operators 
did not carry out the work if producers were not able to pay them for coming to 
their plots, so 'only a few producers have benefitted from the programme'. 
The fieldworker just listened to these complaints, and tried to dissociate the 
Ministry from the private contractors. He promised to inform the head of the unit 
and he said, "these accusations are serious, so I hope you will not retract your 
comments when the inquiry starts, otherwise I will lose credibility in my unit". 
When we returned to Guadalajara it was after 10.30 pm, the fieldworker was 
physically exhausted and worried about the complaints from the meeting. During the 
journey he was assessing the real implications of the accusations and whether he had 
to report these irregularities and so start an inquiry. Who were the people in the 
district acting with these contractors? To what extent would an inquiry attract 
attention to his job? How would these affect his long term objectives? These 
questions made the fieldworker hesitate, although he had to decide on a course of 
action before the next morning. He did not arrive at a decision while I was with 
him. He invited me to his house where we relaxed with a cup of hot chocolate and 
a piece of traditional Mexican sweet bread. The subject of the inquiry was never 
raised again. 
In the above case, one can see that the fieldworker's sympathetic disposition 
towards the producers was not enough to gain their trust. The approach used by the 
fieldworker, who tried to establish a relation of respect with each of the interacting 
parties, created a problem and the politically active producers did not know how to 
interpret his actions. Producers' experiences in dealing with the Mexican system had 
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taught them that a refusal to drink was the sign of a negative attitude on the part of 
the fieldworker. By refusing to drink, the fieldworker threatened the existing system 
of political transactions operating in the community. State intervention constituted 
a threat to the position of the dominant group in the community. Herberto's case 
shows the difficulties of the fieldworker at work; on the one hand trying to gain 
producers' confianza, while on the other, the producers wait to see on which side 
of the local political divide the fieldworker will choose to situate himself, and thus 
the degree of confidence they can afford. 
Herberto was compelled to organise his own programme of intervention in the 
ejido. This was different from the official programme. When the fieldworker 
assumed responsibility for evaluating producers' complaints, he acted as a filter 
between the corrupt practices of the official system and the interests of producers. 
It is in terms of this mediation that the paternalistic approach has to be understood. 
Although Herberto challenged the official system, when he took on a task that went 
beyond the ejido, he used his experiences as a way of avoiding a strong encounter 
between producers and the system. Herberto saw himself as the person who should 
decide when and how a confrontation with the system should take place. Such an 
action is, of course, mediated by an interpretation of both the local and the 
institutional situation, that would minimise the contradictions and his own risks. This 
action, based on the fieldworker's own reflexivity, middle class background and 
well-informed knowledge of the different contexts and circumstances, shows how 
such institutional actors are aware of the need to protect their own interests. They 
calculate their actions so as not to jeopardise their chances for advancement 
politically in the Ministry (usually justified as 'to change things' from the inside), 
or to gain a good reputation for technical achievements and dedication. These are 
important considerations, not only for the nature of their involvement with 
producers, but also in avoiding a possible transfer from Guadalajara, where they all 
have their urban base. In other words, in critical situations of interface, these 
fieldworkers are perfectly aware of what is important and what is contingent in their 
careers. 
These personal motivations mean that fieldworkers using a paternalistic speech-
act, are unlikely to support the direct participation of producers when confronted 
with the need to solve a local problem. They see themselves as representing 
producer interests, although none of their actions are radical enough to change the 
existing distribution of rights and obligations (power) in favour of producers in the 
Jalisco region. 
These fieldworkers never openly discuss their experiences at unit level. Their 
experiences and contradictions with the institutional guidelines are thus never 
acknowledged by the administrative system. With time, these fieldworkers become 
more concerned to save their individual relations with producers, than to achieve 
collective change. 
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The Egalitarian Speech-Act 
A more egalitarian attitude was found among the group of fieldworkers with a 
humble rural or urban social background. They are usually the first members of 
their families to have a university degree and to work for the government. They 
have thus achieved a degree of upward social mobility. 
Their perception of agricultural producers is different from the other two 
groups. For them, agricultural producers are people actively involved in local 
politics, usually through their membership in a group that follows the direction of 
a local leader. One of these fieldworkers said to me, "changes can be implemented 
in the ejidos if one manages to get the support of these leaders. Otherwise, they 
become one of the major obstacles that a fieldworker has to confront when 
implementing a programme". 
This group of fieldworkers is positively motivated to favour close contact with 
producers, seeing such close relations as the main factor securing producers' trust 
and collaboration with programmes. As one of them said: 
"To gain the producers' trust it is npcessary to accept their invitations. If a 
fieldworker rejects these, they immediately interpret this as a superior 
attitude, because of differences in their and our economic situations. In my 
case I love to be among producers and am always on friendly terms with 
them. In my experience I would say that this is essential if a fieldworker 
wants a producer to take any notice of his recommendations." 
These fieldworkers emphasize in their discourse that good communications with 
producers are the best protection against administrative sanctions. As one of them 
related: 
"One day, a companera (female fieldworker) from the organisation had to 
leave the Ministry because her contract was not renewed. The producers in 
my area started to ask me, how they could put pressure on the district to 
stop the dismissal of the companera. First, I explained to them that this was 
not a district or even a regional decision, but policy from Mexico City. 
However, they remained determined to fight for her case. In the end, they 
succeeded in convincing the authorities and her contract was renewed. " 
To accentuate further the differences with the other two speech-acts, these 
fieldworkers did not perceive producers in terms of their good or bad moral 
qualities. On the contrary, they were willing to operate within the limits of the social 
reality in which producers lived. They adopted a mofe positive stance than the 
paternalistic posture, because they did not attribute any special function or status to 
the fieldworker's social position. An illustration of their perception is found in the 
following account: 
"It is true that a fieldworker has to be aware of appearances with producers. 
Producers are tranzas (fiddlers) and they sometimes sell the subsidised 
fertilizers. I once witnessed a government truck delivering the fertilizer and 
immediately behind, a city trader exchanging the fertilizer for mattresses. 
Ok, this type of situation may be considered bad for Ministry policies, but 
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who in Mexico is not a fiddler? And who is to say that the producer needs 
fertilizer more than a new mattress? 
I can tell you, that one of central problems here is that some 
fieldworkers can't accept the producer as he is; or the fact that producers 
can make decisions for themselves, and that they don't want to change their 
decisions because they are based on their own way of living (forma de 
vida). Some fieldworkers never learn their lesson and when producers value 
their own experiences above our advice, the fieldworkers complain that 
producers take decisions behind our back. " 
The most relevant point about these egalitarian speech-acts is the fact that they do 
not see the producers' values as being any different from the values of Mexican 
society as a whole. Such fieldworkers do not perceive producers' attitude as 
culturally backward, and they see the agricultural way of life of producers as valid. 
While recognizing the existence of fiddling among producers, they accept that 
corruption is a cultural feature of Mexican society from which it is very difficult to 
escape. 
The process of reflexivity of such fieldworkers leads them to believe that the 
technical service from the Ministry has to prove itself of value to the producer. 
Among themselves, they say that, in reality, if the whole Ministry disappeared 
overnight, producers would not realise it and production would probably increase 
immediately. 
In other words, these fieldworkers see the means to develop agriculture in the 
alteration of official practices, and not in an intervention that could change 
producers' attitudes. They stress the importance of human relations over any 
technical knowledge, as a way to achieve trust and reduce or minimise the risks of 
modernisation. They view official norms and rules as constraining efficiency, and 
they suggest a closer relation between administrators' targets and producers' needs. 
They say that unless this situation changes, everything will remain as it is. This 
group was the most disposed to favour producers' direct participation, but they were 
not in a powerful enough position to use this as a device to challenge the other 
speech-acts within the Ministry. 
In this section, three main types of speech-acts have been identified as the basis 
of interactions with producers. In doing so, fieldworkers' social backgrounds and 
their experiences with producers were found to be significant variables. These 
influenced fieldworkers understanding of the aim of national policies and the nature 
of their relations with producers. These factors were also seen to be important in 
determining their administrative behaviour. 
This section has shown the heterogeneity that exists among field personnel. 
Fieldworkers are not passive subjects of the administrative context. External political 
pressures are not the cause of diversity to be found in the speech-acts of 
fieldworkers and in administrative behaviour. External political pressures are part 
of the social circumstances of policy implementation. In this sense, how a 
fieldworker relates and responds to the circumstances of policy implementation is 
connected with an individual process of reflexivity and knowledge that includes his 
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life-world, institutional experiences and relationship to rural producers. Fieldworker 
actions usually involve both a challenge to and acceptance of the official 
administrative system. Nevertheless, one common factor unifies all fieldworkers, 
and that is that they are constantly searching to create room for manoeuvre within 
the official system. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that fieldworkers in Jalisco have different ways of 
integrating their experiences, life-worlds, agricultural policy aims and their degree 
of involvement with rural producers. Three main speech-acts were identified as 
reflecting these different ways of integrating and organising at the individual level 
the circumstances of policy implementation, while minimising possible risks during 
the process of agricultural intervention. The preceding discussion indicated that the 
role of the fieldworker is important in linking two different contexts of knowledge: 
that of the rural producers and that of the institutional system. The fieldworker 
enters the rural producer's life world in the ejido, while he has to survive and makes 
his career in the institutional environment. 
The everyday existence of the fieldworker in these two contexts forces him to 
separate these two worlds into providing guarantees of a better future for producers, 
while claiming total achievement of programme targets in the institutional arena. 
This practice makes the fieldworker a manipulator of circumstances, rather than a 
controller of standardised agricultural services. The fieldworker's role is clearly 
different to that of the district officers in charge of programme operations. As was 
shown in the previous chapter. In this sense, it is possible to say that the knowledge 
and actions claimed by the fieldworkers are different to the actions and knowledge 
claimed by district personnel. At the level of policy implementation, district and 
field-units are rather separate cultures, with an emphasis on agricultural 
service-orientated thinking leading to an uncoordinated organisation in the belief that 
this would benefit the needs of rural producers, institutional politics and the careers 
of the individuals. 
Fieldworkers have no trust in district practices, but they nevertheless have to 
accept the constraints of the organisation, while being aware of the political 
circumstances within the institution. They have to learn how-to rely upon internal 
political networks to minimise their risks. The major lesson fieldworkers learn in the 
process of institutionalisation, seems to be that instead of directing their intervention 
practices to obtain the aims of the institutional policy, they might better use them to 
push their own 'mission', objectives and strategies. Their reflexivity of policy 
implementation becomes entangled with their cultural attitudes, life-worlds, 
administrative practices, motivations, career possibilities, ambitions, professional 
role, achievements and frustrations. 
In summary, reflexivity leads to a re-definition of the existing policy discourse 
and practices. Paradoxically, the case-studies show how an active, reflexive attitude 
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on the part of fieldworkers can indeed situationally re-define the relation between 
state and rural producers, but this re-definition does not follow the objectives of state 
policy. The focus on reflexivity with regard to policy implementation has shifted the 
analysis in rural development from the political arena and flow of influences upon 
institutional officials (Grindle, 1980), to the far more important process of 
fieldworkers' modes of operation and how they filter society's demands in action. 
Within this perspective, the practices of fieldworkers in society are far more 
important and complex than a mere effort to keep the dominant notion of 'political 
order' working in society. 
The combination of institutional knowledge, life-world and interaction with rural 
producers, determines the practical outcomes of any rural policy. These are not 
constructed simply as bureaucratic preferences for the 'avoidance of conflicts', these 
are individual experiences, beliefs and values that find their way into policy 
implementation. As the policy formulation document may not represent shared 
values in society, the fieldworker becomes in practice, the filtering 'factor' in 
deciding on what is credible and possible for a rural policy. 
How fieldworkers resolve the conflict between their own reflexivity and the 
institutional aims of a particular agrarian policy is essentially the practical problem 
of adjusting general policy goals to the locality, and adjusting the fieldworkers' 
representations to the means available to implement them. This problem constitutes 
the leading theme in Chapter 5. 
Notes 
1. The servicio social is a compulsory period of social service for university students before they 
can graduate. The servicio often provides students with their first work experience, while serving 
the community. 
2. Speech-act: the importance of this concept in understanding the 'real world' was brought to my 
attention by Quarles van Ufford at the EIDOS summer school 'Giving Disorder its Due' at the 
Free University of Amsterdam, June 1990. The concept has been used by Steiner (1989) to 
balance the study of interpretation and action. See also in this line of analysis the critical view of 
J.B. Thompson (1981) against the centrality of language in the study of social life. 
3. Charro culture can be viewed as the maximum expression of machismo in Mexico. A good 
charro is not only a person who can control horses, but who can equally control guns and 
women. 
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5. THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING AN AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY 
In this chapter, I focus on perceptions of the implementation of the SAM policy at 
local level. In the first part of the chapter the policy is explained, the cultural and 
practical importance of maize is highlighted and some institutional evaluations of the 
policy in some regions of the country are presented. All these constitute a prelude 
to a closer examination of the SAM policy at the local level. The study of the SAM 
in Jalisco contributes to identifying some of the more important agricultural changes 
and social processes which emanate from the construction of a policy. This chapter 
provides, from the producers and fieldworker's point of view, an initial explanation 
of SAM limitations at the level of policy implementation. 
The Formulation of a 'New Agricultural Policy' 
In 1980, President López Portillo launched the Mexican Food System (SAM). This 
policy attempted to cover Mexican food provision. It formalised a policy trend from 
the sixties, in which rural development programmes had been launched on a project-
to-project basis, such as Plan Puebla and the Chapingo Plan (see Chapter 2)". The 
'new' agricultural policy of SAM aimed to consolidate this trend and to provide a 
comprehensive, coordinated development policy. It singled out production, 
transformation, commercialisation and distribution of basic grains, in particular 
maize, as the mean to solve nutritional deficiencies among the Mexican population, 
and to improve the conditions of rainfed producers. The SAM had the ultimate 
objective a) to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of food, b) to improve the 
income of rural producers and c) to create employment in the rural areas. (S.P.P., 
1980; Luiselli, 1980). SAM was presented as a 'new' policy, but it also included the 
assemblance and coordination of existing projects which had been implemented for 
some time. 
With the arrival of the administration of President de la Madrid, SAM continued 
under a new name: Programa Nacional de Alimentacion (PRONAL, National Food 
Programme). This continuation of agricultural policy was formally announced in 
October 1983. The information presented in this chapter was collected in Jalisco in 
1983, that is, during the transitional period of SAM to PRONAL, though throughout 
I refer to the policy as SAM. 
SAM constituted the foundation of Mexican agricultural production policy for 
the decade of the 1980's and as such is an important case study of state intervention. 
The policy aimed to transform producers' social conditions through subsidized credit 
and better access to fertilizers, pesticides and improved seeds. The ejidatarios and 
small private producers were the main target groups to receive these benefits which 
were to be financed by the revenues generated by the oil industry. The 
implementation of this policy and the development of rainfed agriculture was 
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expected to absorb 25 percent of these revenues (S.P.P., 1980). The policy 
promoted twenty different projects to modernise rainfed agriculture, and sought to 
integrate this agricultural sector into the national economy. 
The food policy was formulated by the group of policy advisers around the 
President (the technocratic group), but they had no proper institutional channel for 
its implementation. Before the formal launching of the SAM policy, the projects that 
formed its core had to be almost literally sold to the existing bureaucracy in charge 
of the agricultural sector. President López Portillos' formalisation of the SAM 
ensured that agencies accepted the projects. The SAM policy as it finally emerged 
in 1980 had four main strategic components. 
The first was harvest insurance. With a premium of 3 percent, this was a 
government scheme to share the risk of production with the producers. The 
insurance covered the value of the credit for agricultural inputs, the cost of 
production and the subsistence needs of the producer and his family during one 
agricultural cycle (to an equivalent of 40 percent of the value of the input credit). 
The second component of the agricultural policy was an increase in the 
guaranteed price of maize and beans in real terms. For maize, the price increase was 
15 percent in 1980 and 6 percent in 1981-1982. The third element aimed to 
subsidize agricultural inputs and to provide better access to improved high yielding 
seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. The real price of maize seeds was reduced by 75 
percent, fertilizers and pesticides by 30 percent and interest rates for agricultural 
credit were reduced from 14 to 3 percent. 
The fourth component of the policy aimed to improve the quality of the 
agricultural extension service and to increase organisation among producers. This 
was aimed at the efficient use of credit, and to improve the bargaining capacities of 
producers in the market. These four policy components were expected to trigger off 
rural development, increase grain production and improve the income of rural 
producers. 
Initial Responses to the Policy 
From the start, the SAM policy brought mixed responses from different sectors in 
Mexican society. Generally speaking, the private sector resented the SAM strategy 
because it was seen as increasing state intervention, the importance of bureaucracy 
in agricultural development and public spending. However, the large capitalist 
farmers perceived this agricultural policy from 'above' as a transitional situation. 
They realised that SAM would not interfere with their economic activities and that 
the cost of the subsidies embedded in the policy would make it unlikely for the 
approach to become a permanent feature of state agricultural strategy. Therefore, 
the large farmers did not openly resist SAM. Nevertheless, they pointed out that, in 
their view, public investment should be directed to productive projects 
(infrastructure) as a strategy to increase the supply side of rainfed agriculture. In that 
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way, the policy would not increase the 'evil of inflation', which the rich farmers 
expected from the existing policy (COPERMEX, 1981). 
The livestock and poultry farmers opposed the SAM, arguing that the increase 
of maize would produce a decline in the production of sorghum and soya, affecting 
the production of Mexican meat and dairy products. 
For the political opposition on the left, subsidies for poor rural producers was 
a political strategy to avoid the materialisation of the Mexican state 'legitimation' 
crisis. They argued that SAM was formulated to maintain the existing privileges of 
the land-owners and the multinationals, which, in Mexico, control 75 percent of the 
food industry. They asked for an agricultural policy that would reduce the privileges 
of large, export-orientated producers. Other sectors of the left coalition criticised the 
SAM policy for being anti-democratic, because planners had not involved the 
peasant movement in the formulation of the SAM objectives. 
The designers of the SAM underestimated the negative response from society to 
the agricultural policy. The policy makers wrongly assumed that they had a 
favourable political context for this type of policy. But, as it turned out, in the end 
the implementation of SAM was indeed constrained by problems in the Mexican 
economy. These contradictions surrounding the SAM policy had materialized by the 
end of 1983, when the policy was recognised to have failed as such, and adaptations 
to the policy were formulated. 
The Social Significance of Maize in the Formulation of SAM 
SAM's intervention in the rainfed agricultural sector was mainly aimed at altering 
the production conditions of maize. This crop, that according to some Mexican 
agronomists has its origins in the South of Puebla and North of Oaxaca (see 
Palacios, 1983), has been cultivated in Mexico since 1500 B.C. (Wolf, 1959) since 
which time it has been part of the production and reproduction of the Mexican 
peasant household. 
Maize was the most important crop of the traditional farming system, which, as 
the centre of pre-hispanic social organisation, was closely regulated by community 
rights. Later, this farming system and maize were the basis for peasant demands to 
reclaim the devolution of their native land. It took its maximum expression with the 
advent of the Mexican Revolution, the implementation of the.Agrarian Reform and 
the establishment of the ejido. 
In short, the cultural, economic and social traditions of maize have made the 
crop an important political symbol in Mexico. Lopez Portillo's strategy with the 
SAM was to introduce a policy which recognized the basic grain needs of the poor. 
State intervention aimed to increase production among ejidatarios and minifundistas 
(small private producers). 
In Mexico, about 91 percent of the ejido land produces 85 percent of the total 
maize production (Palacios, 1983: 2), and 70 percent of the national demand for the 
cereal is for human consumption. This trend has slowly decreased from 1978 
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onwards, but human consumption demand was still over 60 percent in 1980 
(COPLAMAR, 1982). Nutritional studies report that in rural areas the consumption 
of maize per person had declined from 407 grammes per day to 324 grammes per 
day from 1964 to 1979. On the other hand, in the urban areas, the consumption of 
maize has remained at the traditional level of 200 grammes per day (COPLAMAR, 
1980). 
The same study pointed out that the consumption of maize in the poorest 10 
percent of the population in Mexico took up to 32 percent of their monetary budget. 
The study found, in 1980, that among the population that did not satisfy their 
minimal nutritional requirements, maize and beans represented 36 percent of their 
normal consumption basket. More staggering was the relation between income 
groups and maize consumption in Mexico. In 1975, cereal consumption in grammes 
per day in the lower income groups was double that of higher income groups 
(COPLAMAR, 1982). 
These low income sectors are pools of reserve labour located on the boundaries 
of the urban settlements in belts of shanty towns, where their deprivation forces 
them to survive from the informal sector of the economy, or from the solidarity 
networks which embrace this mass in a brotherhood of 'sans culottes The potential 
of an awakening of social consciousness among these groups forced the state to 
realise the political importance of maintaining a constant supply of maize for these 
people. Hence, the possible social and political costs of a crisis in maize production 
put the rainfed sector to the forefront of state policy, and presented Lopez Portillo's 
government as making a break from the past, unsuccessful, rural development 
policies. 
The state in Mexico has traditionally responded to urban food problems with a 
limited policy of price guarantees to secure the production of grain among rural 
producers, complemented by large maize imports from the United States. On the 
consumer side, it subsidized the mills and tortillerias (commercial places where 
tortillas are made) to keep bread and tortillas (traditional Mexican bread) accessible 
to the poor. This policy subsidized consumption for the urban poor, but it adversely 
affected the profitability of maize in relation to other crops in the rainfed sector. 
Lopez Portillo's agricultural policy attempted to reverse the trends which 
negatively affected the production of basic grains. The social and political 
importance of maize made him realise that a continuation of the policy to import 
maize would provide a weapon, which could be used by the United States to 
intervene in Mexican politics (Durston, 1982: 22). Such considerations persuaded 
the government to change the way it traditionally intervened in corn production 
(SAM 1980-1982, 1981). According to Salinas de Gortary, from 1978 onwards, 
López Portillo argued the use of revenues generated by oil resources to allocate 
funds to government projects that would solve problems of unemployment and 
marginalization in rural areas (Salinas de Gortary, 1980: 22). 
In a country where government policies have favoured capital formation and 
economic growth strategies rather than redistribution or welfare policies, the food 
policy (SAM) and the importance of maize in it constituted an innovative case of 
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agricultural policy formulation. The possibilities of modernising rainfed agriculture 
and at the same time attacking the social problems affecting Mexican rainfed 
producers, promised to bring about a different type of agricultural transformation. 
Barriers in the Path of Implementing Self-Sufficiency 
The administrative reform of the 1970's (see Chapter 2) radically altered the 
organization of the agricultural sector. The rainfed districts were consolidated and 
the new SAM policy was launched. The Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic 
Resources (SARH) and other government agencies were ready, on paper at least, to 
coordinate institutional actions and implement the programmes of mechanization, 
fertilization, plant control and the use of high yielding seeds in support of the new 
policy. Low income producers were identified as target groups to be modernised by 
the SARH, while the National Agricultural Insurance agency (ANAGSA) and the 
Bank of Rural Credit (B ANRURAL) were to constitute the agencies in charge of the 
financial aspects of the policy. The SARH was to coordinate actions with the 
Mexican Fertilizer Enterprise (FERTIMEX) and organise the distribution of 
fertilizers and pesticides among rainfed producers. The National Seed Enterprise 
(PRONASE) agreed to deliver high yielding seeds and to select and treat native 
seeds to improve the producers' own genetic maize resources (SARH, 1980a). 
As a result of these arrangements, the official government policy towards rainfed 
agriculture appeared to have generated and established the main institutional agencies 
to implement the necessary technical changes. 
After one year of implementation, a first evaluation of the progress of the SAM 
policy was conducted by SARH. The evaluation was carried out in six states of 
Mexico: Chiapas, Jalisco, Michoacân, Nayarit, Oaxaca and Zacatecas. The data 
were obtained from the following rainfed districts in these six states, respectively: 
Comitân, Autlân, Patzcuaro, Santiago Ixcuintla, Tuxpec and Juarez. This early 
evaluation is one of the most important documents for understanding the 
'administrative view' about the implementation of SAM during the years 1980-1981 
(SARH, 1980b). 
The evaluation stated that rainfed producers, even when they had not been 
significantly incorporated into the risk-sharing programme, had taken advantage of 
the other measures of the policy. The progress report showed an increase of 97.2 
percent in the number of producers receiving technical assistance for the period 
1979-1980. 
The SARH reported that the majority of its fieldworkers had received the 
operative guidelines of the SAM. Unfortunately, the fieldworkers complained that 
they did not have time to digest them, and that the directives were not always clear. 
Many fieldworkers, for example, had understood that the producers to be enroled 
under the risks-sharing programme had first to agree to increase their technological 
level. This interpretation meant that producers or ejidos seen by them as not using 
new technology were left out of the risk-sharing insurance programme. The field 
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personnel also pointed out in the evaluation, that coordination between agencies was 
deficient, which effected the distribution of agricultural inputs among producers. 
Producers were reported to be aware of SAM benefits, and ANAGSA (the 
insurance agency) was reported as paying the agricultural insurance according to the 
government agreement. The insurance was presented as an important way of 
motivating producers to participate in the SAM projects. In spite of traditional input 
distribution problems (cf. Sequeira, 1987), the fieldworkers reported that seed, 
fertilizer and insecticides had been received on time by the producers, and that 
policy promotion and diffusion of information had been very important in insuring 
that production targets would be obtained (SARH, 1980b). 
The heads of the rainfed districts reported in the evaluation that they had had 
frequent contacts with the representatives of other agencies and producers. In 
relation to the nutritional aims of SAM, the head of the districts said that there had 
been publicity in their districts and that training courses had been arranged for the 
fieldworkers and producers. Nevertheless, the general opinion of personnel in charge 
of the districts was that information about SAM was insufficient and unsystematic. 
They also complained about inter-agency coordination, in particular with those 
agencies in charge of supplying agricultural inputs (SARH, 1980b). 
The agencies in charge of agricultural inputs, such as PRONASE, reported that 
they had no problem delivering seeds and promoting demands for improved seeds. 
On the other hand, FERTIMEX recognized, that they had no expertise in the 
distribution of fertilizers. The reason for this, according to the people working in 
FERTIMEX, was that this function used to be the responsibility of the national 
agricultural bank (BANRURAL). FERTIMEX argued that they had no mechanism 
to monitor whether or not the SAM target population was receiving fertilizers. 
(SARH, 1980b). 
The national agricultural bank (BANRURAL) claimed that SAM was adequately 
financed, and that producers' acquisition of agricultural inputs had increased in 
relation to previous agricultural years. Personnel said that they knew the operative 
guidelines of the SAM policies, and that in spite of this having arrived late, they had 
promoted the risk-sharing programme (SARH, 1980b). 
From this brief summary of the evaluation report, it can be concluded that very 
early on there were communication problems among the agencies implementing the 
policy, even though individually they each claimed to have proceeded with their 
task. The most common complaint was that the guidelines had been issued late and 
this was identified as the factor affecting regional, district and fieldwork operations. 
A second important deficiency of the SAM was the apparent inability to implement 
projects in the fields, such as the risk-sharing programme. This was related to the 
lack of efficient coordination among the agencies implementing the policy resulting 
from institutional competition. This institutional bottleneck contributed to the 
delivery of an integral agricultural service to producers being blocked (see Rello, 
1981: 25). 
The SARH evaluation recognised that institutional problems limited the 
implementation of the new policy. Still, substantial achievements were claimed for 
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the policy. The limitations in the implementation of SAM became even more clear 
in a second evaluation, which was conducted by an independent research institute 
in the same year (ITESO, 1980). 
This second evaluation was conducted at the end of 1980 in 16 municipalities of 
Durango State (ITESO, 1980). According to this report, one of the problems with 
the implementation of the policy was the large degree of freedom that agricultural 
agencies were given in interpreting the SAM objectives. According to this 
evaluation, a second problem was the anti-peasant bias of the bureaucracy which 
conflicted with the producers' set of priorities. It was reported, for instance, that the 
bank personnel could not understand why producers did not see the re-payment of 
agricultural credit as their first priority. 
The evaluation suggested that producers first insured a minimal income for their 
household subsistence from the harvest. After that they repaid loans to their 
relatives, friends and the local money lender. Their third priority was to replace 
their means of production, and only after all these considerations, were producers 
ready to cancel their debt with the bank. In contrast, the bank officials interpreted 
producers' practices as failing to perceive SAM as a rational strategy for solving 
their problems and of seeing it instead simply as welcome government financial help 
(ITESO, 1980). 
This interpretation of the producers' views of the policy made the BANRURAL 
fieldworkers overly aware of 'credit-abuse'. Following their traditional mission to 
recover credit, they decided to make accessability difficult and started to organise 
access to credit according to their own assessment of producers. This form of 
operation, in the end, differentiated between producers with good credit records and 
those who were considered a liability to the bank, and by implication to the SAM 
policy. 
During the SAM, the bank, instead of paying subsidies to the producers, 
withheld part of their funds, as a way of securing re-payment for rural credit. 
According to the Durango evaluation, the result of this institutional procedure was 
that 95 percent of the producers who participated in the sample did not consider that 
SAM had helped them to obtain cheap fertilizer or insecticides. More revealing yet 
was the fact that only 30 percent of the producer sample knew about the subsidies, 
suggesting that in the interests of the bank they had not provided information about 
the right of producers to participate in these projects (ITESO, 1980). 
The evaluation reported that agricultural insurance was another important area 
of conflict. The insurance agency (AN AGS A), in order to be considered efficient 
and avoid payments, recognised the least possible claims. Producers complained 
about the procedures that determined their crop losses (the differences between the 
producers' and the fieldworkers' computations were in the range of 300 kilos). This 
type of bureaucratic behaviour forced producers not to re-pay their credit until their 
losses had been correctly estimated. This situation created an extra area of social 
friction between bank officials and producers. On the other hand, the report 
recognised that some producers saw in the insurance scheme a way to get extra 
resources for their households, and as usual, they used the Mexican system of 
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mordidas (bribes to the fieldworkers) to make their actual crop losses appear greater 
than they were, and their actual yields appear less. As a result of these every-day 
practices, the goals of the insurance programme were distorted (ITESO, 1980). 
The Durango evaluation emphasized that producers were highly suspicious of the 
SARH and BANRURAL. The evaluation stated that 90 percent of the producers did 
not know the meaning of SAM and that only 10 percent knew something about its 
projects. From this evaluation, one of the main institutional questions facing the 
SAM was through what mechanisms and forms the bureaucracy was distributing 
agricultural inputs and politically dealing with producers' responses. 
It was clear that SAM's agricultural impact was dependent on the political 
character of the relations between bureaucracy and producers. The social objectives 
of the policy were linked to the specific situations and political capabilities available 
to the actors. The difficulties reported in the evaluations provided the SARH with 
the opportunity to request more authority to carry out the strategy. 
In September 1980, Lopez Portillo initiated the 'third stage' of his agricultural 
policy. The first stage consisted of the administrative reforms in the second half of 
the 1970s, and the second consisted of formalisation of the SAM. Now, he sent to 
parliament the Agrarian Development Law (ADL., Ley de Fomento Agropecuario). 
The ADL provided a general frame of reference for defining SAM projects and 
agency actions in rural development. The law gave rise to vehement public debate 
in Mexico. According to Rello, the Agrarian Development Law (ADL) was a 
victory for the capitalist farmers and the bureaucracy, especially for the latter, 
which, with an authoritarian, paternalistic and technocratic approach, was placing 
itself in a position where it could control the independent initiatives of rural 
producers (Rello, 1981: 11). From this standpoint, Rello, like other Mexican 
intellectuals and progressive political parties, started to challenge the objectives of 
the SAM. The agricultural law was strongly criticized as a law that favoured the 
interests of private property, multinationals and was in total contradiction to article 
27 of the Mexican Constitution, which forms the basis of the Mexican land reform. 
The SAM policy arose as a response to the state's recognition that rainfed 
producers needed public support, but once having established the legitimacy of the 
rainfed producer's case, the government had no proper tools for intervention. As the 
shortcomings of the first year demonstrated, a continuation of the SAM agricultural 
strategy needed to be based on a more realistic model of intervention. The ADL 
represented a device for intervention, in which the SAM policy makers could adapt 
their general agricultural strategy to the political and institutional reality of the 
country. 
The law laid out the projects for implementing the SAM, but it also incorporated 
the terms for an agreement between the bureaucracy and the capitalist farmers. As 
such, it consolidated the right of the state to intervene in the rainfed sector of 
agriculture. The state accepted the capitalist farmers' demands that it was necessary 
to end the period of land distribution in Mexico, and supported the idea that the 
ADL and SAM were the beginning of an era of agricultural modernisation. 
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The ADL allowed the formation of associations between ejidatarios, pequenos 
propietarios (small private property owners) and private capital. It provided private 
investors with the opportunity to invest in land, which, until then, had been 
forbidden by law. In this context, the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic 
Resources (SARH) was made the state agency with the power to plan, organise and 
guide ejidal agriculture. It was given responsibility for supervising the different 
agricultural associations and it had the capacity to mediate in conflicts between the 
social and private sectors in Mexican agriculture. 
As Rello points out (1981), the ADL did not have an immediate effect on 
ownership relations in the rainfed districts, because rainfed production was not 
considered a profitable investment. The real effect of the law, therefore was in the 
political domain of the bureaucratic struggle for power. The outcome was the 
delegation of extra power to SARH to carry on with the implementation of 
agricultural modernisation. 
The ADL finally helped to set up planning, as an important tool of SARH 
intervention, and aimed to remove the obstacles discouraging production and 
efficiency. The ADL provided SARH with a series of direct intervention tools to 
organise the implementation of the policy. This consolidated the departure from the 
traditional assumption that state intervention was simply a means of politically 
controlling producers, and it established technocratic intervention at the heart of the 
agrarian process of modernisation. 
The SARH was given the authority to integrate any type of land with agricultural 
potential into production, and could promote contracts between ejidatarios and 
private property producers around private ventures. The Ministry acquired the 
responsibility for supervising these contracts and ensuring that they did not effect the 
legal situation of the parties. In brief, SARH became the main institutional agency 
of the agricultural sector. It was given responsibility for formulating the national 
agricultural plan and coordinating the actions of the other agencies. In spite of the 
difficult political environment and general suspicions about the SAM, the new 
agricultural rationale for intervention was slowly put into practice. 
At that moment, in 1981, the institutional environment was full of contradictions 
and political conflicts. Despite institutional re-organization, 270 government agencies 
were still operating in the agricultural sector. The SARH was perceived as invading 
the administrative areas of others. Especially the financial bureaucracy opposed the 
SARH and rejected its criteria of operations. The SARH's position was complicated 
further when it was given responsibility for rationalising the number of agencies 
operating in the agricultural sector. It had to assess the performance of agencies and 
suppress those which had no clear role in the 'new' agricultural plan of 
modernisation. This politically conflictive institutional environment generated 
confusion for the personnel in charge of implementing the policy. As a fieldworker 
said: 
"First we received a set of general procedures with the SAM to promote the 
increase of agricultural inputs among producers. With the ADL, they 
changed the orientation and made us spot potential land that could be 
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integrated into production. After that we were rushed into the creation of 
'farmers associations'. We had no clear official guidelines about what our 
aims were with the new policy. Differences among agencies and between 
SARH and the ejidos were never settled properly and, in the end, we were 
the ones who had to choose what to do and not do in the field. " 
The ADL provided a stimulus to the implementation of the SAM policy. To 
accomplish the agronomic objectives, the Ministry had to find a starting point from 
which to influence social relations and exercise control over some critical local 
agricultural resources. The Ministry then decided to direct the majority of the 
agricultural resources to those regions where intervention and investment was more 
likely to show success in achieving policy objectives. 
The diffusion of agricultural inputs during the SAM aimed to raise the 
profitability of maize cultivation through increasing crop production per hectare. 
This aim resulted in a selective allocation of resources towards those regions where 
production potential already existed. The technical assistance service, one of the 
main tools to transform agriculture, was mainly concentrated in six of the 32 states 
of the country. These six states were, Jalisco, Mexico, Zacatecas, Chiapas, 
Michoacan and Guanajuato. These regions have traditionally been good producers 
of maize, and according to the SARH agro-ecological profiles, were highly suited 
to technological packages. 35.9 percent of the assistance in 1980 and 42.3 percent 
during 1981 and 1982 was concentrated in these regions. 
From 1977 to 1981, these states had more than 50 percent of the agricultural 
area under the modernisation programmes. Jalisco alone was allocated around 20 
percent of the total mechanisation programme, 18 percent of the national area under 
fertilization and 27 percent of the total input of high yielding seeds. 
These data suggest that institutional programmes to modernise rainfed agriculture 
in Mexico followed an unequal distribution of resources, and their agro-ecological 
criteria were linked to production viability, rather than to social objectives. 
Therefore, development of rainfed agricultural practices was closely related to 
regions that traditionally had high levels of grain production. The policy to increase 
maize production concentrated inputs in those regions where the SARH did not need 
to produce major changes in the farming systems. As a result, the cultivated area of 
maize did not expand and many producers did not receive the benefits of 
modernisation. This opens up to question the SAM policy and redirects us to 
concentrating on the factors limiting the modernisation of Mexican rainfed 
agriculture. 
A central limiting factor was the fact that maize, in spite of receiving state 
support, failed to be commercially competitive with other agricultural crops. Maize 
did not regain land used for crops like sorghum or export agricultural crops. Maize 
continued to be perceived by producers as a crop whose yield was uncommercial and 
not attractive enough to justify the labour and inputs required. In any case, the low 
profitability of the crop forced producers to cultivate maize on the less fertile soil. 
The deterioration of commercial terms for maize in relation to other crops of ten 
percent in 1978 and 11 percent in 1979 were effectively improved with the 
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establishment of the new agricultural policy and the organisation of the rainfed 
district structure. But even so, the market terms for maize in 1981 still remained 
lower than that registered in 1977 (-3 percent). 
In view of these limitations, the major aim of the SAM programme became in 
practice to realise high yields of maize as quickly as possible. In spite of SAM's 
social objectives, the programmes at local level concentrated on achieving 
agricultural production targets. This generated a conflict of interests between field 
administrators in charge of the implementation of programmes, and producers who 
were following household strategies to secure their maintenance and reproduction. 
The institutional objectives of the rainfed districts and the SAM agricultural 
projects, both tended to ensure that project beneficiaries were selected according to 
agro-ecological conditions. The 'new agricultural policy' (SAM) ran in practice 
against the allocation of resources according to social criteria. The use of a costs and 
benefits approach increased polarisation between regions conserving the inequality 
of agricultural development among them. 
The SAM Policy, the Producers and the Fieldworkers2' 
The discussion in the previous section of this chapter focused largely on the 
introduction of the SAM as a 'new' agricultural policy in Mexico, and on the 
outcome that it was designed to promote. Like all policies, SAM was not self-
implementing. Instead, it was a policy addressed to actors in the rainfed sector in 
rural Mexico, who were supposed to use it to guide their practice. It is through the 
description of the actions and practices that the significance of an actor-oriented 
analysis of policy implementation can be presented. Hence, any study of policy 
formulation and implementation needs to encompass a study of actors' practices, 
analyzing the nature of the interface by which policy implementation acquires a 
practical meaning. In the following sections, I will introduce three tecnicos 
(Gilberto, Jose and Enrique) and present their representation of the implementation 
of SAM. This is introduced by describing an encounter between Gilberto and Don 
Luis, a producer from the ejido of Tlajomulco. 
A Routine Encounter31 
Gilberto, a fieldworker, invited me to see his area of work. He was a tecnico who 
believed that producers were in a social and economic backward situation because 
they did not work hard enough and did not want to invest in their plots. He was 
highly suspicious of the efficiency of government programmes "because the aims of 
the government and reality are two separate things. In between there exist so many 
difficulties that people in Mexico City (central office) could never even imagine 
them let alone taking them into account when they are planning". 
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His perception of producers, as people who lack the independent will to improve 
their conditions ("they are always waiting to receive everything free from the 
government"), made Gilberto's position an ambiguous one. According to him, the 
'realities in the communities' acted against the good intentions of the SAM, which, 
in a very idealistic way, tried to improve the social and economic conditions of 
rain fed producers. 
That day we stopped in a place where a few houses constituted the community 
(ejido) of La Teja. Inside one of the houses, the head of the ejido introduced us to 
the producer, Don Luis, from the ejido of Tlajomulco. Don Luis had just finished 
his period as ejidal president, so I asked him about the implementation of the SAM 
policy in his area. He replied: 
"The SAM subsidized us to buy fertilizers, improved seed and insecticides 
and these inputs (insumos) arrived in 1981 more or less on time. The 
majority of producers, apart from receiving these insumos cheaper, were not 
aware of their rights in relation to SAM. So they were unable to claim a 
better service from government agencies. These, as usual, refused us 
services and did not give us information. For instance, we did not know 
how to approach the bank and get the programme of risk sharing (riesgo 
compartido) implemented in the ejido." 
At this point, the tecnico, intervening, said: 
"That was not the whole picture of SAM's problems, because it was the 
producers who didn't respond on time to our guidelines and instructions. 
For instance, in the unit, we used to receive people who came to us with 
their bills after six months. They were absolutely too late to claim their 
benefits. So, Don Luis, how do you expect us to help producers get their 
rights?" 
Don Luis answered the tecnico: 
"Of course, that happened all the time, but the reason why producers did not 
respond was because they were not informed about their rights. Tecnicos 
don't want to recognise the fact that peasants today are awake. We are not 
happy just surviving eating nopalitos [a cactus variety whose fleshy stems 
are eaten as salads] or just what el monte [nature] gives us. So, tecnicos 
should give us the information, and then it is our responsibility to use it 
properly. The SAM had good intentions but the information was defective. " 
The tecnico, now with an authoritarian tone of voice said: 
"Ok then, let us be honest Don Luis. I accept that our faults are important, 
but what about the faults of the ejido presidents and of the producers? I 
think they also accounted for the failure of the SAM. We have to understand 
that if any of these three levels don't work properly, any programme will 
fail in spite of good intentions. Producers are always fighting over the 
presidential ejido elections, and, after the elections, producers forget their 
responsibilities. They don't want to realise that to improve their community 
situation they have to continue supporting their ejido president.In reality, 
they start to use the president to solve their individual problems and 
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presidents don't have time to look out for the interests of the whole 
community.In the end, the president becomes isolated and plays politics in 
favour of himself or just one sector in the ejido. 
Then, the majority of the ejidatarios starts to withdraw from meetings. 
As they still want to receive government benefits, they end up organising an 
opposition party, and as you know very well Don Luis, some producers 
don't want to participate in our programmes because they believe that 
tecnicos only support the ejido president. 
Producers don't realise that, by law, we can't deny recognition to a 
president and that for us, that person is the one who represents the 
community whether we like it or not. So, while presidents and producers 
don't learn how to solve their disputes in a better way, our job in the ejidos 
is going to be defective, or, at best, partial towards some producers. " 
Don Luis, emphasizing his position, said: 
"It is not that sort of order that makes us survive in the present economic 
conditions. If the government really wants to increase production, it is not 
enough to give authority to the president of the communities. We, the 
peasants, have increased our awareness and this should not be 
misunderstood by the government. Because, like it or not, today it is the 
Ministry of Agriculture's responsibility to give us a hand with the 
organisation of the producers. Tecnicos have to speak directly to the ejido 
presidents and to the producers. They listen to the tecnico because he is 
coming from outside the ejido. Producers usually don't listen to their own 
leaders, because they see them daily." 
In this situation, I was observing a reaction to the agricultural policy from a 
producer who was used to the traditional political style of state intervention. He was 
concerned to highlight the need for tecnicos to consider peasants opinions and 
knowledge. The tecnico, on the other hand, did not appreciate the political nature 
of the ejido. He wanted the ejido organisation to act as an administrative structure 
through which the policy could be implemented. 
It was clear that the policy of increasing maize production was not a central goal 
for all peasants. The producer advocated the need to develop a type of political 
participation that acknowledged that peasants were now more awake and provide 
local producers with room for manoeuvre. In this sense, the producer's 
interpretation of the aim of the SAM policy was different from the objectives of the 
tecnico. When we stood up to leave the producer said: 
"The government has to realise that the present official price for maize is 
nothing, and that it is thanks to us that cities can eat. But this does not mean 
that we are tarugos [stupid]. Last year, when the harvest was not very good, 
and the price was low, producers did not want to sell corn. So the 
government sent the police. They arrived in Tlajomulco and started to 
confiscate the grain from our houses.They compelled us to sell the grain at 
the lowest price possible, and if we resisted, the police were there to put us 
in jail. 
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In the end, we did not go to jail nor did we sell the grain to the official 
market board. We gave the maize to the pigs, because that was the only way 
open to us to make some profit. We like to support our government, but we 
don't like to be considered tarugos. We can survive here with just half a 
hectare of maize, and if we decide to do that, it would be interesting to see 
how cities would survive." 
With this clear statement from the producer we left the house. In observing this 
interaction, I had a brief introduction to the social character of the relations between 
tecnicos and rural producers during the implementation of the SAM. The policy, in 
spite of its good intentions to achieve development in rainfed agriculture, was 
strongly mediated by the different actors' expectations and understanding of the 
policy aims. This process of diverse policy expectations, generated a confrontation 
of different bargaining styles. Don Luis asked for a fair exchange of obligations and 
benefits, if they were to be affiliated to government policies. Gilberto wanted to 
implement the SAM without having to take into account politics in the ejido. 
Nevertheless, fieldworkers and ejido producers were unable to escape from the 
effects of a long sequential process of Mexican political intervention. Hence, the 
transition from a political to a technocratic type of intervention in the implementation 
of the SAM policy created local tension. 
The views of Don Luis were shared by many ejidal producers. People whose 
experiences with the state had taught them to expect special opportunities and 
deferential treatment from development agencies and state representatives. The 
tecnico, following agronomic approach and language perceived ejido politics as 
something alien from his professional status and out of his control and 
understanding. According to the tecnico, ejido politics constituted just a disturbing 
factor that disrupted production by limiting the management and the achievement of 
assigned production targets. It is important to realise that politics was a means for 
the producer to acquire a similar status to the tecnico, and as such he expected to 
be recognized and consulted about the best way to implement the policy. For 
tecnicos, politics was the last thing on which they wanted to base their work. They 
feared to become too dependent on local political leaders and on their individual 
interests, since they thought this could corrupt institutional aims. 
The encounter described here provides a first window into the obstacles to the 
implementation of the SAM and ADL policies. Those producers, who traditionally 
considered development opportunities as dependent on political support, perceived 
the new policy to be based on simple technical assumptions (see also Viniegra, 
1987). Consequently, producers resisted collaborating to achieve SARH targets. 
Contrary to the SAM document assumptions, rainfed peasants were not 
backward producers. They had a long political and economic experience of dealing 
with government agencies. They were able to limit tecnicos' administrative 
influences in their attempt to control the productive process at local level. Indeed, 
in Tlajomulco de Zuniga, the government had to send the police in to collect a maize 
harvest. Repression remained in the end an instrument to recover the 'benefits' of 
the programmes. This measure, in an area historically tied to government policies, 
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shows some of the difficulties that government faced in implementing the SAM and 
the ineffectiveness of the rational-planning approach to re-orientate long term 
producers' expectations at local level. 
Those producers who perceived the gap in political control, and the difficulties 
of the state agencies in implementing the SAM, turned to obtaining the maximum 
profit for their crops, and some of them decided to re-direct their grain from people 
to animal consumption. This sort of local action contradicted the whole aims of the 
SAM agricultural policy at the ejido level. 
Everyday Experiences of a Technocrat 
Jose was also involved as a tecnico in the SAM implementation process. In his 
representation of the SAM, we can strongly recognise a technocratic attitude. He 
argued that the main problem with the strategy was that the government subsidies 
were not enough to cover the magnitude of inputs needed to fulfil the programmed 
cuotas of production. According to him, prdducers did not receive the promised 
economic help. When they realised that economic help was not coming, they started 
to doubt government intentions. "Producers usually do not cultivate their 
programmed plots if they have not received the subsidies. This producers' attitude 
upset the whole organisational arrangements, and made us (fieldworkers) dependent 
on the delivery of financial resources. " 
Jose also pointed to inter-agency conflicts, that eroded his authority. According 
to him, the tecnico had to verify whether producers had cultivated basic grains and 
applied the 'modern' agricultural inputs to the crops under the agricultural 
programme. It was only after these inspections that the subsidies were paid to the 
producers. Jose said that the SARH was given the function to control the so-called 
libre (free) producers, that is those producers who were not receiving loans from 
BANRURAL. But the bank keeps under its control producers working with 
government's official agricultural loans. As the majority of producers were receiving 
help from BANRURAL, according to Jose, between 90 percent to 95 percent of the 
ejidatarios producers 'escaped' SARH control. According to Jose, the bank found 
itself with immense power over the target population: "It was this lack of vision, of 
taking power away from SARH and allocating it to the bank, which was a principal 
factor that contributed to the failure of SAM. " 
Jose further identified the following problems during the implementation of the 
SAM strategy: 1) severe problems with the planning arrangements, 2) subsidies did 
not keep up with national inflation, and 3) the government did not increase the price 
of maize enough, so producers had to continue selling the crop to middlemen, who 
re-directed the crop away from human consumption. 
Jose supported the general aims of the food policy, but he believed that it would 
have been more effective to stimulate production through a higher increase in the 
official price of grain, rather than help producers through input subsidies, which are 
difficult to deliver to them: "the government has to realise, that the only solution to 
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increase maize production is to establish a real value for the price of the crop". 
Nevertheless, as a positive effect of SAM, Jose mentioned the by-passing of those 
middlemen who used to deal with fertilizers and seeds: 
"Producers, to claim their subsidies, had to buy the fertilizers in established 
places, because they had to present invoices. These measures affected 
dishonest traders, who in the past, combined good and bad fertilizers to 
increase their profits, or mixed the improved seeds.These agricultural 
traders had to stop these practices, because now they had became liable to 
legal prosecution by the SARH." 
The SAM experience made Jose suggest that tecnicos should have more power to 
allocate, in the field, the financial resources of the programmes, and to have time 
to supervise these technically, from the beginning to the end. 
Jose was clearly disappointed with the reduction of his professional function 
from that of being an extensionist to becoming an administrator of the technological 
package. He explained that the food policy (SAM) was a strategy that delivered 
'modern' agricultural inputs to the producers, but it did not attempt to maximise the 
resources that already existed in the local areas. Jose commented, "SAM was 
concerned to achieve short term benefits and it did not invest in projects whose 
effects could go beyond one agricultural cycle, or could improve the natural 
environment for agricultural production with projects such as soil regeneration or 
desempiedres (stones clearing)". According to him not all areas could "yield the 
expected production or make the package cost effective". The dependence of the 
food policy on the technological package meant that the SAM projects were 
constrained to those areas where the natural conditions existed to make use of the 
benefits of the technological package. 
Jose's experiences indicate that the food policy, at local level, had significant 
problems during its implementation stage. These bottlenecks were the result of the 
internal practices of the agencies and of the different interpretations that these 
agencies had of the rainfed policy. These issues prevented a unified criteria for 
institutional operations. The contradictions between the financial and agronomic 
criteria generated two different understandings of SAM policy. The agronomic 
approach was limited by the different agencies' interests. In practice, the bank 
controlled the administration of public resources. They managed to prevent SARH 
from increasing its influence over the producers. 
The account of Jose represents the technocratic attitude of some of the 
fieldworkers. In his interpretation it seems that he was only able to grasp the 'formal 
life' of the SAM, that is the project-by-project organisation of the policy. He treats 
SAM as a project and thus focuses entirely on the objectives, inter-agency 
arrangements and implementation mechanisms. He acknowledges that the 
particularities of the different areas should have been taken into account, but the 
producers, their knowledge and politics, seem to be excluded from his perspective. 
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Everyday Experiences, Policy and Reality 
Enrique was the only fieldworker of the unit under study, who actually lived in the 
area. Perhaps this explains why producers figure much more in his account of SAM 
implementation. He argued that the food policy gave away subsidies without 
supervising the producers. "Producers presented invoices, but whether they had used 
these inputs for maize or not was impossible to check in every case". Enrique claims 
that the operational procedures of the programme were unknown to the tecnico. "So 
we had in front of us a queue of producers with their bills ready to receive their 
money, but we did not know what to do, because the whole system had 
organisational problems". In spite of this, Enrique claims that resources did reach 
producers, although this depended on the attitude of the fieldworker and on his 
determination to stop the rich producers from getting all the subsidies. This process 
of distributing resources, according to the tecnico, was not an easy one. He recalls 
one incident: 
"One day we were in the unit when a producer, who we all knew very well 
came to claim subsidies. He presented an input bill for 80 hectares of 
maize. The tecnico in charge of that area explained that subsides were just 
to help small producers of maize and that a unit of 80 hectares was 
considered a large unit of production. So I explained that he was not eligible 
to receive the benefits of the SAM. At that point, the producer became very 
angry and started to complain against the government. He said to me, that 
it was incredible that the government could not help someone like him, who 
was a real producer of maize, and that it was stupid waste of resources to 
give support to inefficient producers (ejidatarios), who were not really 
interested in increasing production, but just in submitting false invoices to 
cheat the government. He finally said to me, "you go to my field and see 
my production of maize and then you tell the government"." 
Enrique suggested that the food policy was highly dependent on the tecnico's 
personal knowledge of the physical environment and the social composition of the 
producers in the area, and on the fieldworker not being afraid to make some very 
dangerous local enemies. 
To defend the rights of the small producers to have access to resources was a 
local political problem for the fieldworkers. The other problem was how to convince 
the small producers (individual ejidatarios and small private property producers) to 
accept the SARH project to cultivate maize. "Our problem was that producers knew 
that tecnicos did not have authority in the field and were only able to make 
recommendations, which producers never followed. Traditionally, producers had 
only seen the bank and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform as important agencies and 
not the SARH. So, we had serious broticas (rows) with the producers to establish 
the status of the Ministry and our authority as the agency in charge of SAM. But in 
spite of all this producers did not want to use all their land to produce maize. So, 
to fulfil our institutional cuotas we had to work personally and politically very hard 
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on the ejidal president, or on those people who opposed our plans. Otherwise we 
could not achieve our official targets". 
Enrique recognised that when this sort of 'conciliatory' approach did not work, 
tecnicos had to enforce the implementation of the idle land law. But, this 
'authoritarian' approach created more problems than it solved, because, as land was 
incorporated into production against the will of producers, tecnicos started to receive 
threats to their lives. 
"This form of incorporating land into production made us unpopular in the 
countryside, and for the first time, we had to visit ejidos under rural police 
protection. We started to feel that the government was asking too much 
from us. We were there, risking our lives for something which was not 
producing any benefit for us. We still received the same bad salary and lack 
of official recognition. So, ni modo, we decided just to keep the appearance 
implementing the law. " 
To further justify his position, Enrique said: 
"When a tecnico did implement the law, the staff from the regional office 
kept intervening against us. For instance, in one case, Daniel, another 
fieldworker from my unit, after a long process of trying to persuade a 
producer to cultivate maize, finally declared the producers' land idle. Daniel 
was called by the head of the regional office, and severely reprimanded 
because he implemented the law on the land of the head of the agricultural 
department's compadre [godfather of one of his children]. So, Daniel was 
ordered to withdraw his decision. With cases like these, the SAM policy 
was not worth our sacrifices. " 
Enrique recalls that when some livestock producers perceived the possible effects of 
the ADL, they started to cultivate just a small part of their land with maize, arguing 
that the other part was under pasture because of the need to conserve the land 
through rotation practices. Other groups started to cultivate maize, but instead of 
using the harvest for human consumption, they stored it in their silos for livestock. 
As some of these situations happened at the end of the agricultural cycle, tecnicos 
had no way to stop them. 
Enrique understands and explains these actions as resulting from the lack of trust 
between producers and the government. This, in his opinion, made a tecnico's job 
practically impossible. Tecnicos could have gained the producers' trust and 
diminished their fears of risks, if they had received district support, but the district 
never accepted the tecnico's assessment, evaluation and reports and petitions as 
important information that had to be analyzed and decided on quickly. 
For Enrique, the SAM could have been more successful if more opportunities 
for producers' participation had been incorporated in the policy. Nevertheless, 
according to Enrique, some transformation did take place, for instance in the annual 
meeting of municipal evaluation: 
"It was good to see in this meeting, that the head of the field-unit had to 
meet the representatives from other agencies and listen to the producers' 
petitions. This procedure took some pressure off our shoulders because 
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producers could now see for themselves that tecnicos did not have the power 
to solve all their problems. We suggested to producers that they demand 
services in these meetings, because that would help us to get the things we 
ask for in our reports to the field-unit. " 
Political and technical information during the SAM was a constant problem between 
agencies. According to Enrique, "it was common for the bank to deny us 
information. The only way to get it was by using the slow and complicated system 
of official memorandums. The institutional coordination process was always tense 
and highly bureaucratic". On reflection, Enrique said, "perhaps if we had done a 
little bit more to support SAM, if the government had improved on our salary 
conditions, but still I think that the central factor was the producers. They made 
their own decisions. Some producers rejected my help because they believed they 
knew better. Unfortunately, producers who used my technical advice were those who 
had more money, so these were the ones who got more benefits from a more 
efficient use of agricultural inputs". 
According to the tecnico's view, the SAM was not a radical rural strategy 
because it was adapted and filtered to suit the existing institutional practices of the 
Ministry. "How can you expect a radical increase in production if fieldworkers 
avoid daily contacts with producers? During the SAM, we went to see producers two 
or three times per week, but not to see the producers' plot, just to talk with the 
president of the ejido. " 
Enrique's experiences indicate that some poor producers received government 
subsidies, although channelling resources towards these producers created conflicts 
which required a clear stand against the rich producers at the local level. Enrique 
was a fieldworker who was keenly aware of the political dimension of policy 
implementation and tried to keep up his motivation to help rural producers. 
Unfortunately, the majority did not consider the SAM worth exposure to political 
or even physical risks in implementing the policy. The fieldworkers, therefore, only 
partially implemented the food policy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented background material, drawn from government sources 
on the problems of implementing the agricultural food policy (SAM). This new 
agricultural policy was designed to modernise rainfed agricultural production, in 
order to achieve self-sufficiency in grains at the national level and to improve the 
situation of rainfed producers. In the second part of the chapter, the accounts of 
three tecnicos on the implementation of the SAM were presented using ethnographic 
data. The stories of the three tecnicos tell us a lot about the actual problems 
encountered in the implementation of the policy. They also tell us how tecnicos 
internalise and translate the SAM in their own way and interpret implementation 
accordingly. In doing so, they create a social field at the lower end of the 
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bureaucracy, where technocratic and political views coexist in organizing the 
fieldworkers' practices of intervention. 
There exists a general notion that the SAM was largely a failure. From 
producers, to fieldworkers and even up to the highest state authorities, SAM was 
considered to have failed to achieve its objectives. This resulted in a reformulation 
of the policy in 1983. 
Several Mexican scholars have tried to find an explanation for this failure. 
Austin and Esteva (1987) for example argue that the major problem was at the level 
of policy formulation. According to these authors, it was the intention of policy 
makers to solve the problem of agricultural self-sufficiency in Mexico and that SAM 
could be regarded as an idealistically good strategy, if it was true that the policy was 
the only path along which rural development could advance. This, however, 
according to Austin and Esteva, was not the case. They suggest there were other 
conceivable scenarios that could have formed the basis for formulating and 
organizing a food policy. In Mexico, apparently, the policy makers of the SAM did 
not envisage these other alternatives. As a proof of their views, these authors stress 
that the policy makers did not come up with a food policy that was backed by a 
financial reserve capable of maintaining its continuity and general principles (Austin 
and Esteva, 1987). While some of these points might be relevant for understanding 
the shortcomings of the SAM, we can find in the accounts of one of the policy 
makers, Luiselli, a more complicated explanation of the SAM failure. According to 
him, policy was strongly shaped by economic and political international and national 
considerations, which explains the limitations of the policy (Luiselli, 1987). Other 
studies (see Viniegra, 1987) have indicated that the generation and dissemination of 
technology was the main problem in implementing SAM. According to Viniegra, 
this problem could be solved in future interventions by rescuing, assessing and 
promoting traditional practices of production. 
All the above scholars have highlighted important factors constraining the SAM 
policy. However, they do not seem to take into account the social life of policy 
formulation and implementation, and this has led them to single out particular factors 
as the dominant explanation of the SAM shortcomings. 
This book takes a different approach. We try to show how both the formulation 
and the implementation of policy are socially constructed. From this point of view, 
it follows that a better representation of policy implementation can be achieved by 
looking at the ensemble of actors' practices. From this chapter, it becomes already 
clear that the social life of policy implementation is full of diversity. Because of this 
we have stressed the importance of studying and analyzing both the interpretations 
and actions of rural producers and tecnicos. This is central to interpreting the social 
processes surrounding SAM implementation. 
As the cases in the next two chapters will demonstrate, localities are active 
constitutive parts of the definition and practices of agricultural intervention. As we 
shall see, the contradictions of the policy are linked to the process of negotiating its 
implementation. In this process, both fieldworkers and producers act according to 
their own assessments of the contingencies of the situation. This is why it is so 
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important to pay attention to the way in which actors internalise and translate state 
intervention. From a constructivist perspective it becomes clear, then, that a policy 
can not be merely implemented, but finds its translation in the locality. As such, 
actors become the carriers of policy implementation. The actors - bureaucrats and 
rural producers - become entangled in a process that combines at the same time 
elements of both continuity and discontinuity. Therefore, any explanation of the 
SAM that rests upon a restricted number of factors for analyzing the shortcomings 
of this policy is bound to provide a limited account of the social life of state 
intervention. This kind of single focus explanation leaves out what is perhaps the 
most relevant aspect of policy implementation, namely the variations that emerge at 
the local level in ejidos and the administrative context. 
Notes 
1. The history of the SAM policy formation was more complex than presented in this chapter. For 
a more detailed analysis, see Arce, 1986, chapter 2. 
2. For an additional case of the life-history of a fieldworker in relation to his enactment of policy 
implementation, see Arce, 1985. 
3. A more extended version of the case presented in this section can be found in Arce, see 
forthcoming paper. 
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6. THE EJIDO OF NEXTIPAC: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL 
LIFE OF SAM POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter analyses the response of producers to policy implementation. It finds 
that objections to agricultural policies are not embedded in traditional peasant 
knowledge, nor are they just individual reactions to the state. They are experiences 
that are socially constructed by the actors' internalisation of local history and 
economic and social development opportunities at ejido level and in the wider 
setting. 
Local experience of previous agricultural policies, and their effect on the 
distribution of resources and power among households, have generated different 
actor strategies or ways in which producers engage or disengage themselves from 
the process of state intervention, and how their actions are an attempt to overcome 
the specific constraints in which they find themselves. Differences among producers 
in using or rejecting government policies are expressions of their local experience, 
as well as of their understanding of government (agency) preferences for a particular 
form or style of agricultural development. 
This chapter attempts to show that these differences should be taken into account 
both at the moment of designing a policy and at the level of implementation, 
otherwise, state officials and ejidatarios will continue to encounter serious problems 
in the field. Technical or financial criteria for resource allocation are no better than 
political criteria if they are isolated from the social and cultural environment. 
Planners cannot continue with their fantasies and projections about the positive 
effects of their agricultural policy programme. Their projections did not convince 
rural producers of the importance and benefits of the SAM food policy for the 
people living in the ejido. This situation provoked a lively set of reproaches against 
the irrelevance, simplicity and inexactitudes of planners as they tried to achieve the 
aims of the food policy. The case of Nextipac shows that producers are not just 
passive recipients of government intervention. 
Nextipac is an ejido in the municipality of Zapopan, and was chosen as a 
research site as a direct result of the period I spent in the central office of the 
rainfed district No.l. During that period, Nextipac emerged as one of the ejidos 
which presented problems for the personnel in charge of implementing programmes. 
The area was perceived by government officials "as not providing a very 
sympathetic environment for Ministry policies". Their perception was composed of 
two different views: the view that Nextipac was still a traditional community and 
producers were strong keepers of cultural identity and traditions; and the view that 
considered the problem with the people of Nextipac was that they were grillos 
(experts in politicking) and that they knew how to manipulate officials to get benefits 
from any government programme. Because of this, fieldworkers generated a rule of 
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thumb: "to survive in Nextipac tecnicos have to be extremely careful not to 
antagonise the producers". 
The comments on Nextipac which I heard at the district office, interested me 
enough to make the ejido a case in my study. I thus decided to go and live there for 
a period of three months, after which I visited the ejido on a regular basis in order 
to follow some particular actors. During my stay I realised that the attitude of the 
fieldworkers created practical problems for the implementation of the policy in the 
ejido. In their concern not to antagonise producers, the tecnicos ignored social and 
economic differences within the ejido, specifically to ignore the local history. Their 
lack of awareness of the social life of the ejido reduced them to faithful practitioners 
of the technocratic (agronomic) approach. 
The co-existence of local, traditional knowledge and modern, scientific 
knowledge had existed in the area since 1970, when the University of Guadalajara 
settled its Faculty of Agriculture just a few kilometres from Nextipac. At this time 
also, DECAL, an important producer of hybrid seeds in Mexico, established its 
Guadalajara plant very close to the village. 
The Spectacle of Everyday Life in Nextipac 
My first visit to Nextipac was in March 1983. My intention on that first visit was 
to observe a normal day and also to make enquiries about the producers' perception 
of progress. It was around 11am and the heat had not yet reached its peak. The 
valley was full of activity, the noise of birds mixing with the roar of tractors. People 
were preparing the soil. 
In the flat extension of the valley the settlement of Nextipac appeared like an 
incongruous mirage, more properly belonging to the landscape of Italian or Spanish 
hill towns. It gave the impression of being designed to control and defend space, 
following a kind of condottiere rationality. It was later explained to me that the 
founders of Nextipac had chosen to build the pueblo there, because it was less 
productive land. 
The unmistakable smell of burning tires and a column of smoke gave 
indisputable signs that brick making was an important economic activity in the ejido. 
In a plot close to the dirt road, a producer was beginning to till the land. His 
cultivation equipment was two horses (remudas) tied to a metal plough (la rostra), 
and a tree trunk. I was attracted by this sight and surprised to see such technology 
still in use in Zapopan, as I thought that such techniques had been superseded long 
ago. 
As the heat was starting to increase, I approached the producer with one of those 
typical English remarks about the weather. He responded: 
"Si, esta haciendo calorcitopero que se îe va hacer... (Yes, it is quite hot, 
but what can we do...). This is the difference between those who own a 
tractor and those who haven't got one. People with tractors use the early 
hours of the morning to work, or they do it during the night, so they can 
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stop in the hottest periods and have a rest or do their personal business. " 
After he had asked about our visit and showed that he approved, we prepared for 
a talk. Don David was not in a hurry to continue working. I apologised for 
interrupting his work, but he replied "after all, if I don't finish it today, I can do it 
tomorrow (manana)". He continued: 
"In the ejido there are 150 producers and not more than 30 have a good 
situation economically, the rest have a moderate one and some are very poor 
(pobres de a tiro). There is not much selling or buying of land in Nextipac, 
but it is easier to sell land than to buy. Not all ejidatarios have the same 
number of hectares; some have eight and others more than 20. Progress has 
only come to Nextipac in the last 10 years. Today we have 7 tractors and 
several trucks (trokas) in the ejido, and people are starting to buy pick-ups. 
In the past we used to have a lot of problems because the authorities 
never came here (el gobiemo no entraba), therefore people were afraid of 
outsiders, and several times they killed them thinking that they could be 
pistoleros (gun fighters). With the improvement of the road, the authorities 
now come to Nextipac, and for every fiesta they send a group of policemen 
to keep order. 
With the arrival of the university and DECAL [the seed industry] we 
are much less isolated. Unfortunately, we don't have good relations with the 
students. They steal our animals for their pachangas (parties) and they have 
no respect for us. DECAL has been good for us, because several of our 
people work there and we have learned from them how to use hybrid seeds. 
We normally buy seeds from them and they come to the ejido with pictures 
showing us how to use insecticides, weed killers and hybrid seeds. 
The producer who has money to sow the land in Nextipac can make it, 
but the producer who does not have cash to invest in the land suffers 
because the land does not produce. The Orozcos (the ex-hacienda owner's 
family) have changed the crop sown on their land; they used to cultivate 
maize, but now they plant sugar cane. Four years ago 'the big-man' had a 
disease in his maize and the government came in to burn it all. Orozco lost 
his entire production. He was so angry with this government action that he 
decided to change the crop. 
Orozco sells his production to Tala's ingenio (sugar refinery). He has 
offered us 10,000 sugar cane plants free if we change crop, but none of the 
ejidatarios have accepted his proposal. We don't trust the cultivation of 
sugar cane. We know that with maize in a bad agricultural year we can at 
least keep the household going with corn, but you can't eat sugar cane. 
After a year of sugar cane my soil would be exhausted and from then on I 
would have to depend on the ingenio's credit for ever. In Nextipac, only the 
Orozcos and some private producers have changed from maiz to sugar cane, 
but not the ejidatarios. 
In the last 5 or 7 years we have received better support from the 
government. It is not enough, but credit has improved. Today we have two 
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banks operating with us, Banobras and Banrural. I was president of the ejido 
when SAM gave us subsidies and a bonus for productivity. That helped us 
to produce maize and it was good financial help, because it is difficult for 
us to survive from the land. SAM also improved agricultural insurance. 
Before that, the agency never accepted our claims. They were useless, but 
now they are starting to help us. 
We still have problems with the insurance agency. They pay without 
any problem when a producer reports a totally lost crop (siniestro total), but 
they become very difficult people when we report a partial loss (siniestro 
partial), because the inspector always argues that with the remaining harvest 
we will have enough to repay the bank. Only when the entire harvest is lost 
do we not have to pay the loan back. So we have had to learn how to 
chingar al gobierno en el seguro (cheat the authorities on insurance) because 
this is one of the policies from which we can get some benefit. So we 
always try to claim for a totally lost harvest and we hide any good portion 
of the maize from the inspectors, or we decrease the value of the remainder 
by using the milpa (maize plant) as rastrojo (fodder) before the inspectors 
arrive. The bank, the insurance agency and the producer have to examine 
the crop together. If the producer is not satisfied with the field assessment, 
he can complain to the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(SARH) and they send the case to 'higher' authorities. Those people can 
rule against the field inspectors and may even impose disciplinary action on 
them. There have been some important changes in the ejido in recent years. 
Now we have no livestock because of land shortage. The two or three 
people who still had some animals a year ago have sold them this year. 
Nextipac is now mainly a maize producing ejido. " 
The dry, hot air of Guadalajara and the spirals of dust running over the flat 
agricultural extensions were an indication of the beginning of the secas (the dry 
period). Don David, with his huaraches (traditional peasant sandals) and a straw hat, 
blended into the brown texture of the dry season. There was a feeling of seasonal 
transition. A pick-up stopped in front of the plot and three rancheros came out to 
talk to him. The difference in status between the ejidatario and the rancheros (small-
scale private producers) was expressed in the vehicle, in the charro style of the 
clothes and in their 'innocent', but still authoritarian tone of voice: 
"So, are you going to sell David?" 
"Yes, if the price is right." 
"Well then David, you should consider my offer, because I am interested. " 
Only one of the rancheros talked, the others just observed. Don David, with great 
skill, was providing positive answers without any commitment. They were 
discussing whether Don David would sell some land. After eight or ten minutes, 
they said good-bye and disappeared, leaving nothing behind but a trail of dust. Don 
David came back and said: 
"I want to sell this land that I inherited from my father. You know, in my 
life I have had bad luck. My father died when he was 33 years old and I 
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was left an orphan. From the age of 12,1 had to work to help my mother's 
brother and sister and I have never been able to make any money. I want 
to buy a tractor. I am tired of cultivating the land with animals and these are 
already too old. If I can sell the land this may be my last year of cultivation 
with animals. " 
Don David then pointed in the direction of Guadalajara and said: 
"Can you see that blue tractor? ... Well that's my son. He didn't want to 
study because he had some problems with his teachers. My Uncle Antonio, 
who is like my own father, suggested that he could learn to drive a tractor 
and he offered the use of his tractor and work on his land. My uncle leaves 
the responsibility of making the furrows to my son and he pays him 5,000 
pesos per week [well below the average wage]. But at least my son is 
learning a job. " 
Don David was proud of his son and several times called him to my attention, just 
to show me how he was turning the tractor in the field and said, "He looks as if he 
is going to be a good tractorista (tractor driver)". Don David was not just talking, 
but thinking about his lack of resources and the ways he saw to improve his 
economic condition: "If my son behaves properly with my uncle and works hard, 
I am sure that he will inherit. So I always say to him metele muchas ganas (put a 
will in your work)." 
This was an example of how the use of kinship relations could be an avenue 
towards the improvement of a producer's economic situation. Don David took off 
his hat and moved it around his earthy finger and cleared the morning sweat from 
his brow. It was a brief moment, followed by a glimpse into his life. 
"I have had bad luck in my life, but I have always tried to improve my 
situation. It was 22 years ago that I became an ejidatario. Ortega was 
president of the ejido and it took me two years to get community recognition 
of my right to land. I had to use some political contacts in Zapopan, but in 
the end Ortega had to accept my claim. 
When I was president of the ejido, the ex-president gave me a tip about 
how to get access to two hectares which were not under cultivation. He told 
me to take control of the land under the idle land law (ley de tierras 
ociosas). I immediately started to plough the plot and, when I had finished, 
a producer appeared and asked me if I knew who had been working his 
land. I replied that I had been working it. This person became very angry 
and told me that he had paid the ex-president (le di unaferia) for the use of 
the land. I said that I did not want to know about his dealings with the 
ex-president. I pointed out the fact that he had not worked the land for a 
period of two years, so he had no legal right to it. The man then said: "Ok 
David, but remember you will not be president for ever and I will get my 
property back. I said to myself a huevo me la quites [something like 'the 
devil you will']. I immediately submitted a document to the SARH to 
legalise my right to the plot and I included the case of my compadre to 
whom I gave the other hectare of land. In Nextipac it has not been easy for 
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me to improve my situation. With the exception of that hectare of land I 
have not had too much luck. Since 1934, I have never stopped working." 
When Don David finished his account of his life in Nextipac, it was nearly two 
o'clock; a sacred time in Mexico, devoted to eating. So I left Don David promising 
to visit him at home. 
Through the heat and dryness came the tart smell of municipal disposal through 
the open windows of the car. The fields of Zapopan are being covered by the city's 
rubbish, which is used as a soil re-generator. Hundreds of polythene bags were 
shining in the sun, and a group of children were selecting things to play with from 
the rubbish in the middle of the fields. In less than twenty minutes one arrives at the 
modern Guadalajara ring road. That day my car was not stopped by the army, who 
where usually there looking for guns, in what they called the campaign of 
despistolizacion. 
Tying up the Images to the Structure of Production 
The structure of production in Nextipac consists of rainfed and pasture land. The 
land is divided into individual plots and the soil is well suited to maize production. 
Land is a valuable resource. In our sample of 49 households", 55% claimed to 
have access to land of between 6 and 10 hectares, 19 % possessed between 1 and 5 
hectares, 12% of the households had between 11 and 15 hectares and the remaining 
14% possessed between 16 and 30 hectares (see Table 1). 
On average, households possessed 9.5 hectares of land, which is slightly above 
the national ejido average for rainfed land (6.5 hectares in 1960, CDIA, 1979: 443), 
but considerably less than the official figure recommended in the agrarian law (20 
hectares, according to the law of 1971, CDIA, 1979: 443). 
Agriculture in Nextipac is of a commercial type.2' According to sample 
information, 90% of maize production is sold. This production is sold to 
CONASUPO (a government agency) and to the middlemen in Tesistan. Maize 
production is limited by the scarcity of land and access to resources. 
Of those households with 1 to 5 hectares of land, none have a tractor. Five of 
them use only family labour for their agricultural activities, while the others contract 
seasonal wage labour. Technological conditions of production in this group are 
diverse; two households have a low technological level, five an intermediate and two 
a high level.3' 
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Table 1: Land Distribution by Households 
No of Hectares No of Households % 
1 - 5 9 19% 
6 - 10 27 55% 
11 - 15 6 12% 
16-20 3 6% 
21-25 2 4% 
26-30 2 4% 
TOTAL 49 100 
Of the group of households with 6 to 10 hectares, eight had tractors. Seasonal wage 
labour was contracted by 18 households and only 9 used family labour alone. The 
technological level was intermediate in 12 households, high in 11, and in 4 the 
technological level was low. 
Of the group of households with 16 to 20 hectares, two had tractors and only 
one contracted seasonal wage labour. The three households all had a high 
technological level. The two households with 21 to 25 hectares both had tractors and 
a high technological level. One of these households used family labour exclusively. 
The other two households, with 26 to 30 hectares, both had high technological levels 
and contracted seasonal wage labour, but only one of them had tractors. 
These data are summarised in Table 2. The data show that access to land is 
correlated with access to tractors and level of technology. The use of family labour, 
however, appears as a strategy that crosses lines between a household's access to 
resources. The dominant tendency in the ejido, however, is to contract seasonal 
wage labour. 
Table 2 shows a process of concentration of the means of production in those 
households with more access to land, suggesting the existence of an ejido structure 
supporting unequal access to resources. 
Table 2: Nextipac Household Labour and Technological level 
Tractors Technological level Labour force 
Hectares High Inter­ Low Family Wage 
mediate Labour Labour 
1-5 0 2 5 2 5 4 
6-10 8 1 12 4 9 18 
11-15 2 3 2 1 1 5 
16-20 2 3 2 1 
21-25 2 2 1 1 
26-30 1 2 2 
TOTALS 15 23 19 7 18 31 
As will be shown later, the history of the ejido and its contacts with government 
policies account for the emergence of this differentiated structure of production. In 
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the analysis which follows, I concentrate briefly on the local farming system, local 
history and upon the way in which government agencies, with their orientation 
towards increased production, implemented the SAM programme in Nextipac. The 
main point here is to assess the extent to which the agencies altered the unequal 
social relations in the ejido as a result of their actions. 
The Farming System of Cultivation 
According to the producers in Nextipac they use the Zapopan system of cultivation 
(explained below). They started to use this system about 35 years ago (1948). In 
former days, a deep furrow system was applied in order to utilise the humidity of 
the soil, but this could only be applied in a limited part of the area under cultivation. 
In other plots the soil had different characteristics and the ejidatarios did not know 
how to use the humidity in the soil. 
"Our principal problem with the soil was how to open it. In the dry season 
the soil became solid and we had no instrument able to dig the furrows. 
When the cabanuelas (light rains) arrived in October we were able to do 
something, but it was very slow work. 
We then found out that we could use the three light rains before the 
rainy season [the temporal] really started. These first rains soften the earth, 
which allows us to prepare the soil. Then, just before the heavy rains of the 
temporal start, we sow the milpa (maize). By the time the temporal arrives, 
the seeds must be in the process of germinating. The temporal comes two 
or three months after Ash Wednesday, so we have a lot to do in the first 
days of June. We have to sow according to when we feel that the temporal 
is coming. If we sow too early, the soil will be too tight. If we sow too late, 
the milpa will rot because there is too much water. " 
This particular way of cultivating is called the Zapopan system. According to some 
producers it was a German who had given them the secret. Because the soil in 
Zapopan is moist under the first layer, the seeds can germinate without the rains. 
The main principle of the 'Zapopan system' is to keep the soil loose and, at the 
same time, to maintain the humidity in the soil. This is achieved with constant 
ploughing after the short fallow, and constant covering to avoid loss of humidity . 
Producers use approximately 25 plants of maize per meter, and it is of critical 
importance that the soil is fertilized before the rain Comes. Several producers 
fertilize with tractors, but it is still possible to observe the old method, which 
consists of a long tube that is used to direct the fertilizer to the base of the milpa. 
Using this system, they have to mark the rows when it is dry (before the rains). This 
practice facilitates the weeding operation (escarda) because, as they explained, with 
the addition of fertilizer, not only did the milpa grow quickly but the weeds did too. 
They ploughed again when the milpa was 20 or 30 centimetres high, to make 
el arropaje. This operation consisted of re-forming the furrow, which, with the 
arrival of the rains became low. Later the producers do a second arropaje, this time 
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to provide more support to the plants and to help them resist the wind. 
Contrary to what the agencies say, the producers claim this system was learned 
and improved by themselves alone. They recognize that the bank came around 
1959-1960 and taught them to plough in the maize stems as organic fertilizer and 
that it was then, when the financial credit group was formed and the first tractor 
arrived in Nextipac. 
Producers emphasized that in the 'Zapopan system' of cultivation, the most 
important factor was to receive agricultural inputs on time. Due to the rapid changes 
in environmental conditions, the risks of agricultural failure are extremely high if 
this does not happen. 
The Machination of Forces: the Soil, Rain, State Agencies and Producers 
During Holy Week (Semana Santa) there was no sign of activity in the fields and 
the producers were worried because once again the credit was late. In the square of 
the pueblo, under the shade of a tree, a producer explained their anxiety. 
"Before we adopted the Zapopan system of cultivation, we used to furrow 
in May, but for a long time now we have furrowed in March. This means 
that we have to fertilize and sow in April. This has never been understood 
by the institutions which always bring the fertilizer and seed when we don't 
need it. If we don't sow before the 21st of April we can't take advantage of 
the rainfall. 
This situation has always been with us, so the majority of the producers 
collect seeds on their own initiative (semilla china) and we end up planting 
this local seed which is disinfected by us. With the abono (fertilizer) it is the 
same story. Those producers who have managed to keep fertilizer from the 
other cycle (the previous year) are ok. The others who have applied for a 
loan must wait, knowing that they have to sow before the end of April. 
Because we know that Banrural is always late and that we must sow on 
time, we have to get our own resources. We welcome the cash when this 
arrives [part of the official credit is cash to facilitate agricultural operations], 
but, because of these delays, we incur debts with money lenders who charge 
interest of 6% per month. So it is the money lenders of Nextipac who 
benefit from our credit. 
You will know when the credit has arrived, because the producers will 
start to burn their seeds. The seeds from the bank (HYS) are not good from 
one year to the next. They don't germinate (se pican) and we can't use them 
to feed the animals because they are poisonous. We have to burn them. 
With the fertilizer we can get something back, there is always a demand in 
the ejido to buy abono. But we lose a lot with the seeds. 
But not all producers have these problems. The producers operating 
with the Banobras bank are in a better situation, because they receive cash 
and can buy their own agricultural inputs (insumos). 
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We producers who work with Banrural, because we are always in need 
of cash, have to sell our maize to a middleman in Tesistan. Cristobal (el 
Gueró) buys our maize at a lower price than CONASUPO (the state agency 
of commercialisation), but he pays cash. CONASUPO takes more than 
fifteen days to get the money to us and usually we have to go to a bank to 
cash the check. We have made 'el Guerro' rich. I remember when he used 
to come into Nextipac with a loudspeaker, offering to advance us money in 
exchange for our next harvest in the field. Today he doesn't operate like that 
any more, because every day in the harvest period, there are always more 
than 30 trucks in front of his house waiting to be unloaded. We don't like 
this system, but what else can we do? The producers who work with 
Banobras are the authorities of the ejido and they don't protect our interests. 
Although the majority of the producers work with Banrural, our situation les 
vale madre (doesn't concern them)." 
Political divisions in the ejido had resulted in different types of producers affiliating 
to different credit institutions, and this was one of the central problems to be tackled 
by agencies concerned with rural development. A rich producer explained the 
operations with Banobras as follows: 
"In Nextipac we have six groups operating with Banobras. To operate as a 
group they have to be a minimum of three producers and a maximum of ten. 
After ten, the group is divided and a new group is formed. Each producer 
is responsible to the group, but the representative of the group is responsible 
to the bank. That means that if a producef doesn't pay his debt, the rest of 
the group have to pay it or the group won't receive a new loan. 
So we have to be very careful about who we accept into the group. We 
are not interested in people who can't pay (malos pagadores). It is not 
difficult to avoid such people, because we all know each other in Nextipac. 
Our first responsibility is to make the group stable in the eyes of the bank. 
A person associates with the producers he knows best in order to avoid 
personal problems. 
Credit is no problem for us. It's easy to get up to 10 million pesos 
because we just need the authorization of the regional bank manager. Above 
that amount it has to be approved in Mexico and that means waiting and a 
lot of paperwork. We normally need more than 10 million pesos in the 
agricultural cycle, so we have arranged a system with the manager of the 
bank. As he knows us, he calls some of his friends who supply inputs and 
they, thanks to the manager's approval, advance us seeds and fertilizers. 
This system works much better than the Banrural system and is quicker than 
the official system of credit. This is important for us, because we have to 
finish preparing the soil and applying the nitrogenous gas before the 15th of 
March, and to sow no later than the 20th of April. We can't wait until May 
to sow because it's too risky. At the beginning of June the milpa has to be 
out to receive the rain, otherwise you have had it. " 
128 
Don David, who was present at this interview, then said: 
"That's the main difference between the producers in the ejido. Banrural 
delays our inputs and credits so we always face the risk of losing our 
production. If the first rain surprises the milpa before the plant has broken 
through, you will certainly have to buy new seed. The first rains are not 
dependable. Three or more days could pass between the rains and this 
makes the soil very hard, so the seeds which are germinating don't have the 
strength to break through the soil, so receiving the agricultural inputs on 
time makes the difference between a good or a bad harvest for us. " 
It was clear, that in Nextipac, differences in affiliation to the financial agencies had 
further fragmented the interests of producer. Such fragmentation had occurred at the 
level of individuals, families and groups. The dominant network (the Ortega, Lopez 
and Ribera families) had organised their followers in credit groups, and had thus 
enhanced their economic influence. The Cardenas-Rosales families, on the other 
hand, had only managed to organise one credit group, so the majority of their 
network had to operate with Banrural. Moreover, the Ortega's effectively controlled 
the political structure of the ejido and were perceived as acting to undermine the 
interests of those producers who did not work with Banobras. The ejidatarios 
without representation were thus limited in the action they could take to put pressure 
on Banrural to stop the institutional delays in processing and delivering their credit. 
The social construction of the conflicts in Nextipac undermined the local 
organisation of production. 
What is Local History Made of? 
Don David narrated the following history of his pueblo: 
"Twenty years ago (1960), Nextipac was a very difficult place to live. The 
pueblo was divided into two groups, and families used to have gun fights 
with each other. When a person was shot dead the relatives would take 
vengeance and kill someone from the other family. This went on until 
families virtually disappeared or they had to leave Nextipac in order to 
survive. The families in conflict were the Godoy's from the Alacran barrio, 
and the Rosales from this side of the pueblo. Between these families no 
relation was possible and marriages were totally forbidden. To repay blood 
debts (cobrarse de una deuda), these families used to hire gunmen 
(pistoleros) from La Barca and Ameca. 
Today the ejido is calm but a lot of resentment (asco) still survives and 
while more contact exists between the families and marriages have taken 
place among ex-family enemies, the feelings are still with us. " 
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The Displaced Actor 
As Don David explained the blood conflict between families, that originated at the 
end of the 1950's and continued into the 1960's, has still not been resolved, and its 
effects influence the social and political life of Nextipac. Don David's situation is 
much worse under the present president of the ejido and he feels displaced and 
dispensable since he finished his period as ejido president. For years he has been 
working to reorganise the political environment in Nextipac. He sporadically profited 
from this task, using in his favour the relationship with government agencies. Now, 
out of office, Don David is not the obligatory point of passage for the tecnicos. He 
is a member of the ejido no one needs to consult, except the social anthropologist. 
He is no longer strategically situated between the goal of the tecnico and the 
fulfilment of the SAM programme, but for the anthropologist he represents an 
alternative history (the counter interpretation). He continues his narration: 
"The president of the ejido (Don Jose) killed one of the Cardenas because 
the Ortega's told him that his brother had been killed by a Cardenas. He is 
a Torres and was allied with the Godoy's and Ortega's. He only recently 
decided to build his house on this side of the community, even though he 
has had a plot here for several years. He was afraid of being killed. I have 
some problems with him, not just because of the past, but because he is 
authoritarian and likes to impose his opinions upon other people. In 
Nextipac several people make demands of me, and this means I have to be 
very careful politically. To give you an example, last week I had to reject 
a very good offer from the DECAL seed company, which offered me 
40,000 pesos to use my plot as an experimental field. If I had accepted the 
offer, people could have said that I was not a real ejidatario, because I was 
renting my land. The reality in Nextipac is that we are still divided and 
suffering a lot, but today things are much more peaceful. " 
The Indispensable Actor 
Don Jose Torres was president of the ejido when I was doing the fieldwork. This 
position gave him the status of being indispensable. He was now the ( obligatory 
passage point for the tecnicos^ interventions and was supposed to represent all 
ejidatarios. A man of 47 years of age, he was directly involved in the former 
conflicts and personally carried out una venganza (a revenge killing). He was on the 
side of the Ortega-Godoy faction and was at the time seen as a political tool of the 
richest families (the Ortega's). Don Jose was a strong character. He had resources 
and could be characterised as a middle-income producer. Some producers believed 
that he was involved in corrupt practices involving state agencies, and that his only 
concern was to represent his personal interests and those of his political circle. 
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Don Jose told me his story as follows: 
"When I was 17 years old, I had to shoot dead the oldest of the Cardenas 
family because he killed my brother. After that I had to live in hiding for 
2 or 3 years because the authorities were looking for me. They eventually 
caught me and sent me to jail. 
At that time, 25 years ago, the Rosales and Cardenas families owned 
Nextipac, and they had control of the pueblo's land for their livestock. They 
did not allow us to cultivate the land. During that period we had nothing to 
eat and the Rosales-Cardenas used to sit every day in front of the courthouse 
and from there shoot the ejidatarios who went to cultivate their field. This 
is why the pueblo rebelled against them. I, together with some hired gunmen 
forced the producers who followed the Rosales and Cardenas families to get 
out of Nextipac. If we were to place crosses in the corners of the street to 
remember our dead in this pueblo, it would look like a grave yard. 
The Rosales and Cardenas fled the community and have only recently 
started to come back. The first thing they did was to complain about us, 
saying we had taken their land and rights as ejidatarios, and they accused 
us of stealing land. 
This problem started in 1982 after I decided to clear up the community 
land reserve and give the Rosales land, but they rejected my offer. So I 
distributed that land among the sons of the ejidatarios. I had no 
authorization from the government for this action. The Rosales sent a letter 
complaining to the Agrarian Reform agency [this letter is in the ejido files] 
and the government started an enquiry. I was in a little bit of trouble at first 
but the local department of the Peasant Confederation gave me some help. 
They took the complaint directly to the Delegate of the Agrarian Reform in 
Jalisco who decided that everything was in order and according to the law. 
After this setback, the Rosales accused some of us of being in 
possession of more land than the legal limit. As these allegations could 
cause us problems we decided to recommend that the ejidatarios with more 
than 8 hectares should divide their properties among their relatives and sons. 
This measure allowed us to present a very good case to the Agrarian 
Reform, and we told the government, that contrary to the allegations of the 
Rosales families, Nextipac needed more land. 
These people had given bribes to officials of the Agrarian Reform to 
win the case. But, as we have better contacts with the head of the 
Confederation Campesina de Jalisco [Peasant Confederation of Jalisco], 
with the Municipal President of Zapopan and with the head of the 
agricultural programmes of the SARH, I am not afraid of the Rosales group. 
Don David, the former ejido president, has been manipulated by the 
Rosales. He is playing into the hands of the old Rosales, but David is a 
humble person only related by his mother to them. In the previous period 
he received my support as ejido presidential candidate. David replaced Jesus 
Alvarez, who made mistakes. He imposed a tax on the brick-makers of the 
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community and, as a result, the whole community turned against him and 
David took control of the ejido. 
So, as I tell you, Nextipac started to progress only after the 
Cardenas-Rosales were expelled from the ejido. Gabriel Ortega bought a 
tractor and things started to improve for us. Today the ejido has practically 
no livestock because we don't have enough land, and when the cattle break 
the fences they go into the property of the sugar cane cultivators. As these 
are Orozco's (members of parliament) this creates a lot of problems. 
In Nextipac the things of the past are still with us. Just to give you an 
example, last week someone shot at the Secretary of the ejido, fortunately 
they only aimed at his foot. " 
Don Jose's version confirmed the importance of the blood conflict in Nextipac. He 
claims that progress came to the community only after the Rosales and Cardenas had 
left, almost in justification of the family feud, because it brought 'progress' to the 
ejido. 
The Non-Indispensable Actor 
How could we define the importance of this local conflict for or against 
development? To answer this question we should listen to another producer who 
considers himself 'outside' the political struggle - a producer who has never used the 
ejido office, and has survived without strong linkages with government agencies. He 
is of no direct significance to the political struggles going on in the ejido, nor is he 
somebody tecnicos would consider important for getting their policies implemented. 
Why does Don Eleuterio not accept government support, and consider himself a 
politically independent producer? He does not consider that he and his family belong 
to the group that holds the political power in the ejido, although, he acknowledges 
that during the 'old' conflict he sympathized with the Rosales-Cardenas: 
"In Nextipac there are 7 or 8 families who have money and monopolize the 
ejido land. This happened because the Ortega's and Lopez's managed to 
force the Rosales-Cardenas from the pueblo. The Godoy's were just the 
finger that pulled the trigger. They themselves have no money, they are 
nobody in Nextipac. 
Once the Rosales-Cardenas were no longer here, the Ortega's took 
control and to this day retain control of the presidency and use the post just 
to make money for themselves. I don't belong to their group, but I speak 
with them and I know that they don't like my independence. If I have 
financial problems I go to Guadalajara because they won't give me money 
here. The Ortega's and Lopez's are friendly with government officials, 
especially those from the bank and they control the whole access to 
resources in Nextipac. Between them, these 7 or 8 families own the 11 
tractors of the ejido and it is from this group that the 20 producers come 
who use nitrogen gas in the cultivation of maize. 
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I remember once the SARH provided a tractor for the ejido, to be used 
by producers without machinery. As soon as the tractor arrived here, the 
Ortega's and Lopez's took control of the machine, because according to 
them, it was their responsibility to organize its use. The driver of the tractor 
later told me that after a week in Nextipac, he was being used to work only 
on the land of those producers who already had tractors. 
Gabriel Ortega and Juan Lopez control the administration and 
distribution of fertilizer. In my case, I always received less than the amount 
I had asked for, but every time I complained, they said that that was the 
quantity the government had sent. Later I discovered that this was all lies, 
because included in the bill from the bank, was a charge for the fertilizer I 
had not received. The same happened with the seeds. 
In the end producers either had to buy fertilizer and seeds from them, 
or ask for extra agricultural inputs from the bank. All this taught me to be 
suspicious of these people, and I decided to solve problems for myself. But 
today I have arrived at the situation that I have to sell land that I inherited 
from my father, because I need to buy a tractor. I am criticized here 
because I work as a labourer on others' plots. I need the money, because I 
am not receiving a loan from the bank. The bank said I owe them money. 
In Nextipac, as a result of the conflict, the powerful families have land 
extensions of 24 to 30 hectares of land, but the poorest families have only 
1 hectare. Some time ago a lady from the Agrarian Reform came to 
investigate this situation, and the powerful families fictitiously divided the 
property among their relatives and sons, some of whom had never been 
ejidatarios. Nothing came out of this investigation. Next year I am thinking 
of going back to the bank, because I don't want problems with the agrarian 
community here. In my opinion, all these problems have their roots in the 
fight between the Rosales-Cardenas and López-Ortegas." 
Don Eleuterio sees in the outcome of the conflict the basis of social differentiation 
in Nextipac, and the origin of the present political arrangements, based on 
controlling local institutions and relations with government agencies. 
Is State Intervention Part of Local History too?4' 
I have presented three different accounts of a local family conflict: a blood conflict 
that involved everyone in the community. This disruptive period, in the end, 
established the institution of caciquismo (local bosses) which consolidated the Ortega 
family as the dominant family in Nextipac. State intervention turned out to be part 
of this history of the local community. The success and legitimacy of the gun-battles 
depended on how many families were convinced by the Ortega case that the 
Rosales-Cardenas had prevented agricultural modernisation and political participation 
in Nextipac. Conflicts in Nextipac had been centred around issues of resource 
control and government contacts. The Ortega's had established themselves as the 
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only representatives of the ejido in their dealings with the state. They controlled the 
agenda of local issues and negotiated with government agencies over the 
implementation of policies. 
The Ortega's image as progressive actors was created as a result of their 
contacts with the state. During the 1930's the government promoted a programme 
to use fertilizers in the Tesistan Valley (Zapopan). The programme was supported 
by the National ejido Bank which provided loans to producers to buy machinery, 
animals and to improve the infrastructure of the ejidos. After 4 years of operation 
the effects of this programme radically altered the lives of some peasant families. 
The impact of the programme resulted in improved agricultural practices. Families 
like the Ortega's were able to use their local political influence to monopolize the 
benefits of modernization and present themselves as innovators. Later, during the 
1960's, the government mounted another campaign to provide technical assistance 
to the producers, and to diffuse the use of fertilizers. Local community conflicts can 
be seen as an important contingency preceding agricultural modernisation that 
provided the social conditions for producers who had been able to establish 
privileged access to resources and authority in the ejido to advance. During the 
1960's the aim of the modernisation programme was more the diffusion of 
agricultural technology than land distribution. 
Understanding the history of gun-battles and family blood feuds of Nextipac, is 
necessary for any official trying to implement an agricultural policy. Without this 
local translation of development sequences, it is impossible to see how the Ortega's 
could have increased their own interests with each 'new' government intervention. 
In this sense, state modernization programmes had to work with those producers 
who were in a position to act as innovators, and these were usually the producers 
controlling the political process in communities like Nextipac. In the process, their 
political control was reinforced and consolidated in a changing relation between state 
and ejido. 
However, this situation remained highly unstable politically, because the 
Rosales-Cardenas continued to bear malice towards the Ortega's and were therefore 
constantly trying to erode the political framework of the ejido, trying to discredit the 
Ortega's in the eyes of government agencies so that the government would one day 
transfer recognition to them. 
Credit 
The affiliation of producers to different credit institutions was directly associated 
with local politics in Nextipac. This was a major obstacle to incorporating large 
numbers of producers into the process of rural development in the community. This 
was confirmed by Don Jose Torres (the ejido President) when I asked what had 
happened to the credit from Banrural: 
"I don't know anything about that credit. I have to wait for the tecnico from 
the SARH to come to my house and tell me when I may go to collect the 
agricultural inputs from the bank. There is no point in going there and 
putting pressure on the Banrural personnel. That is not my job, it's the 
responsibility of the tecnico, because no one listens to me in the bank 
office. " 
Don Jose's comment that it was the agricultural agency's (SARH) responsibility to 
put pressure on the financial agency, prompted me to investigate how the credit 
system worked in practice. I wanted to assess to what extent ejidal pressure was 
important in the delivery of credit, so I went to the bank to see for myself. 
The rainfed district's tecnicos arrived at the Guadalajara office of Banrural at 
around 10am. Some ejidal presidents arrived with them. Immediately, presidents and 
tecnicos exchanged ideas about the best way to present the ejido's petitions and the 
best way to ask for an increase in ejido loans and to obtain extra time for those 
producers who had been unable to totally repay their loans. The ejido presidents 
were able during these discussions to put pressure on the tecnicos or fieldworkers 
to get what the ejido producers wanted. In some ways they were setting the agenda 
for the SARH field staff in their dealing with bank officials. Some ejido presidents, 
prior to the meeting at the bank, had gone to the head of the unit who was writing 
reports in his office. The presidents of the ejidos were very active in presenting their 
communities as important contributors to the agricultural plan, and therefore sound 
units in financial terms. 
Observing the interactions over credit, I concluded that it was important for an 
ejidal president to be present when the SARH fieldworkers dealt with the bank. 
Important decisions were made at these meetings relating to credit. A president who 
attended such a meeting was in a position to know immediately the quantity of the 
loan and the date of the money's arrival, which helped lessen anxiety and helped 
them to plan their agricultural tasks better. The field personnel of the SARH also 
liked the presidents of the ejidos to be there with them at the bank. It was an 
opportunity to show the producers that it was the bank personnel and not the tecnico 
who was responsible for the credit delay. Some of the tecnicos pointed out that after 
the ejido presidents started to go to the bank they noted an immediate improvement 
in their working relations with producers. 
The complaint that Don Jose was not interested in trying to get credit into the 
ejido more quickly was justifiable, as he was not a Banrural client, and did not go 
to the presidents to plead their cause at the bank. He argued that it was not his fault 
that Banrural was inefficient. In fact, Don Jose saw no individual benefit in putting 
pressure upon the official system. To do so was time consuming, and would directly 
benefit the opposite political group in the ejido. Thus, producers affiliated to 
Banrural found themselves without a political representative to defend their interests 
with the official agency. 
One of the main obstacles to a more equal development in the locality was the 
Ortega family's ability to control the local political system, and to block or delay 
official credit, thus demobilising the institutional context from reaching the opposite 
network in Nextipac. 
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Actors' Ties with Corruptive Practices 
The case of Nextipac shows a dominant local group participating in the 
modernisation of agriculture, and at the same time contributing to ejido inequalities. 
Local politics and credit have been the main motors of this process. This 
polarization was one of the central problems faced by the implementors of the SAM 
programme, not least because the SAM document perceived ejido producers as a 
homogeneous group who collectively promoted their interests. This was not the case 
in Nextipac. Nor did the way in which agencies operated according to an 
institutional time table rather than according to the local agricultural calendar, help 
to improve the situation of the poorest households. On the contrary, it served to 
reproduce existing social relations. The advantages of agricultural modernisation 
offered by the SAM were not received by the more needy sectors of the ejido, even 
when some of these producers were integrated into the official network of services. 
After the producers had harvested their maize, they had to deal with the 
corruption of institutional agencies which squeezed producer benefits. Don Iginio 
described some of the usual situations which a producer like himself experienced due 
to the existing distribution of political power. 
"For me it is better to sell my maize to CONASUPO [the state agency for 
commercialisation], but this is not an easy thing to do. You have to learn 
how to deal with the official system. Everything starts with the arrival of the 
truck at the depot. The analyst comes to the truck and takes between five to 
six samples of the grain to test for humidity. Each sample weighs around 20 
kilos. The analyst fills his bag because he never returns the tested grain. 
After the test he comes to us and starts to bargain. The first thing he will 
say is that the grain is no good; that it is too humid (up to 60 or 70%), 
arguing that the maize is not up to CONASUPO requirements. 
The analyst can reject the maize, and if he does that, the only solution 
for us is to sell the grain to the middleman in Tesistan (Cristobal), who pays 
us less per ton than CONASUPO, and as I have to pay the price of transport 
and the time of the driver waiting at the depot, it is much better for me to 
give a mordida (bribe) to the analyst. I need to pay two to three thousand 
pesos to get my maize accepted. After the payment, the analyst will look 
again at the grain and reduce the percentage of excess humidity to an 
acceptable level (20% or 30%)." 
Don Eleuterio adds: 
"CONASUPO makes it its business to reject the grain. Last year they 
rejected 30 tons of mine. So I had to take the maize to Cristobal Alvarez. 
He gave me 15,000 pesos per ton, but, as I had to take the maize from 
Santa Cruz to Tesistan I lost 7.000 pesos in transport. I can assure you, 
there is an agreement between Cristobal and CONASUPO. The agreement 
is that CONASUPO rejects maize so Cristobal can buy. El Guero 
(Cristobal) then sells to CONASUPO at the official price. His business is 
to mix good and bad maize and sell that to the government. We don't have 
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trucks, and so to sell the maize we have to contract transport. The drivers 
always take the maize to Cristobal because they say that with CONASUPO 
they have to wait long hours and never get paid the same day. Transporters 
need their money quickly, so they take the maize to the middleman in 
Tesistan and only tell you later. But we need money to pay the labourers or 
for the machinery, so even we have to sell two or three tons to the 
middleman to keep the harvest going. The solution would be for 
CONASUPO to pay us the same day we deliver the maize. " 
Internal community conflicts and the operational procedures of the agencies 
constitute a context which has to be altered if the producers' social and economic 
position in Nextipac is to be improved. In the next section I want to evaluate the 
effect of the technical assistance programme during the period of the SAM 
programme. 
The District's Official Representation of Zapopan 
In the A etas Municipales de Programacion y Evaluacion (Official Minutes of 
Municipal Meetings to Evaluate Programmes), Nextipac is represented as a calm and 
not so visible ejido. When I examined these documents to see the degree of 
participation of the ejido s during the SAM programme, I found no substantial 
participation of Nextipac at the meetings. As this was the level at which 
communities met different agencies and could openly ask for improvements, or even 
criticize the authorities, the relative silence of Nextipac was surprising. In general, 
the minutes from Zapopan were dull. They showed, on paper at least, a municipality 
free from social and political problems; a total contrast with the minutes of other 
municipalities under study. After I became familiar with the case of Nextipac, it 
became clear to me that either the meetings, or the writing of the minutes had been 
manipulated. However, it must be said, that among producers there was a clear lack 
of motivation to participate in meetings with government officials. 
Not only did Nextipac seem a calm, unproblematic ejido according to district's 
documents, it also seemed to avail of the ideal conditions for implementation of the 
SAM policy. All the basic preconditions for the agronomic approach were present 
there. It was an ejido of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara in which no 
communications or access problems existed, and producers usually presented 
themselves as an example of innovation. 
The representation of Nextipac as a calm, promising ejido is sharply contrasted 
with the views of the tecnicos and the producers. The appearance of calm presented 
in the official reports and official minutes did not reflect the social and political 
reality of the producers. Their demoralisation, and lack of confidence in state 
agencies was a feeling based on their own experiences. 
According to my survey, of the 47 producers interviewed in Nextipac, 26 said 
they had not received technical assistance. This high proportion (56%), unassisted 
after seven years of district operations, not only pointed to the limitations of SAM, 
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but also to the lack of effectiveness of the whole rainfed policy. The producers who 
denied receiving technical assistance pointed to a degree of failure on the part of 
fieldworkers in implementing the SAM policy. On the other hand, the tecnicos in 
the field unit had their own interpretations of the reasons for the failure. Let us first 
consider the tecnico's point of view. 
The Tecnicos' Views of Zapopan 
When the tecnicos of the Zapopan unit discussed their work, they always expressed 
keen awareness of the political relations between producers and the district. They 
considered it very difficult to work in this municipality. This was because, according 
to them, producers were grillos who knew how to manipulate policy and the 
tecnicos. The personnel complained that producers were always putting them under 
pressure, and this situation created feelings of insecurity that prevented them from 
carrying out institutional policies. 
"In Zapopan, people outside of the Ministry have more influence than the 
tecnicos. They have the power to get tecnicos transferred from one area to 
another, or even to make life in the district very difficult for us. So, our 
first rule here is not to antagonise the local authorities or the dominant 
political groups. But one should also resist manipulation by these people, 
whose only interest is in getting benefits for their own personal gain. Here 
in Zapopan even the head of the unit has to be a grillo and this makes him 
very important within the district and with the regional representative of the 
Ministry." 
The political nature of their job puts constraints on fieldworkers, but could also turn 
in their favour. In the SARH district, the Municipality of Zapopan was considered 
an important place for personnel to make long term political contacts with high 
ranking authorities of the National Confederation of Peasants, or the Jalisco PRI via 
the President of the Municipality. Nevertheless, the SARH staff considered Zapopan 
the most difficult political place in the district, and Nextipac as one of the most 
critical points of the municipality. One of their major problems was gaining the trust 
of the producers. 
"It is very difficult to win the confianza of the producers here. In the ejidos 
there are key people (personas claves) who we have to win over so they can 
spread confianza among the others. But this work is hard in Zapopan, 
because producers don't believe in the government any more. If we want to 
do a good job in these communities we have to dedicate our whole time to 
that. But our economic insecurity in the Ministry does not provide any 
incentive to do so. In other words, the Ministry behaves as though it pays 
us and we act as though we are working (El Ministerio hace como que nos 
paga y nosotros hacemos como que trabajamos)." 
The tecnicos complained about the lack of institutional backing in their 
confrontations with producers or the actions of other agencies. They rejected 
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producer criticism, because they said producers always expected government 
personnel to solve all their problems. 
"It is true that producers in Zapopan expect more from us, but they don't 
value our technical advice. The only thing which concerns producers here 
is getting credit. So they give much more importance to the bank than to us. 
If we were to rank the agencies, I feel sure that the bank would be first, 
second would come insurance, then the agrarian reform and last the SARH. 
The only thing that makes us different from the other agencies is that, 
having more personnel, we are seen more in the field. So, we are the ones 
to receive all the complaints but none of the credit. " 
In the mind of fieldworkers, the political situation added to this problem. As one of 
them pointed out, the political character of the Municipality compels the supervisor 
of the district to go to the ejidos and promise wonderful programmes, thereby 
creating expectations among the producers. 
"But, after the meeting, the supervisor and his promises usually disappear 
and it is we tecnicos who have to confront the anger and disillusion of the 
producers. These supervisors should know the financial constraints of the 
district before they go to the field and make empty promises. They should 
realize that with this type of action they are increasing the mistrust of 
producers towards the Ministry and, in the long term, they are damaging the 
relationship between producer and tecnicos. If we don't perform better, it 
is because the district expects unrealistic things from us. " 
The lack of trust among producers seemed to be furthered by their own doubts about 
what they had to offer. "To be honest", said one, 
"In Zapopan producers can improve their agricultural technology by 
themselves and if they need us, it is just for reassurance that what they are 
doing is ok. The more market orientated, about 20% to 30% of the 
producers, have very high levels of agricultural technology. The other 60% 
or so follow only half of our recommendations, and the rest, either because 
they don't have economic resources, or through negligence, don't apply our 
recommendations at all." 
Other tecnicos more bluntly argued that it was impossible for them to provide a 
more efficient service while unlike the bank, they lacked the means to compel 
producers to follow their recommendations. Another argument put forward to 
explain the lack of follow-up of their recommendations was the behaviour of the 
bank which, according to them, did not provide the ejidatarios with enough credit 
to purchase the level of inputs recommended in the technological package; so their 
technical assistance could not deliver the expected results. 
In general, the tecnicos concluded that their bad performance in Zapopan was 
a result of the specific conditions of the Municipality; all of which worked against 
the development of confianza between producers and fieldworkers. 
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Producers' Perceptions of the Tecnicos' Performance 
The tecnico from the SARH was seen as being part of the local political context, i.e. 
he was seen to favour the dominant political group. Many producers felt that the 
tecnicos were simply not available to them, others expressed strong criticisms of 
their performance. 
In exploring the social field in which technical assistance had been operating in 
the ejido, I asked the producers if they knew the name of their tecnico. I thought 
this would be an indicator of the degree of tecnico involvement in the ejido and of 
the producers' personal confianza or trust. At the same time, a more general 
question was put, asking whether producers thought they had received technical 
assistance, under the assumption that it was possible to provide a kind of technical 
assistance without other commitments. The result of these question are presented in 
Table 3. 
The replies indicate that the degree of trust between producers and tecnico was 
low. Despite this, more than a third of the sample acknowledged having received 
technical assistance, indicating that a significant number of producers had some sort 
of contacts with the Ministry. To explore the nature of these contacts further, I 
analyzed assistance - what it meant to those 20 people who claimed to have received 
it, and how they perceived their relation with the tecnicos, considering that only 
seven of the 20 respondents receiving assistance actually knew the name of the 
tecnico. The large number of producers who, in spite of receiving technical 
assistance, did not know the name of the tecnico, suggested that the relationship 
between producers and tecnico was of an impersonal nature and could be a factor 
affecting the technical assistance programme. 
Table 3: Producer Perceptions of the tecnico and of the Technical Assistance Programme 
YES % NO % N 
Do you know the name of your 7 15% 39 85% 46 
tecnico? 
Have you received technical 
assistance? 20 44% 26 56% 46 
To establish an indication of the level of confianza, the 20 producers under the 
programme were asked where they would go for assistance in a case of crop or 
livestock emergency (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: Producers' Altitudes towards Technical Assistance in an Emergency N=20 
Relatives tecnico They solve Don't know 
Neighbours SARH the problems 
Friends themselves 
Where do you get assistance 
in an emergency? 9 45% 7 35% 3 15% 1 5% 
Producers showed preference in favour of seeking advice from their families or 
friends. However, if the responses of the whole group are examined, then 13 out of 
the 20 producers (65 %) responded that they would not use the tecnico's services in 
an emergency. The reasons can be seen in the Table 5. 
Table 5: Why Producers don't use Technical Assistance in Emergencies 
I don't know where to find the tecnico 5 39% 
Because tecnicos don't give good advice 1 8% 
They never came to see our crops 1 8% 
Don't know 6 46% 
N = 13 
As one can see, the majority did not know where to find the tecnico, or did not 
know why they would seek such aid. In these responses only two producers clearly 
rejected technical assistance. The question then becomes why tecnicos do not reach 
producers or convince them of the benefits of their services. This seems partly to 
be related to problems of communication, to limited access to information and a 
limited presence of tecnicos. It may also relate to the fieldworkers' own observation 
that their knowledge does not contribute much more than what the producers already 
know. Further interviews with producers also pointed to another factor, namely that 
the access to tecnicos' services is monopolized by certain sectors of the ejidatarios. 
Producers' Views About SARH Institutional Performance 
Don Felipe Vidal said: "It is a rare opportunity when we receive a visit of the 
tecnicos from the SARH. I would like to have more technical help to produce 
maize". Don Bernardo Olivares added: "The tecnicos from the SARH always 
promise to help us, but they never come to see our crops and I wonder if there is 
a way to say this to the proper authorities". Don Jose Rivera, a producer with a 
good economic position, who belonged to the dominant sector of the community 
stated: "I have never had technical assistance from the SARH, but that doesn't 
worry me, because I believe that every producer has to know his soil and obtain the 
necessary resources for himself. I use the bank PROMEX, and they lend me money 
without asking me to insure my crop. " 
Thus, some producers, although critical of the technical service, would like to 
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receive help on a more regular basis. Others though consider agricultural difficulties 
to be a matter of personal responsibility. This last position challenges the right of 
government to intervene in producers' conditions and suggests that nothing is wrong 
with the existing set of institution-producer relations. Such a stance suggests that the 
dominant producers would only accept technical assistance to improve general 
conditions, but would not support any intervention that would affect a more equal 
distribution of resources and allocate power more democratically in the community. 
The coexistence of these two different perceptions of the role of government 
intervention creates problems for the implementation of a rural policy, especially for 
the SAM, which tended to see ejidatarios in an a-historical way, and as a 
homogeneous group. Therefore, issues of local political control must be understood 
as part of the process affecting the achievement of rural policies. Contrary to official 
assumptions, the implementation of rural policies is not a neutral act and they do not 
benefit all producers equally. In Nextipac some producers saw fieldworkers as 
collaborating with the dominant group. Don Carlos Alvarez summarized this 
attitude: 
"The ejido is controlled by a group of producers who manipulate community 
meetings and vote only in favour of things that benefit them. That is why 
I don't go to the meetings any more. The opinion of the ejidatarios has no 
value in Nextipac. During the SAM, the bonus scheme (subsidies) gives us 
extra financial help. The bonuses are administrated under strict card control. 
But there are still producers who don't know about the scheme. The lack of 
information is because the bonuses were under Banrural control, and their 
field inspector used to charge us a commission, because according to him 
he had to do extra paper work to claim the subsidies for us. 
The inspector and the caciques worked closely in the ejido to redirect 
some of the benefits of the SAM to themselves. The field inspector from 
ANAGSA (the agricultural insurance agency) was always asking us for 
money to report healthy hectares as affected ones. All this was done in 
agreement with the President, but something must have happened between 
them, and the inspector was removed from the community. 
The tecnico from SARH is controlled by the caciques. Last year the 
ejido was allocated a water tank. This never arrived. It was sold by the 
tecnico for 10.000 pesos to the cacique group. We don't have technical 
assistance, I don't know the name of our tecnico. When people need advice 
or money they go to see the cacique. Caciques are producers who have 
more land than the rest of the ejidatarios and make profit from selling 
fertilizers to the other producers who then pay more for them than in 
Guadalajara. These people have very good political relations with the 
inspectors and the tecnico and it is they who have benefited most from 
government help because they have the political control of the pueblo." 
Don Carlos presents a reality in which political control of the ejido by one group of 
ejidatarios has stopped agencies from reaching the more needy producers. He 
believes that the agencies have supported the continuation of unequal social relations 
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in the community. This reinforcement, which may be an unintended consequence 
from the government's perspective, is certainly not seen as being politically neutral 
from the viewpoint of the subordinated producers. In Nextipac, agricultural 
technology was not the bottleneck affecting producer accumulation, rather it was the 
encapsulation of the ejidatario labour force within the local political power relations 
prevailing that determined their ability to achieve progress and economic 
development. 
In this context, the fieldworker, armed with the 'agricultural technological 
package' had not the capacity to deal with the 'ejido social problems package'. 
Without confianza between agencies and grass roots producers, fieldworkers could 
not contribute to removing those obstacles that mitigated against producer's self 
determination. The SAM failed to rearrange the existing set of political and 
economic interactions at local level. The new 'era of agricultural production' during 
the 1970's was unable to bring into communities like Nextipac a new political 
legitimacy for people's participation and a more equal distribution of resources and 
benefits. In the end, technocratic intervention was unable to separate itself from 
social conflicts and people's memories of their own past. 
Conclusion 
The main objective in this chapter was to show that the nature of agricultural policy 
(SAM) did not coincide with the complex and diverse character of the social factors 
operating at local level in Mexico (in this case Nextipac). These social factors turned 
out to be central to producers' responses to the SAM, as well as to the producers' 
creation of strategies and their individual perceptions of risks and trust. The political 
activity, or lack of activity, of 'ejido authorities' when representing the community, 
made clear that they were unable, in their contacts with the state, to represent the 
full range of economic and political interests that existed at local level. Although 
these social factors may be of historical origin and political in nature, the point is 
that technocratic policies alone can never be sufficient to achieve particular 
objectives, such as self-sufficiency in grain. 
In principle, any state policy can always be interpreted in alternative ways. The 
experiences and beliefs of producers form their political and institutional reality. 
Their ideas, actions and projects are also partly influenced by the social context in 
which they are assessed. Thus the implementation of SAM in Nextipac was not 
simply a reflection of how the policy implementation had to proceed. The process 
of policy implementation underlined the way in which the ejido had achieved a 
degree of development in accordance with the local politico-institutional 
requirements. Similarly, we saw how the family vendettas were essential to the 
conflict over resources, although they did not uniquely determine the outcome of this 
conflict, nor the representations which the actors held about the role of the state and 
rural development. 
I want to conclude by saying that when a rural policy is implemented, the 
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emerging outcome of the policy is partly assembled by the experiences and beliefs 
of the producers. This social component may be a simple matter of trust and respect 
among the different actors. Nevertheless, the assessment of the fieldworkers' skill 
and commitment are usually associated with their perceived status as 'outsiders' to 
the community. This factor plays an important part in the interface between 
fieldworkers and producers. 
In Nextipac, no firm boundary can be drawn around the social issues used by 
producers in the course of translating the SAM policy to their own reality. No clear 
distinction divided internal and external factors. When a policy effects the social life 
of people, then an analysis of policy implementation and a look at community 
conflicts helps us to understand the importance of local events in rural development. 
Policy implementation is more of a social construct than most academics or 
government policy makers have been willing to admit. This is not just a dispute 
about whether local groups influence rational policy in the process of policy 
implementation, or whether national policy always manages to incorporate local 
groups and people into a system of central control. I found a focus on the different 
actors' speech-acts in the study of policy implementation a useful way to examine 
why policy does or does not achieve its objectives. This perspective may have some 
implications for policy formulation and policy implementation. The Nextipac case 
suggests that policy decision makers should take into account the impact of social 
and political influences on apparently 'technocratic' agronomic approaches. 
Notes 
1. The sample covered approximately one third of the total households in Nextipac and was carried 
out during 1983-1984. 
2. Tractor mechanization in Zapopan increased between 1950 to 1960 by 85.6%, then during the 
1960-1970 decade the level of mechanization decreased to 52.6%, and later between 1970-1982 
dropping by 14.2%. 
In 1970, Jalisco's government formulated its Sub-regional and Municipal programme to 
organise the allocation of public resources. The aim was to support a policy of economic poles to 
create jobs, distribute income and social welfare (DEEJ, 1973). 
In 1975 the Agricultural Plan of Jalisco pointed out that changes in cropping practices had 
resulted in a decrease in the production of peanuts and camotes (sweet potatos) during 
1960-1971, whereas the production of vegetables had increased, as had the production of agave 
for tequila. Maize, nonetheless, still constituted the most important crop»in the region with 
87.4% of the total area under cultivation (DEEJ, 1975). This was a source of concern for the 
planners who wanted an increase in the production of crops with more commercial value. 
In summary, during the 1970's, government policy was: "to take control of nature and 
embark upon an era breaking with the natural inertia of geography and history in order to modify 
the traditional forms that have enclosed the people of Jalisco in its physical environment" (DEEJ, 
1973). 
3. The level of technology was based on sample survey data for one third of the households. In 
order to measure the level of household technology I assigned a value to each of the 7 
agricultural operations, according to the technology involved in each of the 7 operations: 
barbecho, rastreo, siembra, fertilization, escarda, deshierbe y cosecha. I assigned equivalent 
values to each operation (14 points). The rationale behind the specific values assigned is as 
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follows: all producers use some degree of modern inputs. However, it is in the use of tractors, 
animals, family labour or wage labour that differences can be noted. On this basis, households 
scoring between 98 and 84 points were households with a high technological level, using 
tractors, improved seeds and wage labour. Households with 56 to 83 points have an intermediate 
level of technology, usually combining the use of tractor (rented), animals, wage labour and 
family labour, according to specific circumstances. Households with 14 to 55 points have a low 
level of agricultural technology: they combine the use of improved or local seeds according to 
conditions such as credit, market demands or local knowledge about the expected rainfall; they 
usually use animal and family labour in the production process, although, in the peak periods of 
production, they sometimes contract wage labour or organize working groups which operate on a 
reciprocal basis. 
4. For an extended analysis of the history of the community of Nextipac, see Arce (1986). 
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7. THE EJIDO LOMAS DE TEJEDA: PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTATION (SAM) AND LOCALISED 
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Images 
There I was, in the main square of Tlajomulco, one of the municipalities of District 
No.l, observing the modern agricultural machinery standing on the cobbled streets 
in front of the sun-dried brick houses. In the spaces where the households used to 
keep their livestock, large sheds had been erected as garages for the machinery or 
converted into grain store-houses. 
The three most important buildings were the church, the new market, still under 
construction, and the municipality hall. The church constructed with sun-dried 
bricks, represented the colonial past, quickly disappearing. The municipal hall had, 
after a fire, been renovated with modern bricks and concrete. The future, without 
any doubt, was represented by the radical design of the central market: A building, 
which in contrast to the traditional architecture, delivered a cold sense of 
functionality, which broke my image of what I expected to find in a Jalisco 
provincial town. 
At 8 kilometres from the municipal town, we find the ejido of Lomas de Tejeda. 
The ejido consists of 1.295 hectares of land, distributed among 105 families. In their 
oral history, the producers recall that around 1800 a wave of people from Los Altos 
de Jalisco arrived in the community and that surnames such as Nufio, Gonzales, 
Marquez and Chavez have their origin there. Producers are proud of this connection 
and attribute to this inheritance their entrepreneurial desire for progress. This 
entrepreneurial spirit is expressed in the fact that many producers combine their 
agricultural activities with trade. There are 40 heavy trucks in the ejido and they 
control the transporting of cargo for the whole municipality of Tlajomulco. Since 
1948, the ejido of Lomas de Tejeda has been involved in government-promoted 
export cultivation, first peanuts and later sorghum. Since the decline of export 
opportunities, maize has once again become the major crop grown in the ejido. 
Producers are obviously proud of what they have achieved: "We usually start to 
work at four or five in the morning ploughing the land, while the rest of the 
municipality is still asleep". They are equally proud of their capacity to innovate: 
"If we see that some new idea is good, almost immediately all the community 
follows it". Lomas de Tejeda is not an homogeneous ejido, since there are internal 
differences in its social and economic stratification. Yet, the family is still an 
important focal point for the organization of agriculture and business. 
These are some of the characteristics of Lomas de Tejeda, which contributed to 
the selection of the ejido for a pilot project under the SAM. This project is the 
central topic of this chapter. 
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Social Construction of a Project 
The contribution of a social constructivist analysis to development studies is its focus 
on social actors experiencing development situations. This approach allows us to ask 
questions about the social relevance of agricultural development projects in society. 
Are these 'projects to transform society' or just a particular 'technocratic strategy' 
(Elwert and Bierschenk, 1988)? Are these projects formulated to expand people's 
existing choices or just another institutional restriction which sets priorities for the 
allocation of resources? 
This chapter argues that the meanings of development projects are to be found 
within the social networks, rather than in the specific cycle, of a project. Focusing 
on the social networks of a project represents a shift away from project cycle 
appraisal analysis common to development studies. Such a perspective concerns itself 
with the peculiarities of the project's social situation and with the social construction 
of the project from the point of view of the participation of different actors. The 
latter's interactions, transactions and interfaces are not seen in this approach as the 
inevitable outcomes of a specific mode of state organisation; nor the results of the 
material way production is organised (Adams, 1990; Porter, Allan and Thompson, 
1991). 
On the other hand, explanations of people's reactions to projects in terms of 
their resistance to uni-dimensional expressions simplifies how social situations are 
constructed. This type of perspective has blocked for too long the importance of the 
possibilities that actors' practices generate, when they combine different sets of 
relationships, interests and notions. In fact, actors' practices construct a local social 
field that provides the range and meaning to the project modus operandi. Among 
other things, this allows actors to form social networks within the 'project 
community'. The significance of these networks in a particular project situation 
depends on the local distribution of power and on the modes of legitimation available 
to the actors. 
The Social Life of a Project 
My analysis begins, then, from the premise that a rural project is constituted of a 
complex set of relationships, interests and ideas that are socially defined by the 
different actors involved. This process stimulates the formation of heterogeneous and 
often conflicting views about intervention at local level. These views are, the 
outcome of how actors' perceive their possibilities for manoeuvre and discourse 
within the social field of the project. Actors are, in their own right, able to provide 
a mapping out of the possible effects of the project, and to propose alternative 
strategies. They also contribute through their local interactions to the setting up the 
instrumental activities of the project, reducing in practice the existing choices of the 
experts in charge of project implementation. In this way, the implementation of 
project procedures involves the local translation and understanding of a number of 
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social, situational, cultural and institutional conditions. These constitute the social 
life of the project which penetrates the political and administrative contexts of the 
project. Internal and external factors fuse together making it difficult for the experts 
to predict outcomes and manipulate situations. The blueprints and guidelines of the 
project become too simple to predict the 'realities' of rural transformation. Critical 
problems arise at the phases of inducement, transformation and sustainability of a 
project, each phase generating new 'properties^ from the social interactions, 
transactions and interfaces within the social field. These properties set in motion a 
( battlefield, in which actors' struggle for the right to define the identity of these 
emergent social forms and commitments. Hence a struggle for control is set off 
through the activities and social constructions operating within the project. 
The Project Assumptions 
In this chapter, I analyze the social life of one of the SAM's 'pilot modernisation 
pilot projects' in Western Mexico. The project aimed at improving maize production 
through the incorporation of new rainfed agricultural technology and involved 
Mexican and Hungarian 'know-how'. 
In 1980, a Hungarian technical mission followed the 1977 visit of the then 
Mexican President Lopez Portillo to Eastern Europe. The arrival of the Hungarian 
agricultural experts in Mexico was perceived as a 'technical intervention' that would 
provide practical legitimacy to the SAM policy of grain self-sufficiency, launched 
in March 1980. 
Perhaps it is important to ask why Mexican political decision makers opted to 
ask the advice of 'socialist' agricultural experts. This decision was, it seems, 
designated to convey the message that the Mexican government wished to present 
itself as independent of the technical influences of the USA. In implementing the 
SAM the government also wanted to show a strong political commitment to solving 
the technological bottleneck among Mexican rainfed cultivators. Politically, the need 
to increase rainfed maize production was associated with both the national and 
international situation of Mexico at that particular moment. Thus, the 
'modernisation' of rainfed rural production and the introduction of 'Hungarian 
(socialist)' technology became two significant symbols within a nationalistic 
discourse that articulated the Mexican Food Policy (SAM) and the need for food 
security. 
This new development discourse was expected to become a catalyst of different 
Mexican interests. It was symbolically oriented to touch a popular notion of 
'Mexicanhood' in development: namely the generally negative feelings against the 
'gringos' (Americans), and the populist historical version that peasant interests have 
been the cornerstone of the Mexican revolution. The Hungarian government, 
probably unaware of the political and cultural significance of this scientific and 
technical cooperation, assigned the task of implementing the Mexico-Hungary 
agreement to the agrarian cooperative Agrover. ' 
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From the moment of their arrival, the Hungarian experts identified Mexico's 
rainfed agricultural problems as lying with the organisation of production, rather 
than due to a lack of technology. Hence, Agrover proposed that the production of 
maize should be organised collectively. This was the Hungarian 'ready-made' 
contribution to solving local rainfed agricultural problems. As the Hungarian 
technical strategy was heavily based on the use of modern agricultural inputs and 
homogenisation of production practices, for the project implementers these two 
factors became a central aspect of the project. 
Hungarian technical management was directed at realising the full potential of 
the soil in selected areas in order to increase production. The technological package 
approach, which characterised the SAM as a whole, thus found its ultimate 
expression in the Agrover project. The technological optimalisation of production 
slowly became the main 'mode of project operation'. In this, the standardisation of 
agricultural practices was a technical means to achieve better productivity, as well 
as to constrain the producers' ability to make individual decisions. The Hungarian 
management system assumed that the criteria of efficiency should be somehow 
linked to the requisition of the producer's will. With these assumptions, the 
inducement phase of the project focused on deploying among producers the notion 
that cultivators could benefit economically from handing over to the project experts 
the organisation of labour and the capacity to make productive decisions. 
The rationale for the collective organisation of the project was, paradoxically, 
founded on a particular assumption about the level of commoditization of Mexican 
society. Agrover based its strategy on the assumption that the impact of 
commoditization in rural Mexican society was complete and totally consolidated, and 
it was taken for granted that value-relations among producers could be entirely 
expressed in monetary terms. While it was acknowledged that the commoditization 
had resulted in social discontinuities and socio-economic differentiation - totally 
outside of the producers' control - the project nonetheless claimed that these 
discontinuities could be bridged by using the same idiom of money. Therefore, the 
jargon of money-benefits was viewed as the means to realise the 'new 
transformation', which included the transfer of production control from cultivators 
to project administrators. 
In practice, this meant that the project offered cultivators a rent for the use of 
their land during the period of project implementation. The project would make use 
of the producers' labour, for which they would be paid a wage according to legal 
regulations. As the administrators emphasized at the end of the harvest, after all 
costs had been covered, the remaining benefits would be distributed among the 
cultivators participating in the project. The separation of the rural producers from 
their agricultural land was not expected to have a dramatic effect on the life-world 
of the cultivators. Such a 'planistrators' (see Apthorpe, 1970) perception of 'reality' 
was adopted with total disregard for the historical economic context of land and 
capital scarcity, which had for generations forged the reality of the small Mexican 
cultivator. 
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The experts realised that socio-cultural factors could influence the producers' 
reactions to the project design and implementation. So they actively involved 
themselves in identifying political, economic and environmental constraints to 
intervention. In doing this, they came face to face with the issue of social control. 
Thus the experts realised that the capacity to achieve project goals was going to be 
defined in the sphere of social relations, which implied that the issue of power then 
acquired central significance in relation to 'management control'. 
Management control was established in the realm of rural producer participation. 
In line with project assumptions, participation was defined as the instrumental 
involvement of the cultivators in the process of social development that would 
produce no problems for management so long as the project operated according to 
the logic of the perceived commoditization of social relations and marketing 
strategies prevailing among producers in Western Mexico. In short, participation 
was seen, uncritically, as a 'social fact' capable of being manipulated through the 
offering of monetary rewards. 
Hence, the paradigmatic dimensions of this project were the issue of how 
management control was conceptualised, and how the cultivator's source of power 
was seen as controllable. The rural producer's reality was considered as venal and 
producer participation thus had to be organized 'from above'. Project decision 
makers defined a strategy of intervention based on theoretical assumptions of how 
society was supposed to work. This reification of producers' social relations led 
them to deny the significance of differential responses to capitalist penetration in the 
agrarian sector of Western Mexico. 
From Project Origins to Project Arrangements 
During the agricultural cycle of 1980-1981, Agrover (the Hungarian Cooperative) 
started its operations in the Municipality of Jocotepec in Jalisco. The Hungarian 
experts were 'located' within the complex administrative web of Mexican 
government institutions. Difficulties in coordination among the different government 
agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH), the Ministry of Agrarian Reform 
and the Agricultural Bank (Banrural) forced the programme into serious 
administrative problems during the initial period in one community. Evaluating this 
first experience, FIRA - the government financial agency for agriculture - concluded 
that the project should continue in another rural community but that changes in the 
administrative environment should be introduced, so as to avoid situations that had 
led to tensions within the management of the project (Wessman, 1982). 
Following this evaluation, the government decided that FIRA should be the only 
agency involved in the handling of the 'Hungarian project'. Instructions were issued 
to FIRA to select a new site where the rainfed technology could be tested. 
According to one FIRA official, the agency decided to carry out this experiment in 
an area 'representative of maize production in Jalisco'. Moreover, as he explained: 
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"We wanted to test the effectiveness of the Hungarian technology, so we selected 
an area showing some problems with the production of maize". 
The agricultural community of Lomas de Tejeda was identified as having a thin 
layer of agricultural soil. But, as the official acknowledged, this was not the only 
ejido with this kind of problem, there being several communities in Jalisco with the 
same thing. In subsequent interviews with officials, a second important consideration 
became a significant factor for the agency, and that was the 'behaviour of the 
producers as credit subjects'. In this regard, Lomas de Tejeda had an excellent 
record: first, because of its contacts with commercial banks and, second, because, 
from the 1960's onwards, rural producer credit had grown constantly. 
Other lesser considerations, such as access to the area, were also part of the 
selection process. The most decisive consideration, however, was the agency's pre­
condition that the selected area should be a community where producers had 
unanimously accepted the project. During the inducement phase of the project FIRA 
visited potential locations and explained the project to producers, tested their 
responses and eliminated those ejidos where many doubts were expressed, as these 
might eventually turn into opposition to the project. 
In the end, Lomas de Tejeda was the ejido that came nearest to fulfilling FIRA's 
selection criteria. The agency, therefore, opted to implement the project there. A 
FIRA fieldworker remembered his first impressions of Lomas de Tejeda producers: 
"They were receptive to change and eager to experiment with new 
techniques. Even so, I was worried that they were too politically motivated. 
They were too close to the influence of Guadalajara city and, in this sense, 
they were more difficult to control than other peasants of Jalisco, who lived 
in more isolated conditions. " 
The FIRA fieldworker went on to say that organizing the project was very difficult, 
because producers bargained their affiliation according to their individual interests 
and, as the official admitted: "We had studied the locality from a technical point of 
view, but had ignored the social and political dynamic of the ejido". 
To use Lomas de Tejeda as a 'type-site' for the project, the agency had to offer 
inducements to overcome the producers' lack of confidence (confianza) in the project 
and gain their affiliation. FIRA persuaded producers by means of an insurance that 
covered 80% of the producers' loan. The insurance was negotiated on terms that, 
in the event of project failure, producers would receive the equivalent of 3.3 tonnes 
per hectare. This insurance was provided by ANAGSA (The State Insurance 
Company). An even more significant offer, however, was FIRA's commitment to 
finance the sinking of three wells which would transform a section of the ejido from 
rainfed into irrigated land. 
A FIRA representative explained that during the inducement phase and for most 
of the first year, the Mexican officials had to pave the way for the Hungarians, so 
they could come and practice their technology. 
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The Other Side of the Coin 
The producers' perception of the inducement phase of the project was different. 
They claimed that the government had sent FIRA and Agrover to Lomas de Tejeda 
because it was well known that this ejido had the highest productivity in the 
Municipality (between 4 to 7 tons per hectare): "They knew we produced good 
maize. That was why the government sent the gabachos [the foreign experts] here". 
Other producers argued that the Agrover project was sent to the community because 
the regional government of Jalisco had political confidence in the ejido: "they knew 
that we were supporters of the Liga Agraria (Agrarian League) and the PRI". An 
important part of the political power of the municipality was concentrated in this 
ejido. A Lomas de Tejeda producer was the top leader of regional PRI and the 
presidency of the Confederation of Tlajomulco ejidos was given to the ex-ejidal 
president of Lomas de Tejeda. These and other political relations were used to bring 
development to the ejido. 
According to the producers, when the FIRA official arrived in the ejido, they 
organised several meetings with members of the community which led to the 
agreement to carry out the pilot project for a period of three years. The agrarian 
community was made up of 105 ejidatarios. Of these, 97 joined the project, of 
whom 11 committed only half of their land to the project because they were already 
receiving credit from Banrural and could not terminate their financial commitments 
overnight. The rest of the producers, who were receiving credit from the 
International Commercial Bank, contributed all their land to the project. 
In this way the project took control of 500 hectares of rainfed ejido land, and 
the Hungarian field experts selected the land upon which they would work. This 
action motivated some friction with those producers who did not participate in the 
project, who questioned the knowledge of the experts and the significance of the 
project. As one of them said: "I didn't participate because the Hungarians only 
wanted to incorporate half of my land in the project, and leave me the land with 
more stones in it". The FIRA fieldworker confirmed that this kind of friction had 
existed. "Unfortunately" he said, "the nature of the project made the Hungarians 
reject all those plots where stones could halt the introduction of machinery". 
The producers' representations of why they had been selected as the project 
location was clearly incongruent with the agency's assertion that Lomas de Tejeda 
met the physical criteria of an adequate location. The producers' experience and 
knowledge of Mexican affairs led them to 'read' in the arrival of the project, the 
central government recognition that they were both economically viable producers 
of maize and politically loyal supporters. In the view of the producers, this 
recognition empowered them to question the legitimacy of technocratic 
considerations on the basis of their own experiences and social practice as 
cultivators. This discrepancy of knowledge and meaning between the administrators 
of the project and the producers became the social ground where the issue of project 
control (management) was located. 
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The end of the inducement phase was marked by the setting up of organisational 
arrangements and the signing of a legal contract between FIRA and some producers 
from the ejido Lomas de Tejeda. The contract stipulated that rural producers would 
allow the Hungarian experts to try out their technology for a trial period of three 
years on their land, so as to increase the local production of maize. 
A Reconsideration of the Inducement Phase 
The inducement phase allowed the administrators to set the normative framework for 
intervention. In this the effects of commoditization among rural producers were used 
to justify a form of management which considered the knowledge of rural producers 
as redundant. Their relation to land was seen as just a survival link, and stripped of 
any meaning that might connect land to relations of power, local knowledge and 
organisational traditions. The project form of management control appeared to 
perceive rural producers as passive recipients of externally imposed circumstances 
over which they had no control. In this sense, project intervention was 
conceptualised no differently from other types of external intervention and money 
was seen as the universal means to ease the transfer of control over production from 
the producers to the administrators. The project assumed that producers had ceased 
to regard agriculture as a relevant experience in their life-worlds. The assumptions 
of the interventionists provided no scope for discussion about producer participation 
within the project and this contributed to sowing seeds of conflict between the 
technical 'experts' and the rural producers. 
The Process of Transformation 
So far, this chapter has dealt with the process of project inducement and the notions 
employed to define the 'model of intervention'. In contrast, the process of 
transformation deals with the implementation phase of the project and with 
bureaucrat and producer responses. The objective in this section is to analyze the 
process of social change emerging from institutional intervention. 
The use of technological packages in the implementation of the project reduced 
rainfed production to a particular 'recipe'. This recipe approach disregarded any 
previous mode of transformation, and with it the body of knowledge, skills, 
orientations, experiences, and patterns of social interaction of rural producers. 
National political pressure for an increase in rainfed production encapsulated 
technical change in a linear representation and disconnected change from social, 
cultural and institutional situations. Rural producer responses to the project were an 
unwelcome challenge to the authoritative construction of rural change and 
'progress'. 
The nature of the interaction between producers and technocrats became a power 
struggle about whose knowledge was going to lead the pathway to progress. 
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Empirically, the project's conflictive communication was centred around the 
meaning of particular work tasks. Actors managed to identify and use cultural 
images from their own experience of agricultural production. They translated their 
alternative interpretations into practical terms to achieve an increase in production. 
The resulting agricultural technology emerged from a process of interaction between 
'expert' knowledge and producer experience, in which elements of the new 
alternatives and the old ways, beliefs and images were reconstructed as contributions 
to Sie project or the life-world of the rural producer. 
In the course of the project, opposing views around the meaning of work tasks 
became symbolic representations of a conflictive context of social action. The focus 
on working practices became a practical discourse, which disguised the underlying 
conflicts and could justify the need for experts to intervene or for producers to 
resist. The process of project transformation constituted a social field where the 
social construction of the 'facts', by experts and rural producers, threw up two 
contrasting systems of knowledge or agricultural know-how. 
Agricultural transformations cannot be separated from a producer's behaviour 
and culture. Different conceptualisations and understandings of project 'facts' 
indicated that the transformation phase is a highly volatile moment in the social life 
of a project. In this case, project management was not convincing in diffusing 
technical systems among the rural producers. On the contrary, it was this 'black 
box' approach that generated strong opposition of interests at community level. The 
three years of the project were surrounded by social discontinuities embedded in the 
social forms, cultural values and technologies of project administrators and rural 
producers. It is these sort of gaps that lead us, finally, to critically examine the 
relevance of adopting agricultural technological packages in programmes like the 
SAM. The confrontation of alternative technologies opened up within the social life 
of the project and the ejido, a question mark about the 'social practicality' of 
change. 
Conflicts over Agricultural Practices 
Two sets of representations were important in the project: The FIRA's perception 
that the Hungarians demonstrated discipline and devotion to the project, and the 
producers', which was that the Hungarians had much to learn because they did not 
know how to make use of local soil humidity to cultivate maize. 
Producers acknowledged that the Hungarian system of applying fertilizer as they 
ploughed the land was an improvement on existing practices, but they were less 
convinced that an increase in herbicides was the way to control weeds. They claimed 
that this was expensive and ineffective, a judgement that was related to their 
experience with their own benificio practice and their objections to its elimination. 
In beneficio practice, local cultivators sow in furrows, which when well cared for 
prevents the seeds from rotting, and stops the weeds from competing with the maize. 
Moreover, constant maintenance of the furrows provides good support for the roots 
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of the plant, helping it resist the strong winds. This practice is labour intensive. The 
project, to reduce costs, eliminated furrows altogether, selecting a hybrid maize 
more resistant to the winds and combatting weeds with herbicides. This made the 
beneficio practice superfluous. Producers argued that beneficio could not be 
evaluated simply in terms of labour productivity. According to them, it was good 
for soil conservation and weed control. It prevented the 'soil from becoming hard'. 
"The Hungarians", they said, "eliminated the beneficio and now we have to use 
machinery to open the hard soil every year". 
FIRA acknowledged that the Hungarian tecnicos did not know the Mexican 
tradition of using the humidity of the soil for seed germination and that they became 
worried when producers started to sow deep (12 to 13 centimetres), because their 
manuals recommended sowing maize seeds at depths of not more than two or three 
centimetres. 
Knowledge again arose as an issue over the practice of burning the maize stalks 
after the harvest. According to the producers this was done every two or three years 
to control pests and soil diseases. This practice was successfully stopped by the 
Hungarians, because, according to them it mineralized the soil. The Hungarian 
practice of mulching the stalks into the ground to produce nitrogen, brought the 
project into conflict with the few cattle dealers of the ejido, who used to use part of 
the maize stalks as free fodder for their animals. The majority of the community 
supported the experts in this confrontation, and together, they managed to terminate 
the influence of the livestock group. 
The most significant area of conflict between producers and project 
administrators was over the organisation of labour. The labour of producers was 
needed for agricultural tasks by the project and this was paid for according to legal 
requirements, a state of affairs which provoked criticism from those producers who 
had supplied more land because, according to them, this increased the costs of the 
project. "Everything we did for the project was paid for, as if the land was not 
ours". Another criticism was that the project only rented (maquila) the tractors of 
a small group of producers "in spite of the fact that we have more than twenty 
producers with tractors, only six or seven got the benefits of the maquila". FIRA 
argued that this was not true, and that they were obliged to organise ploughing with 
the tractors available at any given time. "As many producers didn't want to work 
for the project, preferring to work on their own land first, we had to decide with 
whom we were going to work'. 
Producers recalled that during the first year of the project it rained during 
March, and because of this the community decided to sow at the end of that month. 
When the Hungarians learned of the community decision, they opposed it arguing 
that according to their agricultural calendar, sowing should take place in June. The 
Hungarians, with great difficulty, since they did not speak Spanish, explained that 
they were experts in rainfed maize production and that the milpa (maize plant) could 
not resist a month and a half in the soil without irrigation. One of the producers 
said: 
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"It was difficult to convince the gabachos, but we let them know that we 
were not just temporaleros (seasonal labourers), and that we knew how to 
use the humidity in the soil to make the seed germinate. We had two 
meetings and finally, even after they agreed, their disbelief made them write 
a letter saying that sowing was taking place against the technical advice of 
Agrover. " 
According to the producers, the harvest was excellent that year due to the good 
temporal. It surprised the Hungarians, and Lomas de Tejeda became a model 
community. It was visited by representatives from Jalisco and authorities from 
Mexico, and, in the words of the producers: "Even the television came to film our 
good harvest. Everybody was talking about the wonders of Hungarian technology, 
while in the ejido we knew the truth - we had taught the Hungarians in that first 
year". 
By the end of the first year, the social life of the project forced the experts to 
acknowledge the complexities of intervention and the significance of the social and 
cultural dimensions of agriculture. The process of transformation illuminated, with 
its contradictions, the enormous relevance of cultivator knowledge and the vitality 
of their position in society. Nevertheless, centres of public validation such as 
Mexican TV, came to the community and with its power delivered to the country 
'the magical achievements of Hungarian technology'. These images of 'progress' 
justified the disregard for local agricultural knowledge and located the significance 
of the project far beyond the control of producers or local bureaucrats. The cult of 
'modernisation' broadcast to the nation the mystical force of foreign technology and 
government intervention. What producers or bureaucrats might admit in private, 
from now on, was not accepted in public. The project had been declared a success. 
The process of project transformation from pilot to model of successful intervention 
generated an extension of the FIRA network of power into the whole system of 
agrarian agencies in Mexico, particularly on how to transform the Mexican 
bureaucracy into a highly efficient group of government implementers. 
The Project as a Social Field: Climate, Social Networks, and Struggles 
Most of the project tensions of the first year continued into the following year, and 
some of them intensified. FIRA explains the origin of some of the conflicts as a 
result of the way in which the agency had affiliated producers to the project. "At the 
beginning of the project, we had to treat producers very well. The result was that 
they started to believe in themselves too much and they began to control us". They 
decided to correct this situation and: 
"to let the producers see that they had to operate according to the same rules 
as other FIRA projects. We let them know that we would not deliver all 
their demands immediately. Producers were treating us as their labourers 
and those who were making the greatest number of petitions to the agency 
were the leaders against the project. " 
156 
The producers who had disagreements with the project focused their criticisms upon 
the unjust organisation of agricultural tasks, saying that not all producers had the 
same chance to work for the project. The other main complaint was that producers 
did not receive enough information from FIRA about how their money was 
administered. The FIRA fieldworker complained that if "the accountant's report was 
delayed for institutional or technical reasons, producers demanded it as their right 
as members, just to create a problem. If the payment for the harvest was delayed, 
that was hell." But the producers presented a different version of the conflict. One 
of the participants in the project said: 
"The tecnicos never explained how our money is spent. In fact we are not 
considered to be important in the project and finally, when the benefits are 
not what they promised us, the tecnicos never explain what has happened. 
We don't demand much, just a paper with the information on costs of 
production and profits per hectare, so that everybody knows what is going 
rt on. 
During the second year, the project continued working the land collectively and the 
project increased the area cultivated to 700 hectares. The Cultipack, one of the 
machines most heavily criticised by the producers proved invaluable because that 
year the rains were late and the soil was like cement. This second year of the project 
(1982-1983) was affected by a poor temporal which reduced the production of 
maize. There was also an unexpected emergency caused by a plague that compelled 
the Hungarians to fumigate from the air. These two elements affected the profit of 
the harvest. Some producers, for the first time in their lives, could not repay their 
loans to the bank and they ascribed la droga (the debt) to the inefficient 
administration of the project (FIRA). 
The Final Year of the Project and Producers' Reactions 
By the beginning of the third year in Lomas de Tejeda, an important group of 
producers had turned against the project. FIRA recognized that problems started to 
disrupt the project at the end of the second year when a group of the producers 
wanted to leave the project and take back their land. 
In the end, three groups of producers emerged, a) those in favour of continuing 
to work the land collectively with the project, b) those who wanted to continue 
receiving Hungarian technical assistance but wanted to work their own plots and 
administer their economic resources and c) and those who wanted to totally 
withdraw from the project. This latter group was unhappy both with FIRA 
administration and with the new technology. 
In this final phase of the project, the general feeling of the producers was, that 
in spite of the effectiveness of the Hungarian technology, the cost per hectare made 
it impossible for the producers to use it. They argued that the increase in maize 
production had not brought them economic benefits; that the high costs per hectare 
had cancelled out any benefits from the increase in production, "Even a tarugo 
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(idiot) can increase maize production with those levels of agricultural inputs, but it 
takes a clever peasant to reduce costs while increasing production". Opposition to 
the project can be better understood from the data in Table 1, which shows that the 
cost per hectare of maize in the project increased 30 percent from 1981 to 1982, 
whereas the value of the crop increased by only 24.5 percent, indicating that the 
costs of production were higher than the commercial benefits. The solution to this 
would have been to increase the tonnage per hectare. Unfortunately, 1982 was a bad 
agricultural year, and production decreased by half a tonne per hectare. This 
represented a 13 percent drop in value compared to the previous year. 
These circumstances severely affected the profits expected by producers. The 
profits of the project were compared to conditions for producing corn in other ejidos 
by FIRA/Agrover (see Table 1) but in the end, project performance was unable to 
fulfil the promise of sustained profit. The decline in the cost/benefit ratio between 
1981 and 1982 was 6.15 percent. What is even more interesting is that in 1983, 
which was an average agricultural year for climate, the profit to cost ratio was 19.6 
percent less favourable than in 1981. 
In conclusion, it is possible to suggest that the project was partly a victim of the 
exceptionally good weather conditions of 1981, which raised producer expectations. 
But, as weather conditions changed, the Hungarian technicians were unable to 
reproduce the earlier benefits. Thus, producers started to question whether the 
project resources had been used improperly. 
Table 1: Comparative Data for Three Agricultural Cycles: Project FIRA-Agrover 4 (in thousands of 
Mexican Pesos 
1981 1982 1983 
Project Region Project Region Project Region 
Production ton/hect. 4.33 2.35 3.80 1.85 4.5 3.0 
Value of Production 28.361 15.392 37.633 17.575 86.400 57.600 
Cost/hect. 15.831 10.000 22.360 15.200 60.000 45.000 
Profit/hect. without 
subs. 
12.530 5.392 15.272 2.375 26.400 12.600 
Profit/hect. with subs. 15.981 8.842 17.821 5.375 29.400 13.600 
Relation profit/cost 1.79 1.53 1.68 1.15 1.44 1.28 
Price/ton 6.550 6.550 9.903 9.500 19.200 19.200 
Source: Document FERA I Agrover 
Producers perhaps more justifiably argued that the problems were caused by the 
excessive use of agricultural inputs, and by the cost of wage labour. These two 
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factors made producers unwilling to cultivate maize on collective land. One 
producer, openly expressing his feelings, said: 
"In the colectivo the crop is not my responsibility, so I don't bother with its 
condition. If the milpa has zacate (weeds) or any other difficulty, I pretend 
not to see it, because in the end, all the expenses and profits are divided in 
equal terms, without taking into account whether production was better in 
one plot or the other. The Hungarians don't understand the differences in 
the soil and they put the same level of agricultural inputs on all the land, 
regardless, which is a waste of money." 
Opposition to the project brought an attempt by the Bank and FIRA to re-establish 
control. They threatened troublemakers with no future credit and compelled them 
to pay back the balance of their debts immediately. The final phase of the project 
(1983-1984) was charged with tension and the organisation of the agricultural cycle 
was carried out under the coercive and authoritarian direction of a bank tecnico. 
This period coincided with FIRA's decision to withdraw its more specialised 
personnel to the regional office, assigning new and less experienced fieldworkers to 
the project. 
Producer Networks and the Process of Project Internalization 
It was in this context that the election of ejidal authorities took place on the 11th of 
August 1983. The election became transformed into a community referendum on the 
project. Three electoral lists were presented. The first list contained the names of 
producers who supported the project and favoured maize production under collective 
conditions. They represented the interests of the bank in the community and were 
producers who had acquired heavy debts with the bank as a result of their machinery 
purchases. A second list was made up of those who favoured Agrover, but wanted 
to work their own plots whilst maintaining the supervision of the tecnicos. Their aim 
was to reduce production costs and increase their participation in the project. A third 
and more radical list was of those who wanted to terminate the project and the 
financial relationship with the bank Banco Internacional. 
The group representing bank interests polled only 11 of the votes in the election. 
The group who wanted to retain the technical assistance but recover their right to 
work their plots individually got 24 votes. But the election was won by the group 
who wanted the termination of the project, with 27 votes. 
Faced with this situation, the tecnico of the bank increased his threats to cut off 
credit to all those producers who abandoned the collective. Ultimately, the 
contradictions forced the project to re-organise into three separate categories of 
producers who were under FIRA administration but not necessarily under its control: 
those who kept their land in collective production (los colectivos); those who 
retained the technical assistance of the project and operated with bank, but worked 
their own plots (los semi-colectivos)\ and those who had broken with the project (los 
libres). 
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In order to stop producers transferring their affiliation from the colectivo to the 
semi-colectivo group, the tecnico of the bank denied credit to six or seven producers 
in order to demonstrate what could happen to producers opposing the project. This 
show of strength on the part of the tecnico was a big mistake, because it generated 
a totally new dynamic, in which the contradictions between producers and agencies 
were no longer focused upon the benefits of the project or the contribution of 
Hungarian technology. The issue now became that of power - who had the right to 
control the project decisions? The bank, FIRA, or the producers? Producers denied 
credit already had contacts to obtain alternative loans. They turned to the SERFIN 
bank for help. They mortgaged their private land as guarantee, and with this surety 
the bank was more than pleased to provide them with credit. The SERFIN bank had 
been trying unsuccessfully to enter Lomas de Tejeda for a long time. The project 
conflict thus allowed this financial institution to establish itself as an alternative to 
the Banco Internacional; a fact that provided more strength to the producers in their 
battle against the project. 
The project had planned to increase the area under collective cultivation from 
700 hectares to 1,500 hectares in the third year. The conflict made this impossible. 
In order to make up the difference the Hungarian project had to rent land from a 
different ejido. In that final year, 36 producers continued to work collectively and 
56 worked semi-collectively. Producers continued to complain about the small 
economic benefits received. They blamed the ejidal president in office at the time 
of the project's arrival and the Banco Internacional tecnico, as the actors mainly 
responsible for the level of conflict in the ejido. The Hungarian tecnicos, because 
they were foreigners, and unable to speak the language, managed to keep themselves 
out of the conflict. However, in private, they argued that the project had run into 
troubles, not because they were using too many agricultural inputs, but because the 
price of maize had not kept pace with the price of agricultural inputs. 
At this stage of the conflict, producers were determined to end their affiliation 
with the Banco Internacional, and started to circulate rumours that the tecnico was 
receiving bribes from producers who were afraid he would stop their credit. These 
rumours increased, and people openly discussed this corruption as taking place in 
concert with the ex-ejidal president, who they claimed was sharing the illicit profits. 
Producers said that the tecnico had been poor when he had arrived in Lomas but 
after only three years possessed a pick-up and two houses in Guadalajara, one of 
which he had given as a present to his father. Producers made allegations that the 
ex-president of the community had bought a new pick-up with money that the Banco 
Internacional was paying him to organise a campaign against the SERFIN bank. 
In one of the interviews, a producer told me how the Banco Internacional had 
charged him extra payments. In 1982 he had refused to pay what they were asking 
of him. He had gone to see the general accountant of the bank who had confirmed 
that they were charging him 10.000 pesos extra. This was done on the instruction 
of the manager of the Tlajomulco branch. "This is my experience," he said "so can 
you imagine what has been happening to the other people here? I am sure that the 
majority of us paid more than we should have. " 
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True or not, the story tells us something about the degree of conflict between 
the bank and the producers. The dissatisfaction with the tecnico worsened, until it 
became critical. The situation finally blew up during the Reunion Anual de Balance 
y Programacion (Annual Meeting of Evaluation and Programming), organised by 
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform on the 14th of February 1984. This meeting was 
attended by the different producer factions, by FIRA, the Agrarian Reform, the 
tecnico from SARH, the fieldworker from the Banco Internacional and the head of 
the SERFIN bank, who arrived later. The meeting started with an evaluation of 
agricultural activities and the discussion centred on the main problem of the ejido: 
the wish to change the existing financial arrangements from Banco Internacional to 
SERFIN. 
One group, represented by the ex-ejidal president, argued that they should 
continue operating with Banco Internacional because they knew now how to work 
with that institution. The other group mentioned some of the bad experiences 
producers had had with the bank, and recommended a change to SERFIN. This 
position was supported by the current ejidal president, the leader of the Liga Agraria 
and by the majority of the producers. 
In view of the situation, the representative of FIRA intervened in the discussion 
and reminded the producers that whatever their decision with respect to the banks, 
the bank which operated in the ejido would have to give credit to the whole 
productive unit {ejido) so that agricultural inputs could arrive on time and provide 
the credit to pay for the machinery that FIRA had already acquired. He then 
proceeded to say that the transition would not be easy administratively, and would 
involve a lot of paperwork. FIRA would have to start afresh learning how SERFIN 
operated. In the end, however, the decision had to be taken by the producers. The 
FIRA regional representative suggested that, in order to avoid the same type of 
conflicts arising again, producers should employ an administrator to be paid by the 
community. 
One of the producers replied that the ejido had been united until the bank tecnico 
had started with his dividing practices. The tecnico contested this accusation in a 
tough manner and said that the responsibility for the conflict lay with the producers' 
lack of responsibility. A young producer of 22 years, got up and said to the tecnico: 
"all this is the result of your corruption!". Tension was high and only the 
intervention of some people of the community stopped a physical confrontation. The 
young man left the assembly shouting that if the community continued with the 
Banco Internacional, he would no longer be an ejidatario, because he was tired of 
"shameless and despotic officials (funcionarios sinverguenzas y despotas) who only 
come here to exploit and insult us". 
After this incident, the bank fieldworker left the meeting and things calmed 
down. The producers in favour of a change of bank tried to get the community to 
decide by voting. The other group tried to prevent this. Finally, however, the 
meeting voted, with 81 producers in favour of changing to SERFIN, and eight 
producers wanting to continue with Banco Internacional. Observing all this was the 
tecnico of the SARH, who was delighted to see the problems FIRA was having in 
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Controlling the producers. The ex-ejidal president was evidently upset, and the FIRA 
representative obviously worried about the consequences of the ejidal decision for 
the future of the project. 
A week after these incidents FIRA attempted to reverse this decision, calling a 
meeting in the Guadalajara office to reconcile the ejido factions and explore the 
possibility of maintaining the financial relationship with the Banco Internacional, but 
the producers rejected this offer. Banco Internacional started to delay handing over 
the money from the harvest in a clear attempt to force a new meeting, where they 
could attempt to revoke the community's decision. Finally, however, in the second 
week of April 1984, the bank paid the producers, even though the money had been 
deposited in the Tlajomulco branch on the 28ttl of February. The credit for the 
agricultural cycle 1984-1985 was delayed as a result of the bank transfer, but the 
producers, who were determined not to be stopped by the 'dirty tricks of the bank', 
had started to furrow with their own resources. 
When the Hungarian tecnicos left the community, Lomas gave them a farewell 
fiesta thanking them for their technical assistance. When my research came to an 
end FIRA was in doubt as to whether to continue the project under FIRA 
supervision or to withdraw it. 
Conclusion 
The case of Lomas de Tejeda helps us to understand why producers do not trust 
agencies. Their lack of confianza in the project was based on disparities of 
objectives among the actors. 
FIRA was given the responsibility for selecting a location to test Hungarian 
technology in Mexico. The financial nature of the FIRA agency led to the credit 
record of a community being established as one of the most important criteria for 
selection. The agency knew that this would make it easier to secure financial backing 
from private banks, and the producers would repay the credit. In effect, this resulted 
in choosing a community with a proven production record, Lomas de Tejeda. This 
decision, although acceptable from FIRA's point of view, created problems for 
Agrover later, during the implementation process. 
Agrover came to Mexico to demonstrate that the Hungarian technological 
package could substantially increase maize production, through the combined use of 
high yield varieties of maize and chemical inputs. Besides, their objective was to 
show that the crop could be profitable under 'modern collective conditions' of 
production. In an ejido like Lomas, where a relatively good level of crop production 
existed prior to the project, the Hungarians were confronted with the challenge of 
how to increase production in a significant way. As the project only resulted in 
minimal increases in production, producers were able to complain that the 
technological package proved too expensive for them to adopt. Producers were not 
interested in producing maize at any cost. They were concerned with reducing costs, 
increasing profits, and having control over the process of production on their plots. 
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The disparity of objectives was a result of the agency's use of financial 
considerations as the main criteria in organising the project. The agency assumed 
that such considerations could serve as practical guidelines to the implementation of 
the SAM strategy. This assumption proved to be fundamentally wrong and at 
variance with producers' reality. FIRA's assumption that an ejido related to the 
market would be a more secure location for the implementation of this SAM project 
proved wrong. In the case of Lomas, the ejido's integration into the market and the 
producers knowledge of institutions, allowed the community to resist pressures from 
the bank, and enabled them to mobilize a social network to resist agency 
mechanisms of control. 
In this context, had the project been more participatory, allowing the producers 
to contribute in the decision making process, perhaps the conflict could have been 
avoided. However, it could not have reconciled the conflicting interests of the 
producers, public and private agencies. In their zealous efforts to create a show-case 
for agricultural development, the implementers did not ask themselves whether this 
ejido actually needed the experts' contributions. The experiences with the project 
demonstrate the determination of producers to resist government solutions when 
these do not take cognisance of local knowledge and experience as being able to 
contribute to the process of rural development. 
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8. MAKING SENSE OF ENTANGLEMENTS OF 
BUREAUCRATS AND RURAL PRODUCERS IN 
AGRICULTURAL INTERVENTION 
In concluding this book I wish to re-assess some of its main arguments. Throughout 
the preceding chapters we have presented an extended case of state intervention in 
Mexico, the Mexican Food Policy (SAM). We explored the process of formulation, 
implementation and outcomes. In doing so, different levels of formulation and 
implementation have been taken into account. The analysis started with the process 
of policy formulation at the level of the national Ministries (Chapter 2). The analysis 
then shifted to the lower-level bureaucracies involved in SAM: the actors in the 
district (Chapter 3) and the field-units (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 formed the bridge 
between the SAM policy and the actual implementation. Chapter 6 and 7 focused on 
the interface between fieldworkers and rural producers. In these chapters, cases were 
presented of SAM implementation, in two ejidos in Jalisco. While Chapter 6 
emphasised the local contingencies that impinged on the policy implementation, 
Chapter 7 highlighted the social life of a project. 
The Mexican Food Policy (SAM) was introduced in 1980, with the aim of 
achieving self-sufficiency in basic grains, in particular maize. It was directed to 
transforming the conditions of rainfed producers by providing technical assistance, 
subsidized credit and better access to fertilizers, pesticides and improved seeds. The 
SAM coincided with a re-organisation of agricultural administrative agencies, which 
aimed at a better coordinated and more effective policy implementation. This was 
accompanied by a shift from a political to a technocratic approach. In this process, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) emerged as the main 
agency responsible for the implementation of SAM. 
The objective of this study was not to assess the pitfalls or successes of the SAM 
policy as such. Rather, SAM was chosen as a case for studying the dynamics of 
processes of policy formulation, implementation and outcomes. State intervention 
emerges as an interactive process in which bureaucrats and rural producers attribute 
intentions and meanings to existing institutions, social groups and agricultural 
policies. This process reconstitutes in practice the existing political boundaries 
between state and society and allows actors to internalise, utilise and transform the 
social consequences that arise with the implementatioh of rural policies. In this way, 
the present study depicts in many ways the complex and multi-faceted dimensions 
of the interface between the administrative framework and rural producers at the 
point of policy implementation. 
In this concluding chapter, the nature of state policy formulation and 
implementation as social processes will be elaborated. We shall then assess 
theoretically the role of actors in these processes and examine the methodological 
implications of an actor-oriented approach. After this, we shall discuss how larger 
social processes and actors' room for manoeuvre interconnect. In this way, we shall 
try to go beyond the often perceived incompatible dichotomy between 'structures' 
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and 'actors'. This leads us to emphasize the importance of empirical contingencies 
in the study of policy intervention. The chapter concludes by delineating the 
implications of this study for an agenda for future research. 
The Relation between State and Society 
This book has dealt with state agricultural intervention. It has addressed the question 
of how we can characterise and describe state practices in relation to agricultural 
producers. We hope that we have shown that this is possible through the use of an 
actor-oriented approach. The next question then is what is the relevance of these 
data for our conceptualisation of the state in relation to society? 
First, let us reconsider several existing instrumental and organisational 
representations of state/society relations. An instrumental, functional representation 
of state/society relations is found in the Marxist tradition. According to this view, 
the state is perceived as entailing an instrumental relationship between capital (the 
ruling class) on the one hand and the practices of the state bureaucracy on the other. 
The state functions as an instrument for promoting the interests of the dominant 
sector in capitalist society for resolving crises of capital accumulation. This 
perspective has been used by de Janvry in his influential book on the agrarian 
question in Latin America (1981). This Marxist interpretation of institutions and 
processes in development sociology has been thoroughly criticised for its 
functionality by, among others, David Booth (1985). Norman Long specifically 
criticises the view of state policy as responding to the unplanned character of the 
crises of capital accumulation on which de Janvry's theory is built (Long, 1988, 
111-4). 
A second focus on state/society relations stems from the neo-Weberian tradition. 
Authors such as Grindle (1977, 1980, 1986; Grindle and Thomas, 1991) and Migdal 
(1987) have adopted an institutional/organisational perspective to the state. In these 
studies, there is a shift away from the role of the state in the process of capital 
accumulation or economic modernisation to a consideration of the various ways in 
which state leaders successfully or unsuccessfully attempt to shape society by 
establishing powerful departments and agencies vis-à-vis sectors of the population. 
Grindle describes and analyses state bureaucratic conflicts at the level of policy 
makers in Mexico. She depicts the bureaucracy as composed of political networks 
that compete for clients in order to enhance their own political influence and careers. 
She moves from the homogeneous view of bureaucracy as portrayed by Weber to 
a more dynamic representation of how bureaucrats compete in their everyday 
practices. However, her view awards too much of an endogenous dynamic to the 
authority of state representatives. Migdal interprets the relation between state and 
society as part of a fundamental breaking point in the analysis of institutions and 
people. His perspective is more sensitive to the impact of societal forces on the state 
bureaucracy. However, in his organisational approach he over-emphasises the 
negative effects of conflict within the state agencies, arriving at the conclusion that 
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states tend to grow weaker and society stronger. 
These types of analysis are helpful in focusing on the dynamics of bureaucrats' 
interactions. As such, they underline the need to study and document processes of 
organisational contradictions within the state. Nevertheless, the view offered of the 
relation between state and society remains shallow. They continue to work within 
a research tradition that treats state activity as something fundamentally different 
from the actions of people outside the bureaucracy. The danger is that by conferring 
state representatives too much ability and capacity to shape society, this perspective 
loses sight of the effects of local negotiation and conflict at the critical points of 
policy implementation. 
In this vein, the work of Theda Skocpol (1979, 1985) represents a path-breaking 
stand against the simple conceptualization of the state as either an instrumental 
reflection of social and economic interests or composed of endogenous organizational 
processes of conflict within the bureaucracy. In her analysis she links conflicts and 
crises in the bureaucracy to social processes in the society at large. Her work 
suggests that state organisations have a powerful capability of learning from and 
using these processes to rebuild themselves in the wake of bureaucratic 
contradictions or social upheavals. 
The work of Skocpol presents a refreshing view on the relation between state 
and society. However, while the historical dimension of her work allows her to link 
larger social processes to state organisation, her approach does not provide a 
methodology for gaining an understanding of the everyday practices of policy 
implementation in contemporary development situations. It is here, I believe, that 
the actor-oriented approach can make a significant contribution to our understanding 
of state/society relations. 
State as a Social Carrier of Rural Development 
In this book state intervention was analyzed as a field intersected by a series of 
social processes. The empirical data presented throughout the different chapters 
show that the process of formulating and implementing SAM was indeed influenced 
by economic and overtly class interests. In this sense, the case of SAM could be 
understood as maintaining and reproducing the existing social and economic relations 
in Mexican society. The case material also demonstrated the influence of 
administrative reform, bureaucratic conflicts and routines on the processes of policy 
formulation and implementation. However, it became clear that these factors by 
themselves far from illuminate the dynamics and diversity in local outcomes of 
policy implementation. The formulation and implementation of SAM was neither a 
mere expression of contradictions in Mexican society, nor a simple reflection of the 
political and economic 'needs' of the state bureaucracy. Such representations lose 
sight of the meaning and importance of local conflicts and negotiations between state 
representatives and rural producers. From the analysis in this book, then, policy 
formulation and implementation appear to have a socially-contested and negotiated 
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character and emerge as socially-constructed processes. 
The important role played by local negotiations between state representatives and 
other actors was earlier illustrated in the study of the dynamics of knowledge 
interfaces in rural Mexico (Arce and Long, 1987; 1992). In the present case study, 
which also refers to the implementation of the SAM in Mexico, a variety of social 
actors - bureaucrats, rural producers and other parties - are shown to be involved 
in the social construction of policy implementation, in such a way that the apparently 
'external' and 'internal' domains of state intervention are merged. 
The perspective developed in this book is that the state can be represented as a 
'social carrier' of rural development. For instance, the state may disseminate among 
producers the seeds of modernisation, but it cannot ensure the growth and shape of 
the crop, nor, for that matter, how the yields are going to be socially and physically 
consumed. State agencies are social entities which implement certain courses of 
action. This capability to do things has the effect of reorganising everyday practices 
and social life in specific political moments of interaction between bureaucrats and 
local producers. Nevertheless, all the various actors play an important role 
themselves as the filters and introducers of new courses of action in their situations. 
It is important to recognise, however, that the state is not the only social carrier 
in processes of rural development. In fact, there are many social carriers, both 
institutional (e.g. producers' organisations, banks, market associations) and non-
institutional (e.g. confederations of households, kinship or customary groups). This 
book argues that processes of state intervention must be explored empirically in 
order to identify and describe the relevant social carriers in development. 
Actors in Rural Development 
The analytical approach adopted aimed to examine the relationship between human 
action and state policy formulation, implementation and outcomes. Our first task was 
to recognise that development must be understood in terms of actors' actions. Behind 
this lay the notion that we should not underestimate actors' choices and 
responsibility, nor should we assume that institutions are the only carriers affecting 
the organisation of society. 
These notions raise the issue of human agency, based on the premise that the 
individual has the knowledge and capability (see Giddens, 1984) to understand social 
experiences and to solve the riddles of everyday life. The individual recognises 
himself/herself in his/her social practices within specific situations. Nevertheless, as 
Long (1989:225) has suggested, agency must be translated culturally if these 
processes are to be fully important for actors' actions. 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that actors working in state agencies 
accumulate valuable experiences vis-à-vis the agricultural producers. Being the 
frontline of the government at local level, their administrative involvement with 
contrasting and often conflicting sets of cultural, social and economic interests 
generates a body of knowledge based upon these personal experiences made up of 
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the 'social dust of the field'. As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, these experiences 
usually lead frontline state representatives to develop their own views while devising 
strategies on how to practice rural development. 
Rural producers also construct their own everyday 'projects of society', which 
cannot be specified in advance. They are able to reject some interventions, while 
accepting others. Through this, they improve their skills of negotiating. The extent 
to which they accept a state policy involves a complex interface between local 
knowledge and the characteristics of the new rural context proposed by the policy. 
Producers cannot be represented as passive subjects of state intervention. State 
policy cannot avoid coming into contact with the character, restrictions and 
capabilities of rural producers. Active participation of local people in their struggle 
for survival and their significant contribution to the shaping of local reality involve 
the entanglements of bureaucrats and rural producers. 
In this book, the Mexican Food Policy (SAM) became the contested means of 
rural development. The way SAM was internalised and translated into actors' life-
worlds generated anxiety, discussion, and reflection. Whereas SAM implied a social 
construction of actors, it came to be conceived in this study as a social field made 
up of a series of related actors' actions and experiences. 
These axes of everyday experience problematize any single theoretical 
explanation of 'the role' of state intervention in Latin America. An essential 
characteristic of our analysis is that state intervention cannot be seen as a set of 
patterned interrelationships between entities, institutions or tendencies totally devoid 
of actors' presence and action. Instead, state intervention was perceived of as a 
process that was part and parcel of the action of actors. 
One important implication of this perspective is that it allows us to recognise 
diversity as the material condition of rural development practice. By studying actors 
and their policy contexts we can perceive the significance of diversity in rural 
practices. For example, we documented the substantial variations among front-line 
workers in the ways they organised and implemented state-sponsored policies. In 
seeking to explain this, the study followed fieldworkers implementing agricultural 
policies (see Chapter 4). We pursued this line of inquiry as a way of transcending 
a simple analysis of discourses and practices. While these latter certainly constitute 
an important part of the reality of rural development, they must be complemented 
by a careful exploration of changing forms of power and authority and patterns of 
'fieldworker discretion'. These arise from the institutional experiences, social 
backgrounds and interactions of front-line workers and rural producers and cannot 
be reduced to the logic of discourse or the workings of economic and political 
structures. 
Concepts and Methodology 
Understood as a social construction of actors, rural state intervention provides a field 
for analyzing the ensemble of actors' responses to social processes and external 
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influences, i.e. how they link influences from the state, markets, technological 
development, limits and possibilities of the natural environment, local political 
processes and changing relations at the household level. Hence the methodological 
stance taken in this book allows us to deconstruct state intervention to the level of 
actors' actions. Rather than reifying state action, as a functional and predictable 
policy system or a hierarchical structural formation, this approach permits us to 
appreciate the human dimension and significance of state intervention in the 
restructuring processes of agricultural localities. 
In the study we have seen how SAM policy and state intervention was 
constituted, organised and implemented in the context of bureaucratic culture, 
viewed as a domain of everyday practices and administrative routines. This was one 
way into the analysis of rural state intervention, but we also needed to observe and 
analyze actors' social backgrounds and situated social actions, in order to get a 
firmer grip on actors' practices that shaped the outcome of the SAM. It was through 
these observations and analyses of the everyday life of rural policy actors, that the 
contributions of an actor-oriented approach could be demonstrated. 
As Long has suggested, an actor-oriented methodology allows us to focus on the 
"face-to-face encounters between individuals or units representing different interests 
and backed by different resources "(Long, 1989: 2). This idea, which Long 
characterises as rural interface, permits us to find, identify and describe critical 
points where actors' actions are situated and temporarily defined. These actions are 
"dépendent on the agency of the actorsAgency, in this study was represented in the 
styles by which actors embodied, internalised and translated the influences of state, 
market, technology and culture. The particular translation of contextual influences 
shaped human action and provided actors with a cognitive chart to organise, 
ensemble and respond to the influences in their lives (see Long, 1992: 16-43). 
"^In the book we have tried to develop such a perspective in more detail since we 
argue that it is necessary to deconstruct actors' actions in relation to the life-worlds 
of the actors involved in the process of policy implementation. Our approach 
attempts to reveal which forms of action mediate the relations between bureaucrats 
and producers, identifying which are admissible and appropriate to their situation. 
Actors' actions are embodied within ideological and culturally-specific meanings of 
authority, and are part of the social construction of power. In recalling these 
situations, the study did not present social interface as a general form of 
discontinuity, but rather as a principle through which one could reveal how 'projects 
of society' are organised in practice by actors according to the political and cultural 
meanings they attribute to them. It was because of this that we placed a lot of 
importance on the compilation of life-careers and life histories, social network and 
social situational analysis, and actors' account of social events. As such, this 
perspective and methodology belong not just to an interface approach, but more 
generally to an attempt to comprehend the transformations of actors' experiences in 
shaping the world. 
It was in actors' life-world settings such as individual biographies, actors' 
accounts of their ejido and institutional surroundings, actors' different interpretations 
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of policy, and in the observation of actors' differential responses, that we were able 
to identify actors' practices and feelings as the central human dimension of rural 
development policy. 
This approach implies that understanding rural state intervention involves both 
serious empirical (ethnographic) work at the local level and a wider sociological 
framework of analysis capable of dealing with specific configurations of 
administrative practice, the elaboration of 'discourses' on development, and the ways 
policies and projects are internalised by the various actors concerned with them. 
In this study concepts such as life-world, room for manoeuvre, internalisation 
and translation of social processes are actor-oriented concepts. These analytical 
devices were specifically useful for understanding those social processes that linked 
situationally institutional operations and actors' strategies and interpretations. 
Explaining the Metaphor of Entanglements in the Title of the Book 
At this point we wish to explain our metaphor of 'entanglements'. This metaphor 
depicts the complexities surrounding actors' everyday trivialities and the way they 
link with other actors and actions to constitute society. Are these links just rational, 
strategic or discursive? Of course not, since it is the contingency of how these 
elements are entangled that constructs society. 
As we have shown in this book, the practices of fieldworkers and rural 
producers are both instrumental and expressive of actors' economic and political 
interests in policy implementation. But the roots of actors' instrumental practices can 
be traced back into their life-histories, values and knowledge ,_wherein one can 
recognize the diversity of speech-acts (Chapter 4) that constitute the medium by 
which they translate and interpret policy. Without any doubt, this translation 
influences the nature of the entanglement between bureaucrats and rural producers, 
generating a configuration of contingencies that includes contextual entities and other 
actors' actions. 
In this configuration actors organise social networks wherein conversations, 
shared memories, circulation of knowledge and the embodiment of culture actually 
takes place. This active process of assembling individual actions and the convergence 
of actors' engagements are both characteristics of the entanglement. This metaphor, 
we believe, can enhance our perspective on how reality is socially constructed. By 
screening off these situational entanglements we can understand better how and why 
'reality' is constituted by degrees of disorder, emotional feelings, inconsistencies 
between actors, and room for manoeuvre between fieldworkers, rural producers and 
other parties. 
The metaphor raises the question of whether it is possible to construct an 
analysis capable of producing 'knowledge for action', and whether the study of 
diversity necessarily remains a kaleidoscopic perspective unable to identify persisting 
and consistent patterns in social processes". Another of our reservations concerning 
the study of social processes is the assumption made in recent work that social 
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practices are mainly constructed around discourses (see Apthorpe, 1984, 1986; de 
Vries, 1992). This line of analysis suggests that empirical evidence about actors' 
practices and interfaces can be simply derived from studying discourses. This view 
presumes that discourses are the filters of action. The metaphor of entanglements, 
on the other hand, conveys the idea that human action and interaction cannot always 
be represented by discourse. The notion of actors' knowledgeability does not imply 
that their practices are always linguistically correct, argumentatively precise or 
manipulatively effective. Social processes are outcomes of entanglements of actors 
who find themselves situationally and emotionally contesting or negotiating values 
and trying to shape their reality through practices and relationships that can be 
mutually antagonistic or might lead to consensus. The explanation of social 
processes, then, requires an ethnographic approach that takes us beyond discourses 
by linking actual practices to the personal, cultural, and historical predispositions of 
actors in their struggle to organise relationships in society. Although discourses are 
part of actors' accumulated knowledge from their experiences, they form only one 
element of the multiplicity of factors shaping social practices. 
In short, entanglements propel one into the intricacies of social process. This 
implies that it is necessary and possible to verify empirically the practices that are 
founded upon the human phenomena of our everyday ceremonies and on how we 
organise, share and dispute the elements that constitute our social life. 
Internalisation and Translation 
In order to explore the relationship between actors' life-worlds and state 
intervention, it was essential to work out a conceptual approach for analyzing actors' 
actions and the strategic ways in which they deploy development discourses and 
organisational practices within the implementation setting, thereby shaping the 
process of intervention at the ejido and institutional level. In order to do this, we 
placed a high degree of relevance on actors' internalisation and translation of state 
intervention. 
We sought to argue that invariably state interventions are interpreted in different 
ways by actors. Moreover, the beliefs that rural actors and bureaucrats hold are 
undermined and transformed in the processes of negotiation that the representatives 
of the state have to enter into, both within the state and in society, in order to 
implement policies. State policy implementation acts as a bridge between 
government representatives, the regulation of markets, and rural producers' 
interests. In the process of negotiating policy implementation, actors socially 
construct new values, perceptions of progress, images of development, forms of 
political participation and labelling. This process transcends the actors' own language 
and categorical boundaries of thought, and allows them to give practical meaning to 
rural policy implementation. 
When writing of the actor's process of internalisation and translation, we mean 
the ways in which they accord validity to their images of reality and their personal 
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transmutations from individual life experiences, actions, and beliefs to a specific 
definition of the world and the organisation of a project, upon wEicIT they can act. 
Interaalisation and translation processes should be important notions in any 
analysis of rural change. However, these processes must not be viewed 
independently of politically - and institutionally - situated life experiences in which 
actors participate and struggle with social meaning and the construction of 
organisational solutions to their problems. 
The importance attributed to processes of interaalisation and translation 
reinforces the view that the analysis of state intervention should focus on the 
everyday practices of social actors, their capacity to internalise and translate the 
technical and political factors embodied in a policy process, and the ensuing 
negotiations and interactions among the social actors. This perspective, while 
studying how actors advance their own interpretations for the solution of problems 
in rural development, at the same time, helps us to concentrate on how actors 
socially construct their livelihood projects at local level and how these processes 
relate to their social identity and sense of belonging. 
Power and Knowledge Revisited2* 
The very practice of state intervention is built upon the perception that state 
representatives have the necessary social, economic and political authority to 
accomplish the implementation of an agricultural policy. Yet, as demonstrated in this 
book, in the everyday practice of implementing state policy this authority is often 
contested and a range of power conflicts emerge. While these conflicts are certainly 
related to differing interests, they are, as we have shown, also related to issues of 
knowledge. 
The implementation of SAM was strongly surrounded by conflict. Part of these 
conflicts arose from contradictions built into the policy. The implementing state 
agencies were conceived to coordinate and implement technical assistance policies 
to improve the conditions of rainfed producers, while overcoming at the same time 
the contradictions generated by the policy of increasing maize production for the 
urban population. Furthermore, SAM was surrounded by institutional conflicts, 
ranging from the pursuit of interests by individuals or political networks within the 
bureaucracy to inter-agency competition. Apart from, yet related to, intra-
bureaucracy conflicts, a number of conflicts emerged at the interface of policy 
implementation between fieldworkers and producers and among producers 
themselves. The collection and analysis of individual biographies, community and 
institutional histories revealed that the beliefs that rural actors hold are often 
undermined by the negotiations that the representatives of the state have to enter 
into, both within the institutional context and in society at large. 
These conflicts contested the authority of state representatives (and in some cases 
the authority of ejidal officials) to implement the SAM, resulting in situations where 
fluid and volatile power relations emerged at the point of implementing the policies. 
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Interactions in policy implementation not only relate to the actual distribution of 
resources, but also concern degrees of legitimacy and credibility accorded to state 
representatives by rural producers. Hence, actors' strategies to accommodate, avoid 
or alter state intervention are part of the way in which power is built, contested, 
distributed and re-distributed in society. 
At this point we need to address the problem of knowledge in relation to such 
conflicts of power. As we saw in Chapter 1, as an expression of culture, knowledge 
is manipulable and means different things to different people. The relation between 
'outsiders' knowledge and different 'local rationalities' in constructing the 'reality' 
of development means that we need to reconceptualize actors' interactions within a 
political-institutional environment. These interactions are highly significant because 
they are linked to actors' interpretations and translations of economic and political 
elements and processes. These contribute to actors' definitions of particular 
situations and to the ensemble and organisation of their responses to state 
intervention. The relevance of actors' knowledge and interests led us then to 
investigate the key dimensions of the interface between rural producers and state 
officials implementing policies. 
The focus of this study on actors' perceptions, life-worlds and biographies is 
used to challenge the notion of an inherent coherence in social life. By treating the 
'reality' of rural development as a series of actors' explanations and actions, we 
inescapably confront the situationally located determination of knowledge (cf. Knorr-
Cetina, 1981). Moreover, awareness that local knowledge does not constitute a 
common, homogeneous body allows us to give adequate attention to diversity and 
differential responses to state intervention. Focusing on how actors' practices have 
emerged, spread and finally become established in their particular environments 
provides us with a good position for describing and analyzing how actors understand 
their social and physical space, their positions in society and how they evolve their 
own representations of boundaries. 
The study of the interfaces between state representatives and rural producers 
provides insight into the strategic ways in which actors deploy their discourses in 
development situations. It also throws light on the ways in which institutions and 
actors develop organisational practices within the policy implementation setting, 
shaping particular styles of intervention in local and institutional contexts. 
Nonetheless, we must remain aware that the interface between state representatives 
and rural producers is not an automatically given property of the conditions of 
intervention. It is an outcome of human (interaction and actors' skills in organising 
the particular situation. 
Actors, Social Processes and Contingencies 
The emerging framework of this book identifies social processes and not structures 
as the distinctive aspect of actors' social reality3'. It is this dimension that must be 
subject to detailed observation and theoretical interpretation. Social process analysis 
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may be defined as the study of actor's practices in constructing social life rather than 
of frozen actions in social structures. Social processes - and here we have been 
especially concerned with policy implementation - constitute the actors' context in 
which they reflect and develop concerns and strategies towards society. Through 
these processes actors enrol other actors into their networks and build projects of 
society. By following actors ethnographically we can describe and conceptualise their 
actions as culture interpreters and creators of new forms of legitimation for policy 
implementation. Rather than treating them as merely clients or interested observers 
of the processes of rural development, we consider them to be an integral part of 
these processes and the driving force in the organisation of contingency settings^. 
Hence, instead of regarding an actor-oriented perspective as being mutually 
exclusive of and contradictory to the understanding of critical social processes, such 
as state or market intervention, the book suggests that, while certain social 
constraints are important in defining the range of actor choices, it is knowledgeable 
and capable actors who shape social action and decision-making processes. 
The present study has opted for the description and interpretation of social 
experience as reflected in the field of rural development intervention. Processes of 
policy formulation and practices of government intervention, such as administrative 
reform and bureaucratic conflict, constitute part of the context of policy analysis, 
which we have to set out in order to contextualise actors' actions. Therefore, 
although such social processes propel actors to perform particular actions rather than 
others, these processes at the same time provide actors with a degree of freedom for 
action, that is 'room for manoeuvre' (Schaffer, 1984). They re-assemble, expand or 
contract existing practices and re-define their context, thus shaping the nature of the 
interfaces between state representatives and rural producers. 
Throughout the book, it has been argued that social action should provide the 
starting point for the study of contemporary state intervention in the rural sector. 
This line of analysis builds upon theoretical work aimed at reconciling social process 
and actor perspectives. The present analysis should also enhance our receptiveness 
to the organisational features of local variation in the implementation of agricultural 
policy. By giving due attention to diversity, the book argues that state intervention 
is a social space where actors must mediate between general administrative rules and 
what they see as possible courses of action. Throughout much of the study, our data 
have strongly supported the current view that agricultural policies are a social 
construction of situational contingencies, using the idea of contingency here to 
characterise a related course of actions that exists not just as discourse, but rather 
as a series of practical capabilities that are potentially able to shape and re-organise 
the world. 
The analysis criticises the use of a normative notion of social order, where state 
and civil society are presented as two clearly defined political domains. Drawing 
upon empirical evidence, we have argued forcefully for a greater recognition of 
social, cultural and political contingencies. And in recognising the significance of 
a series of contingent factors influencing the constitution of social processes and 
actors' actions, we are enunciating a different understanding of development 
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realities. That is, we challenge the coherence and structured order of economic and 
political realities as well as the existence of a single historical transformation 
process. 
A policy implementation situation is thus conceived of as a situational process, 
in which authority, knowledge and power are socially constructed. This view links 
the locality to the state while allowing the actors in their everyday practices to 
contest the distribution of power and question the authority of the state's 
representatives to intervene. 
The sets of contingencies surrounding social processes are by no means simply 
determined by the institutional context. The frontline worker can have a significant 
influence because s/he is responsible for policy implementation, and producers 
likewise may have an impact through their organised responses to intervention. This 
is important because processes other than state intervention are also occurring, 
independently and simultaneously. Furthermore, state regulations and operations are 
often undermined by the impossibility of implementing policies in a coherent and 
simple rational way. These contingencies are a twofold response to the 
discontinuities emanating from society and to the processes by which actors 
legitimate their actions (i.e. through the social construction of new values and new 
social interests). Nevertheless, we should not forget that most local change is the 
result of the secondary effects of state intervention and cannot be predicted by 
sociologists or controlled by planning experts. 
An Emerging New Agenda for Research 
This book has discussed numerous aspects of policy implementation which present 
obstacles to the application of state policy. We have challenged the notion that the 
state is the main or only institution contributing significantly to rural development 
outcomes, emphasising the importance of contradictions and negotiations between 
state agencies, and between state representatives and rural producers. A critical 
overview of recent work on rural development (see Chapter 1) indicated the need 
for a revised conceptual and empirical agenda in the analysis of rural development. 
The basis for such an agenda is to be found in two main directions that explore 
issues of interface and room for manoeuvre. Both raise important questions about 
social processes, actors' actions, discourses and power. 
The book has argued that knowledge confrontations affect the content of the 
social representation of projects (see Chapter 7), and how actors exercise power and 
transform or reinforce existing discourses. In fact knowledge is a property of agency 
which allows actors to construct socially the field of rural development. 
One important theoretical issue we explored concerned the centrality of studying 
the distribution of power and legitimation in local contexts. This led us to examine 
the relation between state authority and the distribution of power at local level from 
a perspective that we have called the 'social life of rural development'. We also 
discussed disputes over knowledge, suggesting that these in fact reflect struggles for 
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legitimacy as well as conflicting interests and visions of the aims of rural 
development. Then, in Chapter 6, we illustrated how power relations were 
transformed in action at the ejido level, and the ways in which the discourses and 
practices of rural actors serve to sustain and enhance front-line workers' discretion 
or room for manoeuvre. This, we suggested, can have practical implications for 
rural project designers and implementors. 
The book points, then, to the importance of negotiations and struggles over 
social interests and images in the processes of rural development. Within our general 
perspective we wish to propose that an analysis of power in rural development 
should be based upon the recognition of the following major points: 
1. Research on state intervention practices in rural development requires a close 
examination of the ways in which relevant authorities a) try to condition rural 
actors' responses and b) affect their existing practices and modes of discretion 
through policy discourses. 
2. Rural development situations are both shaped by, and shape, power relations. 
Given the fact that actors' everyday practices involve struggles against different 
forms of domination and subjection, it is important to study the polycentric local 
representations of power, and, at the same time, the ways in which actors' 
projects interlock in the construction of future social configurations of their 
society. 
3. Research on state intervention in rural development should encompass the 
generation of counter-discourses and people's resistance. These localised 
struggles should be traced back to a wide range of local and extra-local 
contingencies, constituted by social processes and discourses, such as political 
démocratisation, state intervention, gender and political repression, questions of 
local knowledge, intermediate technology, and the internalisation of agricultural 
commodities. This search for the 'genealogy' of local contingent formations 
constitutes one of the central themes of an interface approach. What is important 
here is to identify and describe actors' projects of society, those which actors' 
are continuously constructing through their everyday experiences. Here it is 
pertinent to show how actors are able to reject some interventions while 
accepting others; how they internalise and translate discourses at the level of the 
ordinary person, in order to negotiate the meaning of rural development in 
political terms. To what extent actors' are capable of improving upon their skills 
of negotiation is something that new studies will need to address. 
To sum up, a crucial objective of future research should be to reveal the actual 
composition of power that results from situations of state intervention and the degree 
to which, under circumstances of state policy implementation, actors acquire power 
to keep, ignore, subvert, resist or change the existing ensemble of social 
contingencies. 
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Finally, the book's emphasis on state intervention also implies a certain view 
about the role of the state in the process of rural development, which it is well to 
make explicit before concluding. We believe that state intervention has a limited but 
potentially positive part to play in contemporary rural change. By virtue of policy 
formulation, implementation and administrative practice, the state filters out some 
choices open to rural actors but not others. State agricultural policies, such as SAM, 
have served in developing contexts to re-organise the existing capabilities of what 
is possible in society. The SAM policy selected institutional environments and 
discourses for social transformation, while exerting a contested influence upon 
people's everyday lives. Under these conditions, the capacity of the state to 
determine and control the outcome of the changes it helps to initiate is quite limited. 
But in so far as rural policies can put in place measures that permit diversity and 
maintain the discretion of rural people, rather than forcing its 'good intentions' down 
upon them, state intervention may provide necessary, although not all the sufficient, 
conditions for rural development to take place. 
Notes 
1. In this respect it is interesting to mention recent innovative work in rural sociology that has tried 
to address the issue of diversity. We have in mind here the styles of farming research carried out 
by Jan Douwe van der Ploeg and his team in Wageningen, which takes us some way towards a 
proper recognition of how to deal with diversity. In this work, diversity shifts away from being 
viewed as a kaleidoscopic expression of life into the identification of morphological patterns, 
which are influenced by what Benvenuti (1975) calls TATE (Technical Administrative Task 
Environment), which interacts with groups of farmers. As promising as it may be, this 
perspective is often thwarted due to the tendency to leave out of the analysis significant social 
relationships within a particular cluster of a style of farming. In other words, ethnography is 
distilled out, in order to fit diversity into a more flexible, but nevertheless structural organisation 
of reality. See, for instance, Jan Douwe van der Ploeg (1990, 1993), who gives too much weight 
to the patterns of diversity and tends to lose sight of the self-organizing elements present in the 
culture that is embedded in local farmers' responses to external processes, as well as in the 
contradictions that construct and reconstruct state, market and technology. This position is highly 
problematic, in our view, since it simplifies the issue of how to deal theoretically with diversity. 
2. See also Arce, A. with M. Villareal and P. de Vries (forthcoming). 
3. It is not possible here to elaborate theoretically on what we mean by 'social processes'. 
Distancing ourselves from more conventional usages, we wish to characterize social processes as 
sets of procedures and social actions that emanate from actors' 'centres of representation' (for 
example the university, state, farmers' organization, or cooperative society) that aim to shape 
existing 'projects of society' through tuning them to new conceptions and values. The strategies 
used include the penetration of critical institutions and domains in order to reorganize the 
distribution of knowledge and power; and the enroling and translating of important existing 
actor-networks. We cannot here develop further this definition which would require detailed 
discussion of other usages in the literature. For a different but in some ways parallel 
conceptualisation of social processes, see Moore, S. (1975, 210-239). 
4. We use 'contingency' generally throughout the text to characterize situational but fragile 
ensembles that constitute what are conventionally called 'contexts of social action'. 
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